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The administration has declared climate change to be a threat to national security.  Thus 
far, the national security establishment has focused its attention on adaptation to the 
effects of climate change rather than mitigation of the human cause, though evidence of 
the need to reduce global CO2 emissions continues to mount.  This thesis asks whether 
the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) might be enlisted in the battle against climate 
change (global warming), by supporting the international monitoring, reporting, and 
verification (MRV) of a global greenhouse gas limitation treaty.  This covert monitoring 
is already contemplated by the CIA, though the question remains open, Congress has 
conducted no public discussion of whether using the IC’s unique covert sources and 
methods would in fact aid in climate change mitigation. This thesis compares various 
cases involving the IC’s monitoring of weapons nonproliferation—and in particular the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—with a hypothetical international CO2 emissions 
limitation agreement (ICELA) successor to the Kyoto Protocol.  Using these case study 
findings, an analysis of four policy options for structuring an IC CO2 emissions 
limitation monitoring entity (ICCME) is conducted.  By adopting the most promising of 
these options, Congress might ensure that the ICCME would support, rather than 
undermine, a future ICELA.   
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CER  Certified Emission Reduction units or “carbon credits.”   
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism   
COM  U.S. Ambassadorial Chief of Mission 
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CTBT  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty  
DNDO  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
DNI  Director of National Intelligence 
DPRK  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea  
GHG  Greenhouse gases  
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IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICCME Intelligence Community international CO2 emissions monitoring entity (a 
hypothetical agency contemplated by this thesis)  
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MEDE  Measurement of Earth Data of Environmental Analysis 
NCPC  National Counterproliferation Center 
NFIP  National Foreign Intelligence Program NFIP 
NIM  National Intelligence Manager 
NIO  National Intelligence Officer 
NPT  Non-Proliferation Treaty  
NSG  Nuclear Suppliers Group  
NTM National Technical Means (surveillance conducted with aircraft and 
satellites) 
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NWS  Nuclear Weapons State  
NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon State 
OSI  On Site Inspections 
PRC  Peoples Republic of China  
UNFCCC United National Framework Convention on Climate Change 




Adaptation: efforts to reduce the negative consequences of climate change.  
Anthropogenic CO2 emissions: generally production of CO2 emission the human 
combustion of fossil fuels as opposed to CO2, which is produced and absorbed (carbon 
sinks) through the earth’s natural “carbon cycle.”  Since pre-industrial times, 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions have increased the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere 
from approximately 280 parts per million (ppm) to 392 ppm currently.  The average 
yearly increase is of approximately 2 ppm.1 
Certified Emission Reduction units or “carbon credits”: A means of imposing a cost 
on carbon emissions, and allowing industries to purchase or sell the right to emit carbon 
dioxide  
Clean Development Mechanism: A Kyoto Protocol provision allowing for more 
developed countries to finance clean energy projects in less developed countries in 
exchange for Certified Emission Reduction (CER) units  
CNNC: China National Nuclear Corporation  
CO2 Scrubbers: technology employed to remove carbon dioxide generated through the 
burning of fossil fuels. 
Constraints: for the purposes of this discussion, the parameters of the atmospheric CO2 
transport model (e.g., time, space, location). 
Covert monitoring: monitoring done through the use of secret or covert  sources and 
methods 
Direct measurements: employing sensors to measure CO2 concentrations within a 
country or region (as opposed to “proxy measurements”).  See entry below. 
Fluxes: for the purpose of this discussion, the movement or flow of gases within the 
atmosphere. 
Greenhouse gas: a gas, like carbon dioxide, that contributes to global warming by 
reducing the amount of sunlight-generated heat reflected back into space. 
Greenhouse Gas Information System: a Department of Energy sponsored proposal fora 
greenhouse gas emissions monitoring regime develop jointly by 3 U.S. National 
Laboratories and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. This thesis assumes that the regime will 
be either internationally run, or internationally recognized as the monitoring authority by 
the CO2 emissions limitation agreement signatories.  Within this thesis the acronym 
“GHGIS” is used in reference to such an internationally run ICELA monitoring regime 
unless otherwise specified. 
In situ: for the purposes of this discussion, CO2 sensing which is conducted with 
technology located within the atmosphere as opposed to from satellites. 
                                                 
1 Dimotakis et al., GHGIS, 1-17. 
 xx 
Inventories: the CO2 emissions self-reported by individual countries. 
Mitigation: reducing the rate of climate change. 
Modeling or transport modeling: employing a variety of temporal and spatial 
parameters to calculate how gases move from one place in the atmosphere to another. 
Mission manager: for the purposes of this thesis, an IC position exercising a high degree 
of statutorily recognized executive authority over multiple federal agencies. 
Mole: for the purposes of the current discussion, a unit of measurement commonly used 
in chemistry to express the concentration of a gas within the atmosphere. 
Overt monitoring: treaty monitoring done openly (i.e., without the use of covert sources 
and methods). 
Proxy measurements: the evaluation of a country’s energy production and use in order 
to calculate the amount of CO2 these activities generate. 
Remote sensing: CO2 measurements conducted by satellite.  
Seuss effect: A characteristic of carbon that allows an experimenter to distinguish 
between CO2 created through the combustion of fossil fuels as opposed to that released 





The Prospects for a Future International Climate Change Mitigation Treaty 
For over a century, earth scientists have contemplated the likely climatic 
disruptions that would occur should humans continue to increase the relative proportion 
of atmospheric carbon dioxide through their burning of fossil fuels.  Mankind has already 
increased the amount of carbon dioxide, the most potent greenhouse gas, to levels beyond 
what the earth has experienced for at least 800-thousand—and likely—more than 15 
million years. The earth’s oceans and atmosphere have departed from a state of chemical 
equilibrium established approximately 11-thousand years ago.  There is ample evidence 
in the form of historically unprecedented planetary events, including the seasonal 
disappearance of millions of square miles of arctic sea ice, and frequent record breaking 
weather events, that we have entered an age of environmental uncertainty precisely when 
globalization has irreversibly altered human social dynamics.       
This confluence of uncertainty and its attendant societal dislocations will worsen 
unless humans are able to stabilize the climate.  Damage to the atmosphere is cumulative 
and pervasive, and climate change mitigation can only be accomplished through 
concerted international effort.  The result of a multiyear international discussion under 
the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the 1997 Kyoto Protocol represented the most important international effort 
to mitigate climate change to date.  Economic fears, along with a disinformation 
campaign funded by industries reliant on fossil fuel combustion, resulted in widespread 
public misunderstanding about the expert consensus behind of the growing body of 
climate science, and in the U.S. failure to ratify the Kyoto treaty.   
The scientific and observable evidence of climate change and its perils continues 
to mount.  At some future moment, it seems probable that the U.S. will once again 
engage in some international effort to reduce the ongoing human caused accumulation of 
atmospheric CO2.  For lack of other practical alternatives, the U.S. is likely to pursue an 
approach similar to the Kyoto Protocol.  Signatory commitments to Kyoto were not 
 xxii 
accompanied by any formal monitoring regime, and this lack of a verification 
mechanism—along with other shortcomings—is often blamed for Kyoto’s limited 
achievements.  It is likely that the design of any future international CO2 emissions 
limitation agreement (ICELA) will include a monitoring mechanism.   
The Intelligence Community and Treaty Monitoring 
Most science based U.S. governmental institutions, including those that comprise 
and inform the national security establishment, recognize the unprecedented threat that 
CO2 emissions pose to the nation.  The potential economic ramifications of reducing 
national CO2 emissions include the alteration of existing geopolitical relations.  The CIA 
has already opened—and subsequently, in the face of persistent conservative 
Congressional criticism, closed—a Climate Change Center.  Among the stated objectives 
of this center was the verification of future international climate change agreements.   
Should the U.S. instigate or participate in a new Kyoto-type initiative, it is 
reasonable to assume that the Intelligence Community (IC) will be tasked with using its 
covert sources to identify treaty violations.  This would present the IC with a unique 
opportunity to make an unprecedented contribution to the welfare of the nation and to the 
entire planet.  Poorly managed, however, the IC’s monitoring activities could undermine 
the international trust on which any such effort will depend. 
The Question Posed and the Research Framework Used to Answer It 
 (Chapter I) 
This thesis asks whether the benefits of IC engagement in the treaty monitoring 
mission justify the endangerment of the success of the treaty itself.  To answer this 
question, the thesis first seeks to determine what IC monitoring might contribute to the 
overall monitoring task by supplementing overt international monitoring efforts, and how 
the IC effort would best be structured. 
Because this hypothetical IC mission is unprecedented, the IC’s long experience 
monitoring international weapons limitation agreements is used as a surrogate.  The 
thesis research is built on two methodologies.  First, case studies of the IC’s monitoring 
of international weapons limitation agreements, principally the Nonproliferation Treaty 
 xxiii 
(NPT), are used to derive a set of objectives for a hypothetical Intelligence Community 
international CO2 emissions monitoring entity (ICCME).  Second, these objectives are 
used to determine which of four IC organizational structures would best ensure the 
ICCME’s success:   
1. Allowing the IC to select its own approach,  
2. empowering an executive with authority over IC resources to accomplish 
the monitoring mission,  
3. creating a dedicated entity or agency within the IC, or  
4. a hybrid solution combining options 2 and 3.   
Finally, the entirety of the research is considered in order to evaluate whether 
such covert monitoring is justified given the need for international trust and cooperation 
in achieving significant climate change mitigation. 
Building a New Intelligence Community Agency (Literature Review)  
A review of the literature concerning the design of a new bureaucracy forms the 
foundation of the research for this thesis.  Although the relevant literature infrequently 
addresses the design of a new bureaucracy directly, there is agreement in that the 
behavior of governmental agencies is generally dictated by three actors: the bureaucracy 
and its own institutional preferences, the legislature that enabled the bureaucracy, and the 
interest groups with which the bureaucracy is most associated and engaged.  Though 
existing theories regarding bureaucracies weight the influence of these three factors 
differently, theoreticians concur in that all three must be taken into consideration when 
analyzing bureaucratic operations.  They likewise agree that, in empowering a 
bureaucracy, the legislature must make calculations about structuring the governance of 
the bureaucracy so that the bureaucratic behaviors the legislature intends to achieve 
persist beyond the terms of the legislators themselves.   With this in mind, the 
legislature’s calculations focus particularly on the anticipated stability of the current 
political environment.   
With the notable exception of Amy Zegart’s scholarship, little of the relevant 
bureaucratic literature considers the Intelligence Community per se.  One of Zegart’s 
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contributions to the discussion is her observation that, due to the secrecy surrounding its 
behavior, the IC can operate with a high degree of autonomy.  Similarly, since 
intelligence activities are usually outside the realm of routine domestic politics, the 
primary focus of legislatures in all countries, legislators can generally not afford to 
expend their time and political capital in attempts to direct the IC’s behavior.  Since 
carbon dioxide is not a typical IC adversary—and the ICCME mission is alien to any in 
which the IC is usually engaged—there will likely be a need to overcome institutional 
agency barriers in order to achieve the monitoring objective.  Ensuring the ICCME 
remains “on task” and that its mission is not subverted by a preoccupation with historic 
U.S. adversaries, or too easily influenced by the short-term agenda of any single 
presidential administration, will be an important consideration for the monitoring entity’s 
designers. This consideration is equally as important and for the policy recommendations 
presented in this thesis. 
The Monitoring Value Added by the IC (Chapter II) 
A determination of what the IC could in fact contribute to the monitoring 
objective depends primarily on identifying the impediments to overt monitoring.  The 
overt monitoring challenge has been subject to studies conducted on behalf of the White 
House and the Department of Energy.  In 2011, the JASONs, a group of our 30 of the 
U.S.’s most accomplished scientists, published a paper entitled, “Methods for Remote 
Determination of CO2 Emissions” for the White House’s Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP).  The following year, four three of the U.S. National 
Laboratories and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory published a collaborative plan for the 
development of a Greenhouse Gas Information System (GHGIS) commissioned by the 
Department of Energy.   This thesis has drawn extensively from these two works, both of 
which also address that period in the future when resistance to mitigation efforts will 
have ceded enough to allow for a new international effort in the form of an international 
CO2 emissions limitation agreement.  Both reports highlight the considerable time and 
uncertainty involved in arriving at firm conclusions about treaty signatory behavior.  A 
reading of these studies suggests that covert monitoring could help to identify regimes 
that did not intend to respect treaty provisions, and thereby help focus the attention and 
 xxv 
resources of an international monitoring regime which in turn could build a stronger and 
timelier case against any treaty violator.   
Learning from Weapons Nonproliferation Monitoring (Chapter III) 
Though there is no precedent for IC monitoring of a future ICELA, intelligence 
resources have been used in the past to monitor international weapons nonproliferation 
agreements—most notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear 
Weapons, more commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered 
into force in 1970.  This thesis draws on that history in order to ICCME design 
objectives.  Before that historical examination, however, the nonproliferation 
treaty/climate change mitigation agreement analogy and, more specifically, the 
NPT/Kyoto analogy, are evaluated.  Comparing the two situations suggests two highly 
relevant considerations. The first is that both the nonproliferation and climate mitigation 
issues and their respective international agreements have in the past, and will continue in 
the future, to divide nations into two opposing camps—those that have nuclear weapons 
or that have long profited from industrialization on the one side and those who do not 
have nuclear weapons or are only beginning to enjoy the benefit of industrialization on 
the other.  This first consideration means that an international agreement on either the 
nonproliferation or climate change mitigation issue will be contested by agreement 
opponents and remain unstable.  In the case of a future CO 2 emissions limitation 
agreement, this instability will only be exacerbated by any perceived unilateral U.S. 
initiative to police the agreement.  The second and equally important consideration is 
derived by contrasting the options available for enforcing the NPT with those that might 
be used to encourage signatory compliance with the Kyoto Protocol or a future ICELA.  
Those countries with nuclear weapons, or with greater military resources, can compel 
treaty violators to adhere to treaty provisions.  In joining together in a nonproliferation 
treaty, countries legitimize the future use of force against any signatory that violates the 
agreement.  This legitimation does not imply that non-compliance with the NPT might 
serve as a “trigger” for military action by one or more of the other NPT signatories 
against the treaty violator.  Rather the NPT is an adjunct to a pre-existing power dynamic.  
The treaty may foster greater signatory support or acquiescence of a military “option” 
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against the violator.  Countries may independently elect to employ military force against 
a perceived nuclear threat.  There is currently no similar conceivable military option 
against a country on the basis of their CO2 emissions. In the case of an ICELA, treaty 
compliance is strictly voluntary.  Covert weapons nonproliferation may be seen as 
partisan by other countries, but intelligence collected through the use of covert sources 
and methods may nevertheless be used by one country to compel adherence to treaty 
provisions.  In the case of an ICELA, if findings arrived at through covert means are 
perceived as biased, they are more likely to create sympathy for the target country of that 
covert monitoring, and allow an identified treaty violator to re-direct attention and 
criticism at the U.S. 
An as yet unfulfilled objective of the NPT is the voluntary disarmament of those 
countries that already possess nuclear weapons.   In comparing the NPT with a future 
international CO2 emissions limitation agreement, the NPT’s as yet unsatisfied 
disarmament “pillar” should serve as a reminder of the importance and difficulty of 
maintaining signatory trust in any important international negotiation aimed at altering 
the behavior of nations. 
The Equity Imperative: The ICCME under the Public Spotlight (Chapter 
 IV) 
Whether or not a country is ruled through democratic elections or not, public 
perception plays an essential role in determining the limits within which the country’s 
leadership can maneuver.  Significant climate change mitigation will require considerable 
public buy in.  Absent a perception of treaty equity, there will be no treaty.  Studies 
regarding equity suggest how even under the best of circumstances, individuals and 
societies often prioritize equity over outcomes more likely to further their material well-
being. The U.S.’s own failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates how readily any 
perception of inequity can be used to undermine support for the treaty among Americans. 
This preoccupation with equity is a human, not a national trait.  The IC can support 
monitoring through increased information, but only if this support can be offered in a 
way that treaty opponents cannot easily use to excite public suspicions about “fairness.”     
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The Pivotal Role of China (Chapter V) 
Maintaining a perception of unbiased treaty administration is especially critical 
when engaging China in climate change mitigation.  In regard to climate change, the size 
of its population and amount of CO2 emissions produced by its population alone earn 
China special attention within this thesis. The results of the research, however, 
demonstrate that—just as in considering weapons nonproliferation goals—China’s 
influence over global climate change mitigation efforts is even more outsized than the 
country’s dimensions alone would predict.  In the past, the Chinese have portrayed the 
issue of nonproliferation in a way that undermines U.S. objectives, much in the way they 
have framed the western countries’ approach to climate change mitigation as unfair to 
developing countries.  The Chinese will reject any U.S. accusation of ICELA 
noncompliance that does not carry the endorsement of the international community.  Just 
as in the case of nonproliferation, however, Chinese support for climate change 
mitigation is likely to appear duplicitous when, in fact, it may merely be ambiguous. The 
Chinese central government exercises imperfect control over its country.  If the ICCME 
can focus attention on Chinese treaty violators without exciting Chinese nationalist 
sentiment, it may improve the ability of Chinese mitigation supporters to prevail over 
their domestic opponents.  
The Challenge of Integrating Covert and Overt Monitoring Efforts (Chapter 
 VI) 
Should the ICCME discover an ICELA violator, whether it be China or another 
country, that finding will need to be communicated to the international treaty monitoring 
regime (hitherto referred to within as the Greenhouse Gas Information System (GHGIS).  
The IC’s engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as an 
example of this type of intelligence sharing.  Unfortunately, this model also demonstrates 
how easily the ICs behavior can undermine the legitimacy of the international monitoring 
regime.  Impelled by the Bush administration’s effort to establish a case for the existence 
of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the IC demonstrated little regard for the 
viability of those international institutions empowered to police the NPT.  The damage 
inflicted on the IAEA’s legitimacy echoes in current Iranian criticisms of the agency.   
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There is nothing remarkable about the administration’s or the IC’s disregard for 
the long-term goals of the NPT.  The research for this thesis suggests an underlying 
pattern whereby administrations routinely exchange NPT objectives in pursuit of a short-
term agenda.  Absent close legislative attention, this pattern is sure to re-emerge in the 
case of future covert U.S. monitoring of the ICELA unless the ICCME is subject to close 
legislative scrutiny.   
For its part, the GHGIS will remain sensitive to treaty signatory concerns 
regarding biased or unfair treaty administration.  Over time, the GHGIS will only 
continue to heed ICCME findings if they are borne out through the GHGIS’s own 
analysis.  
The history of IC monitoring of international nonproliferation efforts has been 
marked by a progression of Congressional initiatives to uncover information about 
suspected NPT violators withheld by the IC and different presidential administrations.  
The IC can be held to account for its mission objectives and the conclusions of its 
analysis without compromising its sources and methods.  Significant to the 
recommendations ultimately presented within this thesis, Congress has obliged the IC to 
issue routine reports on its nonproliferation findings.  The adoption of a similar oversight 
mechanism would help ensure the ICCME achieves its monitoring objective in a means 
consistent with treaty success.  
Effective Monitoring without Undermining the Treaty: Achieving 
 Transparency (Chapter VII) 
The U.S. Intelligence Community is a creation of the National Security Act of 
1947.  Until the early 1970s, the Watergate break-in, the establishment of the Church 
Committee, and its revelations of decades of intelligence agency misconduct, the IC 
functioned with little Congressional oversight.   
The events of 9/11 demonstrated the need for effective intelligence operations, but 
the underlying political and institutional dynamics that resulted in previous intelligence 
abuses are perennial and not exclusive to intelligence agencies in the U.S.  After 
intelligence agencies in the U.S., those in Britain have been most subject to scholarly 
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attention.  A comparison of the two systems reveals that intelligence abuses are a feature, 
rather than an aberrancy of intelligence agencies.  Effective intelligence requires a 
systematic legislative approach to intelligence oversight, particularly when intelligence 
mission effectiveness relies on ongoing public support.   
Ultimately, the ICCME will fail to further the ICELA—and U.S. interests—
unless it can provide the GHGIS with analytical support without undermining 
international trust in the treaty regime.  By structuring the ICCME so as to expose the 
new agency to routine Congressional accountability in open session, Congress would 
reassure American citizens and international treaty signatories that the ICCME was in 
fact performing its duty without bias.   
ICCME Design Objectives (Chapter VIII) 
The ICCME will need to accomplish its monitoring goals while competing for 
resources with other IC agencies whose own human-adversary driven agendas will 
receive higher visibility within the Executive Branch.  In discussing the challenges of 
these broad goals (e.g., protecting the integrity of the monitoring mission in the face of 
competing IC priorities), this thesis breaks them into a set of more discrete objectives 
(e.g., identify violators quickly and reliably) in order to consider how each might be best 
accomplished in structuring the ICELA within the wider IC.   
Structural Options (Chapter IX) 
Among an infinite assortment of possible organizational structures from which to 
form any new IC entity, three basic options are available: the IC can be allowed to select 
its own approach, a dedicated entity (herein referred to as a “center”) can be empowered 
by statute, or an executive with authority over IC resources can be assigned.  In fact, 
many variations on these basic structures have been employed in the furtherance of 
national security objectives.  To these three, this thesis proposes a fourth that combines 
attributes of the second and third options.  A policy analysis is then conducted in which 
each of the four described options is subjected to an evaluation based on the previously 
case-study-derived ICCME objectives.  Finally, based on this analysis, a policy 
recommendation is advanced.  
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Findings (Chapter X) 
The International Community would be unwise to reject U.S. covert support, 
given that U.S. technological and intelligence resources could significantly augment the 
capacity of the international monitoring regime.  Nonetheless, to enjoy international 
legitimacy, that support would have to be offered under conditions amenable to both the 
U.S. and a representative majority of other treaty signatories.  IC monitoring support 
would have to be predicated on a transparent relationship between the IC entity entrusted 
with the covert monitoring task and the overt international treaty monitoring regime. 
Establishing and maintaining a perception that the ICCME’s engagement with the 
ICELA is indeed consistent with the signatories’ common interests will only be 
accomplished by exposing the U.S.’s covert monitoring regime to a high degree of public 
scrutiny.  This apparent paradox need not deter Congress.  IC operations are frequently 
investigated by Congress in a manner that ensures public accountability and that protects 
sources and methods.  By creating a rigorous and publicly visible Congressional 
oversight regime that narrowly focuses on the IC’s international CO2 emissions 
limitation treaty function, Congress can shape an IC entity that will bear domestic and 
international scrutiny. In addition, it can be able to offer crucial support to international 
climate change mitigation efforts.  Should the IC’s monitoring regime be sheltered from 
public accountability, it will invite suspicions and remain heedless of the corrosive 
effects these suspicions will have on international treaty cohesion.    
Should the U.S. choose to employ its intelligence resources to support overt 
monitoring of a future ICELA, Congress should statutorily empower an executive 
position within the IC with Cabinet level authority to marshal IC resources to engage in 
the monitoring function.  Such a position would entail a high degree of public visibility 
and concomitant accountability.   
Ultimately, however, such a statutorily established executive position, regardless 
of the authority wielded by the particular office holder, would run headlong into the 
resistance of other intelligence “players” with whom he or she would compete for 
resources.  Unless this highly placed executive commanded a core group of dedicated 
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intelligence professionals whose loyalty to the extraordinary climate change mission was 
not divided among other intelligence objectives, the mission would suffer from a lack of 
institutional continuity and determination.   
A “hybrid” agency—combining the institutional resources of a “center” well 
integrated in the larger IC, with the authority of high ranking executive leadership—will 
offer the country and the world the best hope for a constructive IC contribution to the 
global objective of climate change mitigation. 
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I. CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: CAN THE 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HELP 
[The President’s] own EPA director a couple of years ago testified before 
the House that the United States by itself is not going to accomplish the 
global warming problem. It's going to have to be done on a worldwide 
basis. And so we ought to be working on an international treaty as 
opposed to individual legislation for the United States.  
U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley R-Iowa, interviewed on National Public 
Radio following President Barak Obama’s Second Inaugural Address2  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What does the Intelligence Community’s past participation in monitoring 
international non-proliferation efforts suggest about how its resources might be optimally 
organized and employed to support the monitoring of future international CO2 emissions 
limitation agreements?3  Does the IC’s experience with weapons nonproliferation 
monitoring suggest that the benefits of employing Intelligence Community resources to 
supplement future climate change agreements monitoring justify the potential costs in 
global support for such a treaty? 
B. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the last two decades, the world has witnessed the most significant planetary 
changes since the dawn of civilization.  Among the most stunning is the diminution of the 
Arctic ice sheets.  Within a few brief years, the once mythic Northwest Passage has 
become an imminent reality.  Speaking at the Active in the Arctic seminar on June 16, 
2011, Admiral Gary Roughhead, then U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, stated: 
In my mind, there is a phenomenal event taking place on the planet today, and 
that is what I call the opening of the Fifth Ocean; that’s the Arctic Ocean. We haven’t had 
                                                 
2 David Welna, “Republican, Democratic Lawmakers Weigh in on Obama's Speech NPR,” January 
22, 2013, National Public Radio, accessed February 26, 2012, 
http://www.npr.org/2013/01/22/169950208/republican-democratic-lawmakers-weigh-in-on-obamas-speech. 
3 In order to focus the research and discussion of international global cooperative efforts designed to 
reduce climate “forcing” (i.e., human caused global warming), the discussion herein will generally be 
limited to international treaty efforts to limit CO2 emissions.  Though anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
represent approximately 80 percent of human contributions to climate change eventual agreements will 
include other human generated greenhouse gases.   
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an ocean open on this planet since the end of the Ice Age. So if this is not a significant 
change that requires new, and I would submit, brave thinking on the topic, I don’t know 
what other sort of physical event could produce that.4   
Unprecedented as they may be, however, these changes do not evoke the same 
visceral reaction as the mayhem perpetrated on thousands of fellow American citizens on 
9/11.  Satellite images of ice disappearing on a continental scale have little power to 
overcome political inertia when that thaw is occurring thousands of miles from U.S. 
population centers.  Wishing that this global event might prove a benign natural 
phenomenon is understandable.  However, given the preponderance of scientific expertise 
that promises ongoing changes, assuming there is nothing to fear is—at best—
irresponsible.  Fortunately, along with most important scientific institutions, the U.S. 
national security establishment has begun to consider the implications of climate change 
and to plan for contingencies.5  
By declaring climate change a matter of national security, the U.S. government 
has acknowledged the phenomenon’s transnational scope, and moved the issue from one 
                                                 
4 Gary Roughhead, “Active in the Arctic Seminar” (presented at Active in the Artic Seminar, 
Washington, D.C., June 16, 2011), Navy, accessed March 24, 2012, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Speech/110616%20Arctic%20Capitol%20Hill.pdf. 
Tom Tryon, “Confronting the ‘Fifth Ocean’” The Herald-Tribune, July 10, 2011, Herald Tribune, accessed 
March 23, 2012, http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20110710/COLUMNIST/110709602.  
5 Peter Backlund, Anthony Janetos, and David Schimel, The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, 
Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the United States, U.S. Climate Change Science 
Program, Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Climate Change Science 
Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, 2008); Department of Defense [DoD], 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010), 87; Dimotakis et 
al., GHGIS; Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], “Emissions Climate Change,” Environmental 
Protection Agency, accessed December 18, 2011, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/index.html; 
Michael McElroy and D. James Baker, Climate Extremes: Recent Trends with Implications for National 
Security, 2012, Harvard University, accessed February 14, 2013, 
http://environment.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/climate_extremes_report_2012-12-04.pdf (study funded 
by the Central Intelligence Agency); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], “Climate 
Program Office,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, accessed December 16, 2011, 
http://climate.noaa.gov/index.jsp?pg=/education/edu_index.jsp&edu=literacy; National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration [NASA], “Climate Change: How Do We Know?” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, accessed December 16, 2011, http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence; Charles Perry and Bobby 
Andersen, Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International 
Collaboration (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2012), Institute for Foreign Policy 
Analysis, accessed March 24, 2012, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf; United 
States Global Research Program [USGRP], The U.S. Climate Change Science Program: Vision for the 
Program and Highlights of the Scientific Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: United States Global Research 
Program, 2003).  
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of concern to traditionally environmentally oriented national institutions, to one that 
should be addressed ecumenically by all government institutions with the ability to 
contribute to countering this threat. As the national security establishment focuses greater 
human resources on confronting exigencies associated with climate change, the nation 
will be forced to contemplate possible extreme climate scenarios.  Once convinced of the 
reality of the climate change threat, U.S. citizens will accept the sacrifices required to 
confront it. The prevention of disaster will ever remain preferable to even the most adroit 
response, and Americans need to understand the choice they face.  Nonetheless, those 
charged with the security of the U.S.—homeland the ones who should most appreciate 
the potential long-term human costs of such unabated climate change—have 
demonstrated little initiative in championing efforts to stabilize the climate.     
Regardless of the climate change consensus evidenced in publications and 
pronouncements emanating from military and civilian institutions within the federal 
government, there are currently considerable political restraints on the federal 
government’s ability to adopt more aggressive climate change initiatives.  These 
impediments are self-perpetuating.  The magnitude of the changes in current human 
activities needed to halt the progression of climate change is so great—and the forces 
arrayed against taking action so boisterous—as to discourage even those most convinced 
of the need for urgent action from taking it.  Absent a more resolute governmental 
acknowledgement of the need for reducing carbon emissions, it seems likely public 
attention to the issue will fluctuate. Regardless, the prospect is for public opinion—and 
thus climate change politics—to respond to increasingly perceptible or perceived changes 
in the world’s climate.6  By “securitizing” the climate, the federal government may 
influence public opinion regarding climate change and thus expand its room to 
maneuver.7   
                                                 
6 Christopher Borick and Barry Rabe, “Fall 2011 National Survey of American Public Opinion on 
Climate Change,” Issues in Governance Studies, no. 45 (2012, February): 7, Brookings Institute, accessed 
March 24, 2012, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/02_climate_change_rabe_borick/02_climate_chan
ge_rabe_borick.pdf.   
7 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 23–25.   
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In nations based on pluralism and the consent of the governed, the state’s very 
legitimacy is contingent on the safety of its citizens.  Philip Bobbitt asserts that the world 
is experiencing a transition from a nation state to a market state from which ills such as 
contemporary terrorism have emerged.8  In his book, Terror and Consent, he notes:  
…because market states of consent assert that pluralism grounded in 
human rights distinguishes them from other forms of the market state, 
protecting civilians from the risks of catastrophes that threaten such 
pluralism is a proper defense aim of those states.9   
Given the tools at its disposal, it is fair to ask whether the national security 
establishment can go beyond simply managing some of the effects of climate change and 
actually attempt to help stabilize the climate. There is no definitive means of answering 
this question, but the stakes are too high to forgo an exploration of the possibilities. The 
nation’s multi-billion-dollar-a-year investment in national security should not remain 
sidelined in the battle against what may soon be accepted as the greatest long-term 
national threat short of nuclear winter.  If, as suggested by Senator Grassley, effective 
mitigation depends on concerted international effort, then the national security 
establishment should consider means of supporting any such global initiative.10 
The U.S. has participated in past international negotiations to collectively reduce 
the amount of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHG) released into the 
atmosphere through human activities.  Though the U.S. refrained from joining in the most 
important of the subsequent agreements, the Kyoto Protocol, there is wide and growing 
acknowledgement among U.S. scientific and governmental institutions that increasing 
CO2 emissions continue to pose significant risk to U.S. security.  During his second 
inaugural address, President Obama declared the need for the U.S. to lead on climate 
change mitigation.11  As cited at the beginning of this thesis, Republican U.S. Senator 
Charles Grassley responded by reminding the President that the U.S. could not solve the 
                                                 
8 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2009), 44. 
9 Bobbitt, Terror and Consent, 215. 
10 Welna, “Republican, Democratic Lawmakers.” 




climate change problem alone and that an international effort was required.12  Judging 
from the comments of both these U.S. leaders, as well as international scientific 
consensus regarding climate change, there is every reason to believe that the global 
concerns that prompted U.S. engagement in previous international climate negotiations 
will foster new efforts in the future.13  
The adoption and success of international climate change agreements may hinge 
on the world’s faith that they can be reliably monitored.  Monitoring international CO2 
agreements will be an undertaking in which many international and national entities are 
likely to participate.  Nevertheless, opponents of climate change will question the degree 
to which treaties can be verified in those countries unlikely to allow on site monitoring of 
their industry.  Because carbon based energy sources are projected to remain the most 
economical during the initial period of transition to cleaner energy sources, any country 
that fails to adhere to an equitable international CO2 limitation agreement will enjoy a 
proportionally higher GDP, part or all of which it may invest in greater military 
capacity.14  Thus, the security stakes among potential military rivals will remain high, 
and reservations concerning the integrity of all treaty participants’ commitment to their 
treaty obligations cannot be dismissed.  It is likely there will be a desire within the U.S. to 
independently verify treaty compliance, particularly among the nation’s geopolitical 
competitors.    
Ultimately, the task of monitoring international agreements on climate change 
includes evaluating three interrelated variables: the terms of the agreement, the 
measurement tolerances permitted within those terms, and the effort exerted by each 
signatory to remain within them.  It is worth considering whether understanding and 
overcoming the technological and political challenges of monitoring CO2 agreements 
                                                 
12 Welna, “Republican, Democratic Lawmakers.” 
13 Council on Foreign Relations, “The Global Climate Change Regime,” last modified February 2013, 
Council on Foreign Relations, accessed February 23, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/global-
climate-change-regime/p21831; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 
“Essential Background,” 2013, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed 
February 23, 2013, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php. 
14 Kevin Bullis, “The Cost of Cutting Carbon,” Technology Review (2009, January/February), 
Technology Review, accessed April 19, 2012, http://www.technologyreview.com/energy/21835/.  
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might be facilitated by the participation of the U.S. Intelligence Community.15  As yet, 
however, there has been no published discussion of how the  Intelligence Community 
might be organized in order to assume this mission, nor whether it could in fact be 
organized so as to further rather than undermine the goal of climate change mitigation.  
This thesis is an effort to fill that void. 
C. METHOD 
1. Method Overview 
Two methodologies, case study and policy analysis, undergird this thesis.  Two 
steps are involved in designing a new IC entity. First, a set of objectives for the entity 
must be established.  The thesis employs case studies to derive these ICCME design 
objectives. Second, resources within the IC must be organized so as to best achieve the 
previously derived objectives. After proposing a set of four IC organizational models 
with which to achieve these objectives, policy analysis is used to select the most 
promising among them.  
Because the U.S. is not a party to any international CO2 emissions limitation 
agreement, the IC has not yet been tasked with its monitoring.  The IC has, however, 
been engaged in monitoring various international weapons nonproliferation agreements.  
Primary source documentation regarding these various IC monitoring efforts is classified.  
Nevertheless, several high profile cases have generated ample secondary source material 
in the form of scholarly works and media accounts.  Because much of this secondary 
source material must rely on inference and analysis, whenever possible multiple sources 
and similar cases were considered in deriving relevant ICCME design objectives. 
An important distinction between nonproliferation agreements and a future 
ICELA involves, as is subsequently explored in greater detail, the more narrow scope of 
enforcement options available in any treaty regarding climate change mitigation.  
Weapons nonproliferation treaties are negotiated in order to avoid armed conflict.  While 
                                                 
15 Council on Foreign Relations, “The Global Climate Change Regime;” JASON, Methods for Remote 
Determination, 107; Joseph Romm, “Barrasso Seeks to Block Intelligence on Climate Change Threat,” 
October 5, 2009, Grist, accessed January 2, 2012, http://www.grist.org/article/barrasso-seeks-to-block-
intelligence-on-climate-change-threat.    
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they may reduce the likelihood of military action, they do not preclude it.  Military action 
cannot be brought against a climate treaty violator.  To a far greater extent than in the 
case of nonproliferation, the objectives of a future ICELA must be achieved through 
international cooperation. Though the U.S. is not party to the Kyoto Protocol—the most 
notable current international greenhouse gas limitation agreement to date—the U.S. 
played a key role in the negotiations of the agreement and the history of this negotiation 
provides an important case from which additional relevant ICCME objectives are mined. 
Among an infinite assortment of organizational structures on which to form any 
new IC entity, three basic options are available.  1) The IC can be allowed to select its 
own approach; 2) a dedicated entity (herein referred to as a “center”) can be empowered 
by statute; or 3) an executive with authority over IC resources can be assigned.  In fact, 
within the IC many variations on these basic structures have been employed in the 
furtherance of national security objectives.  To these three, this thesis proposes a fourth 
that combines attributes of the second and third options.  A policy analysis is then 
conducted in which each of the four described options is subjected to an evaluation based 
on the previously case study derived ICCME objectives.  Finally, based on this analysis, 
a policy recommendation is advanced.   
2. The Research 
a. Bureaucratic Design  
The focus of this thesis is the establishment of a new IC entity to 
accomplish a task within a specific political and institutional environment.  Therefore, the 
foundational research is a review of the literature regarding bureaucratic design.  The 
preponderance of the published literature focuses on bureaucracies outside the national 
security establishment. An important exception is the scholarship of Amy Zegart, which 
draws on the wider body of bureaucratic theory to focus on intelligence and other 
national security agencies.  These sources provide a conceptual bureaucratic model and 
highlight the Congressional oversight “fire alarm mechanism,” which ultimately serves as 




b. The Design Constraints  
Bureaucracies can never be built entirely from scratch.  They are creatures 
of circumstance, and those circumstances define the bureaucracy’s structural and 
operational constraints.  This thesis addresses the creation of a bureaucratic entity (the 
ICCME) under circumstances that have not yet manifest and, indeed, may never.  The 
consequences of the accelerating accumulation of anthropogenic CO2 within the 
atmosphere will, however, eventually result in future human attempts to slow or halt the 
damage.  Effective action will require concerted human effort and judging from 
precedent—the Kyoto Protocol negotiated in 1987—it is very possible that this 
collaborative effort will result in a future international CO2 emissions limitation 
agreement (ICELA).  The evidence, in the form of the CIA’s establishment of its Climate 
Change Center in 2009, also indicates that any such agreement would elicit a covert U.S. 
effort to monitor international compliance to the ICELA.   
Two distinct U.S. objectives, then, present themselves.  The first is to 
promote the mitigation of climate change through the vehicle of the ICELA.  The second 
is to employ the IC in order to monitor the compliance of other countries to the 
provisions of the agreement.  Because the U.S. cannot compel other nations to reduce 
their CO2 emissions, U.S. promotion of the ICELA would have to be achieved by 
encouraging international cooperation.  However, covert monitoring is the antithesis of 
cooperation and indeed has the potential to undermine the mutual trust on which the 
ICELA must be established.  In order to design an intelligence entity that can achieve the 
second objective, covert treaty monitoring, without undermining the primary objective, 
treaty success, the researcher must identify both the monitoring objectives and the 
political constraints within which they must be accomplished.   
c. Defining the ICCME’s Practical and Political Objectives  
This thesis considers both the potential and limitations for overt treaty 
monitoring through a review of two recently published documents. One is funded by the 
Department of Defense and the other by the Department of Energy, and hereafter they are 
referred to, respectively, as JASON and GHGIS, which consider the technology that 
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might be applied to the overt monitoring problem.16  The author consulted frequently 
with Karl Jonietz, a lead author of GHGIS, to ensure that the wider ICCME discussion 
remained faithful to the national knowledge base regarding the technological aspects of 
CO2 emissions measurement and modeling.  The limitations of these overt technological 
options were subsequently used to identify practical objectives for the ICCME. 
The remainder of the research explores the most important political 
actors—both within and without the U.S.—as well as the international treaty monitoring 
regime, and the political imperatives to maintaining mutual international trust in the 
treaty.  In order to gain insight into the political constraints within which the ICCME 
must operate, an effort was made to seek out analogous international treaty regimes and 
circumstances.  There is ample scholarly literature regarding the long history of U.S. IC 
support for international weapons limitation treaties generally and the Nonproliferation 
Treaty in particular.  From this literature and contemporary and current governmental 
publications as well as media accounts, the researcher extracted and analyzed U.S. IC 
weapons limitation experiences from which to derive a set of political objectives for the 
ICCME.  Because of the importance of China in past U.S. weapons limitation efforts, as 
well as to current prospects for climate mitigation, it is significant that the author 
benefited from the insight and suggestions of Wendy Frieman, a notable expert on China 
and nonproliferation.   
d. Determining Options and Selecting Between Them  
Once these two sets of ICCME objectives had been established (i.e., the 
first based on supplementing overt technological methods with covert IC resources and 
the second based on consideration of historical and current discussions of both IC support 
for international weapons limitation agreements and international climate change 
mitigation initiatives generally) four different organizational options were considered for 
the ICCME.  The first three of these options are archetypes of existing IC entities.  
Ultimately, the counterbalancing strengths and weaknesses of the second and third 
options suggested the forth option, a hybrid of the previous two.  In turn, each of these 
options was analyzed against the previously identified desirable ICCME objectives.  
                                                 
16 JASON, Methods for Remote Determination; Dimotakis et al., GHGIS.  
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While a significant portion of the analysis of these structural options was based on the 
previously described scholarly work and historical documentation, much relied as well on 
governmental publications. Most significantly, the analysis relied on the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence’s 1996 analysis of the IC, IC21: The Intelligence 
Community in the 21st Century; Alfred Cumming’s Intelligence Reform at the 
Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives, which was 
published by the Congressional Research Service; and Christopher Lamb and Edward 
Marks’, Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, 
published by the Institute for National Security Studies.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW: BUILDING A NEW INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY ENTITY  
Climate change remains a controversial issue and any legislation aimed at 
addressing it will be subject to pressure from a wide array of powerful institutions, 
industries, and political interests.  In empowering the IC or any segment thereof to 
monitor CO2 emissions treaties, care will need to be taken to ensure that these interests 
do not confuse or undermine the agency’s mission.17   
The closure of the CIA’s Climate Change Center in November of 2012 was 
prompted by the type of political pressure sure to dog any governmental attempts to 
engage seriously with the climate change issue.18  The center had been established only 
three years earlier, and it had endured persistent criticism from conservative politicians, 
including some in Congress.19  At the time of its opening, the CIA’s website had 
announced that the center’s charter:  
…is not the science of climate change, but the national security impact of 
phenomena such as desertification, rising sea levels, population shifts, and 
                                                 
17 Kate Martin, Director Center for National Security Studies, email correspondence with the author, 
August 23, 2012. 
18 John Broder, “CIA Closes its Climate Change Center,” The New York Times, November 20, 2012, 
accessed November 21, 2012, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/c-i-a-closes-its-climate-change-
office/. 
19 Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], “CIA Opens Center on Climate Change and National Security,” 
Central Intelligence Agency, accessed October 16, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-




heightened competition for natural resources.  The center will provide 
support to American policymakers as they negotiate, implement, and 
verify international agreements on environmental issues. That is 
something the CIA has done for years.20  
It went on to quote then Director Leon Panetta as saying, “Decision makers need 
information and analysis on the effects climate change can have on security. The CIA is 
well positioned to deliver that intelligence.”21   
The brief history of the CIA’s Climate Change Center highlighted three issues 
central to this thesis.  First, the national security establishment already recognizes climate 
change as a national security issue.  Second, absent Congressional intervention, the CIA 
will likely assume a leadership role in shaping the Intelligence community engagement 
with the issue of climate change.  Third, the CIA would include among its duties, or 
prerogatives, the verification of “international agreements on environmental issues.”   
Whether it be the CIA or another department or agency, the assumption that the 
IC should engage in treaty verification or monitoring is unremarkable.  Nonetheless, as 
will be explored more fully in this thesis’ discussion of the history of the NPT, the nature 
of that engagement can influence public perceptions.  Those perceptions can in turn alter 
the way the U.S. or other governments behave with the treaty regime.    
While increased knowledge about treaty signatory compliance can increase 
signatory cooperation, this benefit is derived from the resultant increase in mutual 
signatory trust.  However, mistrust between nations is the raison d'être of intelligence 
agencies.  In enlisting intelligence to monitor treaty compliance, this underlying 
contradiction must be considered. Again, the history of the NPT and the IC’s engagement 
with the IAEA provides insight into how the IC can both promote and undermine treaty 
success.   
U.S. participation in any future ICELA will reflect a national acknowledgement 
of the need to mitigate climate change.  In considering how best to monitor such an 
ICELA, Congress should consider whether and how to structure the IC’s treaty 
                                                 




involvement.  This discussion will benefit from a survey of what is currently understood 
about the creation of a new bureaucracy. 
1. The Powers behind the Bureaucratic Throne  
Ostensibly, the people’s political representatives create federal agencies to 
conduct the public’s business and protect the public’s interest.   However, theoreticians 
have studied how these agencies originate and operate within a complex and shifting 
political environment.  Generally, the wider public interest influences bureaucratic 
behavior only indirectly. Understanding the underlying political dynamics that determine 
how bureaucracies function is essential to devising an agency able to resist outside 
attempts to divert it from the fulfillment of its mission (i.e., supporting efforts to ensure 
compliance with international CO2 emissions agreements).    
Most of the literature regarding the design of bureaucracies ignores the U.S. 
Intelligence Community. One recent exception is the work of Amy Zegart, who has 
written extensively on how existing governmental bureaucracies shaped—and perhaps 
intentionally handicapped—U.S. security institutions at the moment of their conception.  
Among the writers considered, Zegart provides the most fully formed theory of 
bureaucratic origins and design from which to contemplate the development of a new 
agency within the Intelligence Community. While Zegart incorporates much of what her 
scholarly predecessors proposed, she identifies differences between strictly domestic 
regulatory agencies, so clearly influenced by their associated interest groups, and those of 
the national security establishment, largely ignored by the legislature and generally more 
responsive to the President. 
Public opinion and electoral politics provide the context within which the 
principal players exert their influence over policies and the bureaucracies that carry them 
out.  Within this political framework, theorists identify interest groups, the legislature, 




a. The Relevant Actors  
Among Zegart’s predecessors, Terry Moe, notes political science theorists 
seek to include “society” or, more specifically, voters into their calculations.22  Moe 
discusses this as an impediment to the creation of a useful model and recommends the 
substitution of “interest groups” for voters or constituents.23  He identifies the relevant 
actors in any theory of bureaucracy as “interest groups, politicians, and bureaucrats.”24  
i.  Interest Groups.  In Moe’s proposed model, the interest group, 
desiring to promote a policy agenda, exerts its political influence over the legislature to 
create an agency to further that agenda.25 Faced with the question of how most efficiently 
to exercise its influence over the agency, the interest group designates subject matter 
experts working within the constraints of a predefined set of rules.  The substance of 
these rules is a compromise between adequate flexibility to allow the subject matter 
experts to respond to contingencies and enough rigidity to impede the subject matter 
experts from acting contrary to the desires of the interest group.  
George Stigler’s arguments on regulatory agencies, though not 
directed at agency creation, offer insight into why interest groups, rather than the public 
at large, figure so prominently in theories regarding bureaucracies.  According to Stigler, 
constituents seek benefits from politicians, and these benefits equate to a transfer of 
wealth from one group to another.26 Stigler identifies the larger per capita stake held by 
members of a smaller group as the key driver.27  Stigler explains this apparent paradox of 
smaller groups wielding greater relative power by noting that members of the smaller 
group—more motivated than the individual members of the larger group—are able to 
form a more informed and cohesive front as they seek benefits from the politicians.  
                                                 
22 Terry M. Moe, “The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy,” in 
Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, ed. Oliver E. Williamson, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 116. 
23 Ibid., 124. 
24 Ibid., 131. 
25 Ibid., 124. 
26 George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science, 2, no. 1 (1971, spring): 3–5. This theory came to be known as “regulatory capture.” 
27 Ibid., 11. 
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Stigler employs this reasoning to explain why and how the interests being regulated are 
often the true beneficiaries of regulation.28  
“New institutionalists” is the term that Zegart applies to theorists 
like Stigler, Moe, and others who focus their attention on the interest groups influencing 
different government agencies as the key to understanding bureaucracy.  Zegart relies on 
these thinkers for much in her own theory, but because she feels their narrow focus 
blinkers them to the influence of the President and of the agencies themselves, she 
suggests that what they offer is “less a theory than a collection of analytic concepts.”29 
Zegart’s intention is not to denigrate the ideas they offer, she in fact sees those ideas as a 
previously missing acknowledgement that, as she puts it, “institutions matter.”30 
For Zegart, one place that existent government agencies matter is 
during the creation of new agencies.  The strength of the “new institutionalists’” analytic 
tools is that they provide a means of considering how and why existing bureaucracies 
exert their influence and shape the prospects for the agencies created in their wake.   
Implicit in any international CO2 limitation treaty is an effect on 
the activities of domestic industry.  Though not directly under the purview of a U.S. 
intelligence agency monitoring international CO2 limitation treaty compliance, U.S. 
industry, particularly those with overseas operations, will likely take an active interest in 
all aspects of treaty enforcement.  The literature suggests not only that these industries 
will seek to protect their own interests, but that they might also support the monitoring 
mission through their sustained attention to the application of the treaty’s provisions.   
Murray Horn demonstrates that the attentiveness of government 
regulated enterprises to actions of the regulatory agency relieves the legislature of one of 
its primary impediments to overseeing other types of non-regulatory government 
agencies: information asymmetry.31 Whereas the functioning of a non-regulatory agency 
                                                 
28 Sam Peltzman, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics, 
19, no. 2, (1976, August): 212–213; Stigler, “The Theory of Regulation,” 5. 
29 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 14. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
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can remain relatively opaque to the legislature, those entities overseen by a regulatory 
agency are often more knowledgeable than their regulators about the impact of regulatory 
actions or inactions.32  
ii.  The legislature.  Ultimately, it is the legislature that holds the 
power to determine the structure and operational parameters of any new bureaucratic 
agency.  Enabling a new agency or altering the mission of an existing agency is, however, 
recognized by theorists as presenting a multiplicity of risks and benefits which the 
legislature must weigh in considering the agency’s enabling legislation.   
David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran found that, among the 
various tools available to legislatures to address what Horn called “the commitment 
problem” (i.e., the difficulty for any legislature to ensure the agency it created will 
continue to pursue its goals beyond that enacting or authorizing legislature’s tenure), 
other scholars had given little attention to one of the most apparent options: simply 
writing limits to the agency’s discretion into the enabling legislation.  From the legal, 
legislative, and economic perspective, Epstein and O’Halloran consider the benefits and 
costs to the legislature of exercising this option. 
Epstein and O’Halloran note the advantages to the legislature in 
permitting the agency greater latitude.  These include:  
1. the avoidance of subsequent legislative conflicts,  
2. the assurance that the subject matter experts retain the ability to adopt the 
measures they need to perform effectively, and  
3. freedom from having to spend excessive amounts of time overseeing the 
agency. 
Epstein and O’Halloran identify the cost to the legislature in 
foregoing the imposition of strict operating instructions on the government agency.33  
Previous authors highlighted the legislature’s resulting inability to enforce bureaucratic 
accountability.  To this discussion, Epstein and O’Halloran contribute nuance by 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency 
Discretion,” American Journal of Political Science, 38, no.3 (1994, August): 698. 
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observing that the legislature thereby also forfeits the option of re-directing the agency’s 
efforts should these “drift” from the legislature’s intent.34  They postulate a relationship 
between the degree of the legislature’s uncertainty about the future and the amount of 
discretion they will invest in an agency.35 
Epstein and O’ Halloran apply an explicitly formulaic approach to 
this “commitment problem.”36  A legislature seeking to ensure the durability of the 
policies it assigns to the new agency, may be willing to sacrifice its own day-to-day 
control over the functioning of the agency in order to make it more difficult for any future 
legislature to fundamentally alter the functioning of the agency.  They note that a future 
legislature opposed to the mission or functioning of the agency will confront the 
“transaction costs” of overriding the original enabling legislation.  The new legislature 
may be unwilling, for example, to take on strong public or interest group opposition to 
alter the legislation.  What Epstein and O’Halloran add to this discussion are the 
inclinations of the agency itself.  Here the advantage of employing the term “drift” 
becomes apparent because it allows the theorists to easily represent a situation where the 
policy preferences of the agency mirror or—less likely—diverge from those of the 
legislature as these evolve over time. 
Zegart points out that the secrecy inherent in national security 
matters limits the ability for outside interests, and to a great extent even Congress, to 
influence the policies of an intelligence agency.  Zegart notes that the incentives for 
Congressional members to engage in oversight of intelligence agencies are generally few.  
Largely focused on their particular congressional constituencies, though they may have 
the tools to influence international relations at their disposal, individual congressmen 
prioritize domestic rather than foreign matters—the bulk of national security concerns.37   
iii.  The Bureaucracies (Bureaucratic Independence).  Perhaps 
Daniel Carpenter’s premier contribution to the development of a theory of bureaucracy is 
                                                 
34 Epstein and O’Halloran, “Administrative Procedures,” 698. 
35 Ibid., 697–720. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Zegart, Flawed By Design, 28–36. 
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his questioning of the strict “principal-agent” process regulating relations between the 
legislature and the bureaucracy.38  Previous models suggest that interest groups 
determine the legislative agenda, and the legislature assigns the policy objective to the 
bureaucracy.  Carpenter argues that the process need not be so linear.  An astute 
bureaucratic agency, having earned legitimacy among the public or interest group, can 
change the agenda and, in effect, dictate the agenda to the legislature.  In Carpenter’s 
words, “Political harmony and the appearance of control can mask autonomy.”39  
In Flawed by Design, Zegart considers the 1947 National Security 
Act and its establishment of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Zegart describes the flaws in these agencies, 
which she attributes to the machinations of those federal bureaucrats who stood to lose 
influence, and were able to legislatively ensure the new entities would be unable to fulfill 
their centralizing mandate.  Those political scientists, who maintain that the behavior of 
nations can be understood as the furtherance of their interests, overlook—in Zegart’s 
view—the influence that internal national factors can have in those nations’ conduct.40  
According to Zegart, the fact that bureaucratic ambitions can undermine the 
establishment of effective intelligence agencies demonstrates an essential failure of this 
“realist” school of political science theory.41  In other words, bureaucratic interests can 
trump national interests.  
Finally, Zegart describes the considerable means the bureaucracy 
has to promote its own agenda and to hinder Congressional or Presidential efforts to 
create new agencies or to alter the functioning of existing agencies.42  The bureaucracy’s 
leverage includes:  
1. its expertise on which politicians are often forced to rely for policy 
direction and implementation,  
                                                 
38 Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy 
Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 353.   
39 Ibid., 357.   
40 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 50–51. 
41 Ibid.,13. 
42 Ibid., 50–51. 
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2. “asymmetrical incentives,” by which Zegart means that bureaucrats are 
willing to go to much greater lengths to preserve their prerogatives than 
other political actors are to impose change or reform,  
3. the bureaucracy’s ability to ignore or delay the implementation of actions 
requested of it (indeed, the bureaucracy can use even the implied threat of 
obstructionism to discourage political reform), and,  
4. appealing to the public through press leaks, congressional hearings, or 
targeted publicity campaigns. 
Whereas Zegart suggests that the national security agencies enjoy 
greater influence over their makers than do their domestic counterparts, Carpenter 
demonstrates how domestic agencies’ closer association with the public can confer a 
notable degree of authority on these bureaucracies’ leaders.43  Interestingly, both authors 
build their arguments by showing how agencies of similar origin can evolve into very 
different creatures.  Both offer evidence that the varied outcomes in their examples 
confirm the validity of their theoretical models, rather than undermine these models’ 
predictive potential.  While Zegart maintains that extant bureaucracies may impose their 
own agenda on the genesis of a new agency—and so determine that agency’s fate—
Carpenter shows how an agency’s success at winning public support determines the 
degree of discretion it enjoys.  
b. Tools to Limit Independence of the Bureaucracy  
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast’s contention is that the legislature can 
overcome many of the limitations of monitoring and sanctions by employing and 
adjusting administrative procedures.44  The authors suggest that procedural requirements 
in the 1946 Administrative Procedures Act (APA) can shape the decision-making 
environment and effectively limit the choice of options available to the bureaucratic 
decision maker. 
By obliging the agency to engage in decision and rulemaking procedures 
that permit input by the interest group that inspired the creation of that agency, the 
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legislature can, in the authors’ estimation, generally ensure the desired decision making 
environment persists into the future. 
In response to theorists who suggest the eventual dissolution of interest 
groups who foster bureaucratic agencies, Jonathan Macey’s refutation suggests a yet 
more entwined symbiosis between those interest groups and their related bureaucracies.45  
According to Macey, no empowered interest group is likely to disappear spontaneously, 
and any possibility of this occurrence is further diminished by the existence of the new 
agency, which owes its very existence to that interest group or regulated entity.46 
2. Literature Review Conclusion  
Because the scholarly literature on agency design is more descriptive than 
prescriptive, the guidance it suggests must be inferred.  Zegart’s contention, noted earlier, 
regarding the contributions of some of her academic colleagues that what they offer is 
“less a theory than a collection of analytic concepts” is perhaps an accurate conclusion 
about theories of bureaucratic design in general.  Nevertheless, it may be that these 
concepts provide more guidance in designing an agency than an overarching theory 
might.47 
Some of the analysis shows how the composite of influences over the design and 
behavior of the bureaucratic agency implies a dynamic wherein projections about the 
future drive interest group and legislative decisions about how to ensure the bureaucracy 
pursues their respective agendas in perpetuity.  If interest group and legislative 
projections are for a future political climate similar to their contemporary one, the 
bureaucracy can be allowed the freedom to adjust to circumstances that are not expected 
to alter the relevant political environment.  If the future appears less stable, then the 
legislature is likely to impose a more restrictive regime on the bureaucracy’s enabling 
legislation.  Given the high degree of uncertainty that characterizes every aspect of 
climate change, any political consensus about addressing it could be short lived, and it 
                                                 
45 Jonathan R. Macey, “Organizational Design and Political control of Administrative Agencies,” 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8, no. 1, (1992, March): 96.   
46 Ibid., 96.   
47 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 14. 
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would seem prudent to impose stricter, rather than more flexible requirements on any 
bureaucratic agency enlisted to address the issue. 
Likewise it will be important to heed the warnings implicit in Zegart’s analysis of 
how the pre-existing national security establishment may seek to ensure any new agency 
or initiative lacks the authority to fulfill its mission.  It will be particularly important to 
remain attentive to current IC preferences and objectives that may run counter to those of 
limiting CO2 emissions. 
Whereas Zegart notes the Intelligence Community’s relative insulation from 
meaningful congressional oversight, U.S. participation in any future international CO2 
emissions limitation agreement (hereafter referred to as an ICELA) presupposes a high 
level of domestic political engagement.  Given Carpenter’s reflections on the political 
leverage available to bureaucracies that communicate effectively with the public, and 
other writers’, especially Macey’s, analysis of interests groups’ interaction with 
bureaucracies that operate within their domain, a dynamic could emerge whereby the 
intensity of interest group and wider public engagement with the subject of climate 
change might reveal the issue as yet another manifestation of the modern convergence of 
domestic and international politics.  In engaging with global climate change, the IC may 
find itself more exposed to, and perhaps more influenced by, the day-to-day concerns of 
Americans. 
In designing an agency, the framing of its mission will play an important role is 
determining the coalitions that emerge as champions and detractors.  The relative strength 
of these coalitions, their respective agendas, and the existing political climate will all 
determine the bounds within which the agency designers must work.  Given these 
bounds, the designers will consider how the hierarchy, personnel practice, decision-
making process, legislative oversight, and various other variables can best be employed 
to ensure the resultant agency has the best chance of accomplishing the tasks required for 
it to achieve its goals and objectives.   
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E. INTRODUCTION: RESCUING TOMORROW TODAY  
The scientific consensus attributing the climate change phenomenon to human 
activity is clear.  Ninety-seven to 98 percent of climate scientists accept that climate 
change is occurring and that humans are the cause.48  Nonetheless, U.S. and global socio-
economic conditions remain resistant to the type of concerted international action needed 
to forestall the worst climate change effects.  Increasing observable evidence will 
promote understanding about the threat climate change poses to human societies.  Greater 
understanding will reduce, but not eliminate, resistance to mitigation efforts.  The 
findings within this thesis are intended to support decision makers in that future period 
when international mitigation efforts have coalesced, however provisionally, around a 
new effort to reduce CO2 emissions.  
The White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the 
Department of Energy, and the Central Intelligence Agency have each enlisted the 
support of the most prestigious U.S. scientific institutions to evaluate the nation’s ability 
to monitor a future international CO2 emissions limitation agreement.  In 2011, the 
JASONs, a group of 30 of the U.S.’s most accomplished scientists, published a paper 
entitled, Methods for Remote Determination of CO2 Emissions for the OSTP.  The 
following year, three of the U.S. National Laboratories and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
published a collaborative plan for the development of a Greenhouse Gas Information 
System (GHGIS) commissioned by the Department of Energy.  This thesis has drawn 
extensively from these two works, both of which also address that period in the future 
when resistance to mitigation efforts will have ceded enough to allow for a new 
international effort in the form of an international CO2 emissions limitation agreement.  
While the CIA’s evaluation is not itself available for public research purposes, its 
existence likewise supports for the premise underlying this thesis.49   
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A steady stream of newly released scientific reports suggests the dangers of 
anthropogenic climate change are graver than suggested by prior warnings.50  While the 
international scientific community has arrived at a consensus about the clear link between 
the climate effects we are witnessing and human burning of fossil fuels,51 science cannot 
predicted with precision how climate change will unfold. Increasingly, however, 
scientific and governmental reports employ the terms “non-linear effects” and “abrupt 
climate change” in the forecasts they do make.  A recent World Bank climate change 
report frames the challenge in its title, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World 
Must be Avoided. So far, the earth has warmed approximately 0.8 °C since preindustrial 
times.52  The World Bank report notes that, even given current the international pledges 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the likelihood is for the earth to warm to at least 3°C 
above preindustrial times by the end of the current century with the possibility that, if 
“current [international] mitigation commitments and pledges…are not met, a warming of 
4°C could occur as early as the 2060s.”53 
Even among those who have long acknowledged the dangers of anthropogenic 
climate change, it is only recently that the complexity of the climate phenomenon has 
been given the attention it merits.  Climate complexity should be of especial interest to 
those concerned with national security.  As the authors of the World Bank report note, 
“The effects of a 4°C warming will not be evenly distributed around the world, nor would 
the consequences be simply an extension of those felt at 2°C warming.”54  Like many 
other climate change warnings, the World Bank report includes a long list of potential 
effects of a warming planet.55  Sea level rise, increased flooding, increased temperature 
extremes, alternation of ocean circulation patterns that could plunge Europe into a new 
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ice age, more severe and unpredictable hurricanes on the U.S. East coast, droughts in the 
mid-west, more frequent crop failures, loss of bio diversity, acidification of the oceans, 
increasingly significant loss of fresh water supplies for huge population centers, and 
many other singular, though significant, climate effects are described in, Turn Down the 
Heat and in thousands of other discussions of the subject.  But beyond these isolated 
impacts, the World Bank report confronts a more fundamental danger noting: 
Projections of damage costs for climate change impacts typically assess 
the costs of local damages, including infrastructure, and do not provide an 
adequate consideration of cascade effects (for example, value-added 
chains and supply network) at national and regional scales.  However, in 
an increasingly globalized world that experiences further specialization in 
production systems, and thus higher dependency on infrastructure to 
deliver produced goods, damages to infrastructure systems can lead to 
substantial indirect impacts.  Seaports are an example of an initial point 
where a breakdown or substantial disruption in infrastructure facilities 
could trigger impacts that reach far beyond the particular location of the 
loss.56 
The World Bank report goes on to lament the lack of more comprehensive studies 
of the wider impacts of events that are too often discussed in isolation.57  The need for a 
more comprehensive approach to the problem of climate change extends beyond the 
scientific community and must be more widely embraced by all governmental 
institutions.  Another recent evaluation, funded by the CIA and conducted by a group of 
prominent scientists, identifies the many studies that are needed in order to better assess 
the full potential impact of climate change, including the likely timelines involved in 
those impacts.  The CIA funded publication notes:  
The conventional approach to assessing the impacts of climate change—that they 
will unfold only slowly and in the distant future following pathways to which society can 
easily adapt—is inadequate. Impacts that were once thought of as threatening future 
societies have been telescoped suddenly into the present, and some consequences are 
stark. The risk of major societal disruption from weather and climate extremes such as 
droughts, floods, heat waves, wildfires, and destructive storms is already with us, and 
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expected to increase. Changes of the magnitude we are witnessing already threaten water 
availability, food security, energy decisions, and critical civil and defense infrastructure. 
The rapid loss of permanent Arctic ice could result in a cascade of climate feedbacks that 
lead to irreversible change. We can no longer assume that the extremes of tomorrow will 
resemble the extremes of yesterday.58   
These World Bank and CIA alerts echo an increasing number of similar reports 
from other government, scientific, and educational institutions.  Cumulatively, they 
identify an unprecedented level of risk that should be aggressively addressed by all U.S.  
security institutions.  Although this thesis is anticipatory, it was inspired by a need that 
requires immediate action. 
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II. THE MONITORING VALUE ADDED BY THE IC  
The U.S. has participated in past international negotiations to collectively reduce 
the amount of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHG) released into the 
atmosphere through human activities.  Though the U.S. subsequently refrained from 
joining the most important of the subsequent agreements, the Kyoto Protocol, there is 
wide acknowledgement among U.S. scientific and governmental institutions that 
increasing CO2 emissions continue to pose significant risk to the nation’s security.  There 
is little reason to believe that the global concerns that prompted the U.S. to engage in 
previous international climate negotiations will not foster new efforts in the future.59  
During the Cold War, Congress depended on determinations by the IC regarding 
the nation’s ability to monitor Soviet compliance with specific provisions of arms control 
treaties.  In fact, by giving Congressional responsibility for evaluating the IC’s 
effectiveness in arms control treaty monitoring to the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the Senate gained greater leverage over intelligence policy.60  In 
determining whether or not to ratify a future international CO2 emissions limitation 
agreement, Congress will likely call on IC expertise to determine the nation’s ability to 
verify that other treaty signatories are abiding by the treaty provisions.  In making this 
evaluation, Congress will have the opportunity to greatly influence the nation’s treaty 
monitoring effort, and by extension, the prospects for treaty success. 
As noted in the literature review, the CIA has already assumed that its role will 
include “support to American policymakers as they negotiate, implement, and verify 
international agreements on environmental issues.”61  No publicly available 
documentation regarding the origin of this assumption exists.  The discussion of 
environmental issues and national security extends back into the 1970s. Though there is 
no public record of IC participation in the 1997 Kyoto negotiations, the subsequent 
advent of China as both a major greenhouse gas contributor and potential U.S. 
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geopolitical rival may have drawn the IC’s attention.62  More frequently than not 
perhaps, China has been involved—if not always implicated—when the IC has found 
evidence of international weapons nonproliferation violations.63  Regardless of how this 
link between environmental issues and the need for IC involvement was established, the 
question as to whether there is a proper role for the IC in monitoring any future ICELA 
should be asked.  Like weapons proliferation, climate change will unquestionably imperil 
U.S. security.  It does not follow necessarily, however, that both problems are amenable 
to a similar national security approach. 
It is likewise important to consider how the IC came to monitor weapons 
nonproliferation treaties.  Weapons proliferation predates nations themselves as a 
“security” concern.  For example, ancient civilizations attempted to restrict slaves and 
conquered rivals from accessing weapons.64  Treaties to counter weapons proliferation 
provided a cooperative international approach to a problem that had long been policed by 
regimes individually.  The notion of using covert means to monitor a treaty involving 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions reverses the weapons nonproliferation chronology.  As 
will be seen subsequently, this difference has important implications when considering 
whether or not to enlist the IC is a novel climate change mitigation mission.  That the 
CO2 mitigation effort is conducted by treaty rather than by arms tacitly acknowledges 
that climate change is not a problem that can be solved through force but must ultimately 
rely on cooperation.  Unless covert means are employed in a manner that fosters 
cooperation, they are unlikely to prove beneficial. Before endeavoring to answer the 
question as to whether the IC should be engaged in ICELA monitoring, it is necessary to 
consider the problem of ICELA monitoring more generally.  As noted previously, two 
prestigious groups of U.S. scientists have conducted research into this question at the 
request of the White House and the Department of Energy, the aforementioned JASONs 
                                                 
62 Lester Brown, “Redefining National Security,” Worldwatch Paper 14, Worldwatch Institute, 
Washington, D.C., 1977.  
63 Shirley Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 2, Federation of American Scientists, accessed 
June 30, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf. 
64 Peter Hunt, “Arming Slaves and Helots in Classical Greece,” in Arming Slaves: From Classical 
Times to the Modern Age, ed. Christopher Leslie Brown and Philip D. Morgan (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 14.  
 27 
 
and the GHGIS authors.  This chapter is dedicated to a review of their findings, with 
particular attention to the considerable challenge of reliably identifying ICELA violators 
using exclusively overt methods, and focuses attention on the opportunities that might 
exits to facilitate or supplement the overt monitoring effort with covert resources. 
A. THE CHALLENGE OF MEASURING CO2 EMISSIONS: AGREEING ON 
ESTIMATES 
The overwhelming preponderance of scientific evidence establishes a strong 
correlation between climate change and the increase in CO2 concentrations in the 
atmosphere that have resulted from human burning of fossil fuels.65  Humans have upset 
a balance in the amount of CO2 recycled by the earth that persisted for millennia prior to 
the industrial age.  This concentration currently exceeds any in at least the last 650,000 
years.  The earth has begun to seek a new CO2 equilibrium, but until it does in some 
future—possibly hundreds of years from now—there is little the human race can predict 
about the climate, except the near certainty that it will continue to change from the one 
known throughout recorded history.  In absolute terms, however, the amount of CO2 
generated yearly through billions of discrete human actions remains a small fraction of 
the total atmospheric CO2.66  There is no way currently, nor will there be in any 
foreseeable future, to measure the precise amount of anthropogenic carbon dioxide that 
each country may or may not release into the atmosphere.   
Unlike any limitation on nuclear warheads, say, any country entering a climate 
agreement must acknowledge each participant’s need to, as accurately as possible, 
estimate the amount of CO2 generated by its human population through that population’s 
various enterprises and actions.  Each participating country’s commitment will be to 
activities to reduce CO2 emissions by an amount proportional to that to which that 
country has agreed. 
Since reducing CO2 emissions and mitigating associated global climate change 
currently requires a degree of engagement and potentially significant economic sacrifice 
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on the part of the participating countries, each of those countries will seek to ensure that 
other participants are respecting their commitments.  Each country’s own willingness to 
enter into and its desire to adhere to its own CO2 emissions commitments will depend, in 
some degree, on its confidence that its efforts are conscientiously being replicated by the 
other partners to the agreement.67   
The task of monitoring international agreements on climate change includes 
evaluating three interrelated variables: the terms of the agreement, the measurement 
tolerances permitted within those terms, and the effort exerted by each signatory to 
remain within those tolerances.  The terms of the agreement negotiated between countries 
will likely be determined, in part, by the means employed to establish whether parties to 
the agreement are living up to their commitments.  The second variable, the uncertainty 
allowed for within the agreement terms, follows from the difficulty of accurately 
measuring the anthropogenic CO2 emitted by any country.  Various existing and 
emerging technologies can reduce the uncertainty in measurements of CO2 emission, but 
they cannot eliminate it.  To one degree or another, signatories to any international 
climate change agreement must accept the need to establish limits or targets based on 
estimations.  Using agreed upon methodologies for measuring carbon dioxide 
“inventories” and emissions, countries must each work to reduce their emissions by 
amounts within certain statistical tolerances.  Ultimately, the willingness of each 
individual country to scrupulously fulfill their commitments, the third variable, may be 
influenced by the likelihood of having agreement compliance shortcomings discovered.   
B. DIRECT AND PROXY COMPLIANCE MONITORING: MULTIPLE 
MEANS TO REDUCE UNCERTAINTY 
Carbon dioxide emission agreements can be monitored in two ways.  The first is 
to employ sensors to measure CO2 concentrations within a country or region.  Used in 
conjunction with models that essentially predict the movement of the atmosphere within 
that country or region and after having accounted for the naturally occurring CO2 
“fluxes” produced in the area in question, these sensor derived measurements provide an 
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estimation of the CO2 being generated by human activities.  The second is by evaluating 
a country’s energy production and use in order to calculate the amount of CO2 these 
activities generate. These two approaches might be employed in tandem with each 
complementing, enhancing, and helping to calibrate and confirm the results of the other.  
In a U.S. government commissioned study entitled “Methods for Remote Determination 
of CO2 Emissions,” the independent group of scientists known as JASON chose to refer 
to the first of these monitoring approaches as “direct” and the second as “proxy.”68   
JASON distinguished a third category that they described as “inventories” or the 
CO2 emissions self-reported by the country in question.69  These inventories are most 
relevant to establishing a country’s baseline emissions circumstances against which to 
measures future emission reduction efforts and achievements.  For example, should a 
country opt to decommission a coal burning power plant and replace it instead with one 
employing nuclear energy, inferences can be reliably made regarding the relative 
reduction in CO2 emission that country thus achieves.  Considered in conjunction with 
direct and proxy measurements, inventories can assist in further reducing uncertainty 
about the precise amount of anthropogenic CO2 being generated by and/or within a 
country. 
This chapter offers an overview of the potential and limitations of using direct 
monitoring.  Ultimately, it will be demonstrated that direct monitoring alone is currently 
unable to provide reliable measurements of anthropogenic CO2 emissions without the 
unfettered establishment and monitoring of in situ sensors throughout the territory of each 
climate agreement signatory.  Current global political and economic circumstances 
preclude this eventuality, and it will be necessary to supplement direct monitoring, 
including remote sensing through the use of satellites, with information about the actual 
actions of agreement signatories gathered through other means (i.e. “proxy” monitoring 
and/or the self-reported “inventories” of the signatories).  In fact, whether the U.S. elects 
to evaluate its agreement partners’ compliance through direct, proxy, or inventory 
monitoring, or most likely some weighted combination of all three methods, a 
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determination will need to be made as to the extent that technological tools can and 
should be relied upon to provide accurate estimates.  
As previously noted, each participant to an international CO2 emissions 
agreement must recognize the need to build a certain degree of potential “error” into the 
terms of these agreements.  Much past unwillingness to engage in climate change 
agreements has resulted from controversies ignited over the uncertainties inherent in such 
a complex issue.  The public has frequently confused properly circumspect scientific 
language regarding predictions about the climate, with uncertainty about the established 
link between anthropogenic CO2 and climate change.  Clearly, successful action to 
confront climate change is aided by reducing allowances for “error” to the greatest degree 
possible. 70  
1. Direct Monitoring: Inferring CO2 Emissions from Atmospheric CO2 
Concentrations  
The measurement of CO2 emissions from a country or region is achieved by 
using in situ (within the Earth System) or satellite sensors to establish the concentration 
of atmospheric CO2 parts per million (ppm mole fraction) in samples collected at 
multiple locations.  Meteorological and other data are employed to determine the 
upstream origins of the samples. Once aggregated, this data is used to inform equations or 
models from which CO2 emissions estimates are derived.    
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has been 
involved in the most substantial efforts to model the natural uptake and release of CO2 
from the atmosphere through its Earth System Research Laboratory.71  The ESRL 
CarbonTracker project employs 89 surface monitoring stations to collect data on 
atmospheric CO2, which it then combines with meteorological predictions to model CO2 
fluxes worldwide.  JASON notes that there are 258 parameters within the CarbonTracker 
model that are adjusted to further refine the accuracy of the model in light of actual CO2 
measurements. While mindful of the scientific contributions made by CarbonTracker, 
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JASON suggests that these considerable achievements must be built on and refined 
before they will provide a level of “spatial and temporal resolution” needed for any 
meaningful CO2 emissions monitoring regime.72   
In situ sensors could be fixed or mobile.  The establishment of fixed sensors 
would likely require the cooperation of the “host” country.  Mobile sensors could be 
placed on aircraft, either with the approval and knowledge of the country through whose 
airspace the aircraft traveled or not.  Samples of the local atmosphere could also be 
collected on a conveyance, such as an aircraft, traversing the region targeted for CO2 
measurement, and then subsequently analyzed.73    
Importantly, the primary source of uncertainty in CO2 emissions is, and is likely 
to remain, the difficulties inherent in constructing atmospheric models which reduce 
uncertainties to within generally acceptable tolerances.74  These tolerances would have to 
be determined by the agreement signatories.   
a. Constraints 
Constraints can be considered the parameters of the atmospheric CO2 
transport model.  For CO2 emissions modeling the constraints include, at minimum: 
• Temporal sampling density, 
• Spatial sampling density, 
• Location, and 
• Sensor performance 
These constraints need to be considered when modeling the behavior of 
the atmosphere, which is dependent on meteorological data superimposed on a model of 
natural CO2 sources and sinks.75   
Temporal sampling density can be considered the frequency with which 
measurements are taken.  Depending on the means of sampling and the technology 
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employed for sample analysis, more frequent sampling implies an increase in costs.  
Regardless of the technology, however, these costs are likely to decrease with improved 
performance as the technology matures.  Because there will be localized variability in 
CO2 concentration for a variety of reasons, more frequent measurements can reduce 
uncertainty about the reliability of measurements. 
Spatial sampling density, the number of sensors or—in the case of 
satellite imagery the number and resolution of the images—likewise influences the cost 
of monitoring as more measurements generally imply greater reliability of the inferences 
taken from the available measurements.  Because of localized variability in the 
movement, both lateral and vertical, of the atmosphere, denser sampling can further 
reduce uncertainty. 
Location determines the spatial relation of one sample to another.   
Sensor performance, the benefits of increased sensor sensitivity to 
overall measurement significance increases as temporal and spatial measurement density 
increases and conversely.   
C. ACCURACY VERSUS PRECISION IN CO2 MEASUREMENTS  
Somewhat paradoxically, sensor accuracy from either remote (satellites) or in situ 
sensors is an important consideration, but it must also be evaluated separately from 
sensor precision for the purposes of modeling.  For instance a sensor may detect very 
small changes in CO2 concentrations, with a considerable degree of inter-measurement 
accuracy, but be far off the mark of the actual mole number.  Modeling in combination 
with known values may then be used to adjust the mole numbers so that they more 
accurately reflect actual mole concentrations.    
1. How Accurate Do Measurements Need to Be?  
CO2 is already a very small constituent of the atmosphere, currently at 
approximately 390 (parts per million) ppm.76  To be useful, measurements of actual CO2 
concentrations must attain a certain level of sensitivity.  The literature suggests this 
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accuracy must be from between between 0.1 and 5 ppm.  For any particular model the 
value of greater sensor accuracy quickly approaches a point of diminishing returns.  A 
model built to achieve a course resolution of atmospheric behavior will derive limited 
additional benefit from very precise CO2 concentrations taken at widely separated 
locations on an infrequent basis.  Therefore, the cost investments in greater accuracy 
must be justified against the model in question and the degree of acceptable uncertainty 
agreed upon by treaty signatories.   
D. MEASURING CO2 IN A GAS SAMPLE  
1. Gas Chromatography  
Gas chromatography is the process wherein a sample is passed through a medium 
that absorbs different constituents of the sample at different rates.  As the sample passes 
through the absorption column, different constituents leave the column at different times 
and can be electronically identified as they escape.  This technique provides precise 
measurement, but the instrument is expensive (up to hundreds of thousands of dollars) 
and analysis of a single sample can take up to an hour. 
2. Cavity Ring-Down Spectroscopy (CRDS)  
CRDS is a laser technique wherein a short burst of light is trapped within a cavity 
filled with the gas to be analyzed.  As the light makes round trips within the cavity, the 
time for the beam’s intensity to degrade is measured and this provides a very precise, 
down to parts per trillion, detection of the moles of the substance being measured within 
the sample.  CRDS provides measurements that are both accurate and precise.  
Additionally, CRDS measurements can be conducted continuously.  However, the cost 
for the device is currently between $50,000 and $100,000. 
3. Non-Dispersive Infrared (NDIR)  
NDIR is the preferred technology for satellite measurements of CO2, but also is 
preferred over spectroscopy for in situ measurements.77  CO2 absorbs a specific 
wavelength band in the infrared spectrum.  By illuminating a gas sample with this 
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infrared wavelength and measuring the attenuation of that wavelength, the concentration 
of CO2 in the sample can be derived.  The cost for these systems varies, but some can be 
purchased for under $5000.  The cost appears to be declining and a low cost device, 
suitable for widespread use, could likely be developed within a short time span. Like 
CRDS, NDIR systems provide a continuous reading.  JASON suggests that one way of 
deploying such a device would be to place them on cell towers.78 
E. REMOTE (SATELLITE) SENSING OF CO2  
Satellites can be used to measure atmospheric CO2 levels in one of two ways, 
both based on CO2’s absorption of particular wavelengths of infrared light.  The first is to 
sense the sunlight reflected off the earth in order to determine the relative attenuation of 
those wavelengths.  The second involves sensing the thermal emissions of the atmosphere 
caused by the presence of CO2.   
There are several challenges that must be overcome in order to derive useful 
measurements of CO2 from satellites.  Most of the difficulties have to do with factors that 
distort or complicate the readings being attempted.  Such factors include other molecules, 
particularly H2O, that also absorb or emit thermal signals, variations in ground 
reflectivity, and atmospheric pressure and temperature differences.  While in situ sensors 
based within the atmosphere benefit from a controlled volume of gas, satellite 
measurements are complicated by a range of atmospheric conditions.   
Likewise, there are benefits and drawbacks in choosing between several possible 
satellite orbits. JASON describes the pros and cons of six orbit options.79  Currently, 
there is insufficient data to determine an optimal orbit for conducting CO2 
measurements, and any such determination may involve assessing how different options 
can be supplemented with in situ sensing.  JASON suggests several important benefits of 
a geosynchronous orbit, and that the effectiveness of such a satellite could be augmented 
with data currently collected by existing low earth orbit satellites.80 
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1. In Situ versus Satellite Sensing  
The authors of the JASON study previously collaborated with the CIA’s Crime 
and Narcotics Center to identify crops from infrared satellite imagery.  They compare this 
prior experience to the challenge of conducting satellite sensing and modeling of the CO2 
emission and absorption of earth’s vegetation.81  These so called “normalized difference 
vegetation indices” (NDVI) will likely not provide sufficiently precise information from 
which to adequately distinguish natural from anthropogenic CO2 fluxes.82  Ultimately, 
deriving useful information from satellites may depend on calibrating satellite sensing 
with that done in situ.  Given a region of relatively similar vegetation, one or more in situ 
sensors could provide a measure of the natural CO2 flux that could then be extrapolated 
to a larger area using data provided by the satellite. 
JASON suggests that using, as yet hypothetical, low cost in situ sensors on 
weather balloons.83  Fitted with GPS transmitters, these balloons would collect CO2 
measurements that could then be correlated with the balloon’s movements to inform CO2 
emissions models. Continued study of transport models (i.e., how CO2 emissions diffuse 
within the atmosphere) will be necessary to know whether these in situ types of sensors 
would be better suited to monitoring CO2 emissions treaties than satellites, or whether 
some combination of both would offer the optimal combination of performance and 
cost.84 
2. The Seuss Effect 
Named for Hans Seuss, the Austrian chemist who called attention to the 
phenomenon, the Seuss effect provides a means of distinguishing between CO2 released 
through natural processes and that produced by the combustion of fossil fuels.  Though 
currently not practical for use in a widely deployed sensing regime, the measurement of 
carbon isotopes in an atmospheric sample can be employed to extrapolate the 
concentration of anthropogenic CO2 emissions in a given location.  The “effect” is in fact 
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a by-product of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.  Nuclear weapons testing in the 
1960s resulted in a significant increase in the concentration of carbon 14 in the 
atmosphere.  Fossil fuels do not contain carbon 14.  The burning of fossil fuels results in 
a localized dilution of the amount of atmospheric carbon 14.  When subjected to analysis, 
vegetation growing within that local atmosphere reveals the amount of local 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions through the relative absence of the photosynthetically 
fixed carbon 14 isotope.  In cases where other measurements are not possible or practical, 
agricultural exports of reliably known geographic origin can be analyzed to provide 
evidence of the local anthropogenic CO2 emissions.  Most importantly, whereas other 
means of deriving CO2 concentrations provide only the concentration, the Seuss effect 
isolates the anthropogenic from the naturally occurring CO2 in the atmosphere.85 
F. FILLING A GAP LEFT BY TECHNOLOGY   
This review suggests the scope of the technological challenge involved in 
attributing CO2 emissions to one or another human source.  It has by no means exhausted 
either the challenges or options involved in CO2 emissions monitoring.  For example, 
this thesis has not discussed the difficulties in incorporating oceanic carbon fluxes into 
the climate model, or the possibilities offered by international air travel for collecting and 
analyzing atmospheric samples.   
The significance of the climate change problem—and its entry into the national 
dialogue as a national security threat—suggest that we will increasingly focus the 
country’s resources on climate stabilization efforts.  The challenge of monitoring 
international climate change agreements, though not yet discussed widely, is receiving 
considerable attention from national security establishment, as evidence by the JASON 
study, and the more recent GHGIS paper.86 These studies reveal that, though 
considerable technological resources exist to monitor anthropogenic CO2, they remain 
far from being able to do so with the accuracy and reliability we would desire as parties 
to an international agreement, and on which U.S. policymakers will demand in making 
vital decisions about the country’s future.   
                                                 




As evidenced by the creation of the CIA’s now disbanded Climate Change Center 
the IC has been proactive in developing internal expertise on climate change issues, 
including the challenges posed by the likely U.S. desire to independently monitor the 
treaty compliance of other countries.  Nevertheless, given the complexity of determining 
the optimal balance of available technological and human intelligence collection 
methods, it is likely the IC will continue to rely on outside technological expertise to 
supplement its own.  The IC too frequently relies upon trusted vendors to provide advice 
on developing technologies.87 Significant contracts will be won or loss according to the 
technologies employed.  Because the optimal mix of monitoring technologies will remain 
contingent upon many different variable (e.g., the treaty provisions, the sources of CO2 
emissions most targeted) vendors will be have many opportunities to champion 
technologies that will most enhance their own influence within the IC, or increase their 
own profits, rather than those that will most efficiently achieve the monitoring objectives.  
In the case of CO2 monitoring, the technology options should be subjected to 
independent evaluation by entities that can dispassionately consider all the available 
technological alternatives.  The decision of whether to launch a new satellite or instead to 
deploy 10 thousand in situ sensors should not be made without a nuanced and unbiased 
understanding of the complexity of the treaty monitoring environment.  Simple cost and 
instrument sensitivity comparisons will be inadequate guides for responsible 
governmental decision makers.   
Most importantly, regardless of how accurately we are able to model regional and 
national contributions to anthropogenic climate change agreements, considerable 
uncertainty is bound to persist about these sources for the foreseeable future.  An 
intelligence agency well versed in the technological challenges of greenhouse gas 
monitoring would be best equipped to identify U.S. knowledge gaps and to fill them with 
information collected by means only available to a clandestine organization.   
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G. PUBLIC SENSORS AND THE IC  
In studying international environmental agreements game theory, researchers 
have hypothesized a paradoxical phenomenon involving the human predilection for 
equity (the need to maintain a broad consensus about the equitable distribution of 
national treaty sacrifices is the subject of Chapter IV).  Underlying the theory is the idea 
that even though some countries that choose not to participate in an international 
agreement on climate change, these non-participating nations are home to many citizens 
who will feel a duty to reciprocate the sacrifices made in treaty signatory countries.  
Ultimately, according to this theory, countries where this sense of reciprocal duty holds 
sway may adopt internal measures and behaviors matching or surpassing the restrictions 
their nation would otherwise have been held to under the terms of the treaty. 
However, by not signing on to the treaty, these countries thereby increase the level of 
climate change concern in countries where the sense of duty might be less prevalent, 
thereby encouraging these countries to participate in the treaty.88 
The implications of a duty that citizens in one country might feel towards those in 
another are particularly significant in regard to the ICCME task.  It suggests, furthermore, 
an area where the challenge of identifying ICELA violations would differ substantially 
from that of the NPT (the subject discussed in detail in the next chapter).  In any country 
the number of citizens—whether inside or outside of government—who would have 
ready access to information regarding their own country’s ICELA compliance are 
exponentially greater than those who would have knowledge of the materials needed or 
used to build nuclear weapons.  Moreover, while it can safely be assumed that the 
majority of world citizens do not believe that their country would maliciously employ 
nuclear weapons, those citizens who recognize the danger of rising atmospheric CO2 
levels also understand that the CO2 emissions of any country, including their own, 
imperils all.  The 18-year old United National Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) is only one example of the international solidarity that has been 
established on the issue.  Informed citizens of any country recognize then that they are 
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equally impacted by emissions issuing from their own country as they are by those from 
another.  
It is worth highlighting another fundamental difference between nonproliferation 
and ICELA monitoring efforts. Very few citizens of any country would have both the 
knowledge and the motivation to divulge information regarding their own country’s 
failures to meet their NPT obligations.  Self-interest and a sense of duty to ICELA 
compliant countries would, however, lead many citizens to reveal ICELA treaty 
violations committed within their own country.  Given the possibility that in some 
countries, individuals who provided such revelations might face harsh punishments 
should they be discovered, it will behoove the international community to support and 
sustain a mechanism whereby treaty violations might be reported anonymously. 
It is not hard to conceive of a situation where a simple worker in a power plant, 
for instance in India, becomes aware that the CO2 scrubbers in the plant where he works 
are being systematically disabled to save his company money.  In this case, 
whistleblowing could well lead to a loss of more than just the whistleblower’s 
employment.  In many countries like India, whistleblowing has proven fatal.89  Once the 
ICELA were put in place, it is all but certain that treaty violations would occur.  In such a 
case, it is likely that some individual citizens who identified potentially systemic treaty 
violations in their place of work might well be inclined, but would nonetheless fear, 
bringing their concerns to an international monitoring regime.  Any international treaty 
monitoring regime would likely include representatives from the very countries who 
might themselves be violating the treaty.  Therefore, such a multinational treaty 
monitoring entity would face enormous challenges in guaranteeing the anonymity of the 
violation reporter.  However, the U.S. IC could provide a reliable and safe conduit for 
such whistleblowing.   
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Recently, the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations instituted an 
anonymous tip line that can be accessed through the internet.90  By providing such a tip 
line, an IC agency could make whistleblowing against an ICELA violator safe, when it 
otherwise might not be.  By collecting, vetting, and aggregating such tips, the ICCME 
could provide anonymized reports to the GHGIS for follow-up.  Such a mechanism 
would not only discourage treaty violation and increase global trust in the viability of the 
ICELA, it would go far to demonstrate the value the IC could add to international ICELA 
monitoring. 
H. THE U.S. IC AS A KEY CONTRIBUTOR TO GLOBAL TRUST IN THE 
ICELA 
As with nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, should the U.S. IC identify 
violations of a future ICELA, it will attempt to address such violations through the 
mechanisms made available by the international community.  Unilateral U.S. declarations 
alone will not be viewed as legitimate by the international community, and it is unlikely 
any signatory in treaty violation would feel compelled to rectify its behavior absent an 
international finding.  While other nations may employ their intelligence agencies to 
support an international treaty monitoring regime, the U.S. is unquestionably most 
prepared to do so.  Therefore, the U.S. IC will find itself once again supporting an 
international treaty monitoring agency, like the IAEA, with the difference that the U.S. 
will need to be infinitely more cautious that the GHGIS’s legitimacy is not undermined 
by its association with the U.S. IC.   
While there is a chance violations of the NPT could have ramifications for an 
average world citizen, the likelihood is remote for most.  An ICELA will likely impact 
most world citizens directly, and there is ample evidence that any negative perceptions 
regarding the application of the treaty provisions could detrimentally impact on the 
chances for treaty success.  Should the IC, however, contribute to the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the GHGIS, the effect could be equally as profound, and would doubtless 
be ranked among the IC’s most important achievements. 
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The IC is calibrated to protect the nation from real and potential human 
adversaries.  The IC’s perpetual vigilance is a virtue that should never be undervalued.  
The caution that imbues the ethos of members of the IC, however, sits uneasily with any 
form of collaboration.  Should the IC’s vigilance preclude its subordination to the needs 
of international cooperation in the pursuit of lower CO2 emissions, then the IC will fail in 
its larger mission of ensuring national security.  If, however, the IC can come to 
appreciate its unique qualifications for fostering global trust in the ICELA, its 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 43 
 
III. WAR BY OTHER MEANS: LEARNING FROM WEAPONS 
NONPROLIFERATION MONITORING  
The previous chapter drew attention to the complexity involved in monitoring an 
ICELA.  It also identified opportunities where covert sources and methods might serve to 
fill knowledge gaps, most notably regarding signatory intentions, and better focus overt 
monitoring efforts.  Ultimately, however, U.S. participation in an ICELA will be 
predicated on a desire to mitigate climate change.  While reliably determining the amount 
of CO2 emitted by any treaty signatory may help achieve this end, this monitoring 
activity is not the end in itself.   
By defining international climate change agreement verification as part of its 
Climate Change Center’s mission, the CIA drew an implicit analogy between 
international weapons nonproliferation treaty monitoring and cooperative international 
action to mitigate climate change.  In order to explore the prospects for an ICCME, this 
thesis draws the same analogy explicitly.  Ultimately, through the cases to be discussed, 
this thesis finds this analogy to be partially justified.  There is much to be learned both in 
the similarities and differences between the application of covert resources to the treaties 
dedicated to nonproliferation and CO2 emissions limitation.  
A. CONTAINING A TYRANT—THE NPT AND IC SUCCESS  
Ending Muammar Gaddafi’s nuclear weapons ambitions is among the U.S. 
Intelligence Community’s most significant achievements and a striking example of U.S. 
intelligence support for the NPT. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Gaddafi made 
repeated attempts to obtain nuclear weapons.  In seeking nuclear weapons technology and 
nuclear weapons, however, his regime engaged in negotiations with countries that were, 
like Libya itself, signatories to the NPT.  The U.S. IC was able to expose and thus abort 
these attempted treaty violations.  Eventually, Gaddafi was forced to recognize that these 
efforts were too costly and that he would benefit more by abandoning his pursuit of 
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nuclear weapons in order to secure the right to join the international community of 
nations.91 
The Libyan example demonstrated how difficult it could be to identify treaty 
violators absent covert monitoring.  While the NPT did not include a monitoring regime, 
signatories to the agreement enlisted the IAEA to perform this function.  In the cases of 
both the NTP and the Kyoto Protocol, treaty signatories anticipated being able to rely on 
signatory honor to greater degree than subsequent experience justified.  The NPT 
included a provision for “safeguards” whereby NNWS would permit inspections of the 
civilian use nuclear facilities that received technical and material assistance from NWSs.  
In her book, China, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, China and nonproliferation 
specialist Wendy Frieman notes, “The notion that a country would establish a clandestine 
nuclear weapons program in parallel with a safeguarded civilian program was not 
contemplated at the outset of the regime.”92  This is, in fact, what countries including 
Libya and Iran, proceeded to do. Signatories to the NPT have progressively increased the 
scope of the monitoring activity, largely in reaction to attempts by both signatories and 
non-signatories to contravene the treaty’s provisions and the IAEA’s ability to uncover 
violations.  There should be little doubt, however, that without the involvement of the 
U.S. IC, no effective monitoring of the NPT would have been possible.    
Analysts of the Kyoto Protocol have attributed much of the treaty’s failings to a 
lack of any ability to verify compliance.  Environmental treaty scholar Scott Barrett 
addresses the issue head on, noting: 
Where verification is difficult, monitoring will be especially important. Very 
often, the payoff to one country of complying with a treaty will depend on whether the 
other parties are also complying with it. Even the suspicion that others are not complying 
with a treaty may cause cooperation to unravel. Put differently, if cheating can’t be 
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detected then it can’t be punished; if it can’t be punished then it can’t be deterred; and if 
it can’t be deterred then cooperation can’t be sustained by the treaty’s bootstraps.93   
Given the difficulty of verifying ICELA compliance with exclusively open 
monitoring, it follows that without intelligence agency resources, the chances of success 
for a future ICELA may be greatly diminished.  
Should countries attempt to intentionally skirt the provisions of a future ICELA, 
an ICCME may be similarly suited to uncovering such efforts.  Indeed the well-
publicized existence of such a U.S. IC initiative would be likely to discourage any 
country from attempting to evade the treaty provisions.  In discussing the design of a 
monitoring mechanism for a future international greenhouse gas reduction agreement, the 
authors of the GHGIS paper note that, “the primary benefit of GHGIS is not achieved by 
accurate outputs alone, but from the expectation that GHGIS outputs will be accurate and 
definitive and, in turn, induce behavioral change by governments or international 
actors.”94 Properly applied, information provided by intelligence agencies could serve to 
direct GHGIS focus, increasing the likelihood both of identifying violators and of 
ultimate treaty success.  
Nevertheless, caution must be employed in comparing the Libyan success with 
the prospects for using Intelligence Community findings to induce change in an ICELA 
violator’s behavior.  In joining together in a nonproliferation treaty, countries legitimize 
the future use of force against any signatory that violates the agreement.  Gaddafi was 
aware that the ultimate price for continuing his pursuit of nuclear weapons could well be 
foreign armed intervention. Tripoli had already been the target of U.S. bombers in April 
of 1986.  It is unimaginable that the U.S. or the international community would initiate or 
countenance armed enforcement of a future ICELA.  Though an ICELA might include 
sanctions for treaty violators, it is self-interest and the preservation of a county’s good 
international standing that will inspire treaty compliance among most treaty signatories.  
Injudicious use of intelligence could undermine the legitimacy of the international treaty 
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monitoring regime, and ultimately prompt rejection of the treaty by the citizens of the 
identified treaty violator country.  Before considering the important similarities between 
the NPT and Kyoto or a future ICELA, it is important to establish the limits of the 
analogy by focusing attention on the dynamics underlying international cooperation on 
environmental issues. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY DYNAMICS  
Nonproliferation treaties are, ultimately, military treaties. Countries purchase 
some assurance of protection from real or potential military aggression in exchange for 
their own agreement to refrain from aggressive behaviors, or to support the use of force 
to protect other treaty signatories from aggression.  At the end of this exchange, as in 
Libyan example, lies the prospect of military action against a treaty violator.  
The NPT is only one tactic employed by some countries to encourage other 
countries to forego acquiring nuclear weapons. In certain instances, individual countries 
have acted preemptively to keep rival countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.  Israel’s 
attack on Iraq in 1991, on Syria in 2007, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 are 
examples.95 The NPT suggests to those countries considering the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons (like Iran) that if they forego nuclear weapons, there is a better chance that some 
of their nearby rivals will agree to forego them as well. In any case, should there be a 
military will to prevent another country from pursing nuclear weapons, the treaty will 
only retard or accelerate the employment of that military option by making it more or less 
politically palatable.  Though the U.S. desired U.N. endorsement of the Iraq invasion, it 
was prepared to act unilaterally regardless.    
In fact the NPT was composed of three “pillars.”  Two of these, non-proliferation 
and the peaceful use of nuclear technology (i.e., the sharing of nuclear technology by 
nuclear weapons states with non-nuclear weapons states) will be shown to parallel 
analogous aspects of the Kyoto Protocol.  Fewer weapons and the sharing of nuclear 
technology for peaceful purposes are echoed in Kyoto’s aspirations for reduced CO2 
emissions and the sharing of “clean technologies.”  But it is perhaps the NPT’s remaining 
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“pillar” (i.e., the notion that nuclear weapons countries would eventually disarm)96 that 
most resembles Kyoto or a future ICELA.  Whether realistically or not, the NPT 
originally envisioned the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.  Four decades after 
the NPT was negotiated, however, there is little discussion regarding universal nuclear 
disarmament.  While arguably vital for the maintenance of world stability, the NPT’s 
non-proliferation objectives merely required that the status quo be upheld.  Universal 
disarmament, like a hypothetical ICELA, would require that individual countries trust 
one another’s intentions enough to risk the erosion of their relative geostrategic power.  
Were the U.S. ever to consider comprehensive nuclear disarmament, the role of the IC in 
evaluating that option—determining the strategic intentions of potential rivals—might 
more resemble the task of a future ICCME.  
If the U.S. or China refuse to participate in an ICELA, and continue to pollute, it 
will only be moral suasion that will change their behavior.  Were China to reduce its 
import of oil unilaterally, that would only make oil cheaper in the U.S. and so increase 
the incentive for the U.S. to refuse to “abate.”  The rest of the world might want to punish 
the U.S. economically, but whatever economic sanctions they might be able to coordinate 
would be insignificant compared to the U.S.'s economic incentive for burning oil.  In 
part, because they can only be sustained through cooperation—not military threats—
scholars have devoted attention to environmental treaties as a unique area of study.   
1. Game Theory  
For over two decades, there has been growing interest in the lessons game theory 
may have for a future international greenhouse gas limitation agreement.  Of particular 
focus has been the question of which particular “game” most resembles the current global 
situation.  While it may only be in the hindsight of a successful or unsuccessful 
agreement that such a determination will be possible, the theories are helpful in 
identifying the situational variables that bear on treaty signatory decisions about treaty 
participation and compliance.  Though these variables are largely determined by existing 
conditions, some, including participant evaluations of the costs and benefits of treaty 
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participation, are subject to modification, sometimes with a significant impact on the 
likelihood of treaty success.97  Thus far, the literature does not address the question of IC 
monitoring of these agreements directly, nonetheless game theory highlights the 
importance of “player” confidence in the behavior of fellow treaty signatories.   
Three game theory concepts are commonly employed in discussions of 
international treaties.  These are the prisoner’s dilemma,98 the Nash equilibrium, and 
Pareto optimality.  States engage in treaties for many different reasons, and their 
motivations regarding adherence or defection from them cannot be easily isolated or 
quantified.  The concepts, like those referred to above, however, help in discussing the 
influence that information about treaty compliance is likely to exert on countries as they 
contemplate treaty participation and their own adherence to treaty provisions. 
Countries that enter into an international agreement cannot know with certainty 
whether the other signatory(ies) will adhere to their agreements or “defect.”  In the 
language of CO2 limitations agreements, treaty signatories either “abate” or “pollute.”  
The relevance of the prisoner’s dilemma to an international CO2 limitation agreement 
and monitoring in general is that the monitoring will allow the “prisoners” (i.e., the treaty 
signatories) more insight into their treaty counterparts’ intentions.  If the prisoners can 
communicate and, more importantly, know the others’ true intentions, both can benefit 
from the optimal outcome. 
Academics have performed experiments with test subjects in order to determine 
their behavior under repeated iterations of the prisoner’s dilemma game.  The results 
suggest that the test subjects will increasingly cooperate towards a point of equilibrium as 
they accumulate more knowledge about their counterparts’ past behaviors.   
The idea that knowledge about a treaty counterpart’s behavior will lead towards a 
maximum equilibrium is where the prisoner’s dilemma may be said to converge on the 
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“Nash equilibrium.”  The Nash equilibrium is the point at which all parties to an 
agreement have determined their maximum level of agreement participation—what they 
are willing to sacrifice in order to gain the agreement’s promised benefits—based on each 
participant’s knowledge that all other participants will adhere to their current level of 
commitment (sacrifice), and not vary from it.   
Importantly, there may actually be multiple or even infinite “Nash equilibria” in 
any international agreement corresponding to different sets of treaty signatory behavior.  
At the extreme end of these different possible points of Nash equilibrium is the Pareto 
optimality.  This theoretical limit is where the commitment (sacrifice) of all parties to the 
agreement achieves the maximum level of aggregate benefit (e.g., the greatest reduction 
in CO2 emissions).  
Theorists build models of treaty adherence based on the concepts, including those 
described above.  Unfortunately, the models only roughly approximate reality in that 
countries and their negotiators do not typically negotiate as equals (i.e., because of their 
relative economic and military power, or the authority that they exercise within their 
government or society varies significantly).  Likewise, negotiators may ostensibly 
negotiate with a similar agenda, but in fact are more likely to be motivated by any variety 
of objectives.  Nevertheless, the conceptual framework supported by the concepts 
described above help in discussing and isolating the variety of issues involved in treaty 
negotiation and participation.  They demonstrate, for instance, the fundamental benefits 
provided by treaty transparency and monitoring reliability.   
Rather, directly deciding the outcome of the “game,” effective treaty verification 
may help determine the conditions under which the game is played.  “Games” are 
modeled on whether or not participants have full knowledge of the influence that their 
own behavior will have on other participants.  To the extent that intelligence can increase 
player confidence about the future, it can help optimize the “equilibria” points upon 
which players settle.   
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2. The Geopolitical Balance: U.S. and China  
In their paper, “Game Theory and Climate Diplomacy,” DeCanio and Fremstad 
discuss the situation wherein two potential treaty participants may prefer to “play abate,” 
rather than continue to pollute, but fear that substantially reducing their use of fossil fuels 
will provide the other player, their geopolitical rival, with a strategic advantage in the 
form of relatively less expensive energy.99  The authors thus model the current situation 
confronting the U.S. and China (discussed at greater length in Chapter V).  Both 
countries may contemplate reducing their use of fossil fuel in order to address the threat 
of unmitigated anthropogenic contributions to climate change but realize that, should 
their rival not abate as well, their sacrifice will ultimately prove insufficient to stop the 
worst effects of climate change.  According to DeCanio and Fremstad, the only solution 
in this case is for both powers to reach an agreement to play abate.  Implicit in their 
discussion is that both parties will find it in their best interest to continue to adhere to the 
agreement, so long as they remain confident that their rival will continue to do so as 
well.100 
Perhaps the greatest benefit in the discussion of these game theory concepts is the 
common ground that they provide for two divergent conceptual schools of international 
law, the “realists” who suggest that “international law” is ultimately an oxymoron (i.e., 
that states will inevitably do what is in their individual best interest) and the “idealists” 
who believe that the normative sum of the growing body of international law does more 
to compel the behavior of states  than the individual treaty parts that make it up.101  
Regardless of whether a student of international law is more inclined to embrace the 
realist or idealist school, the tools provided by game theory highlight the benefits of 
increasing or maximizing participants’ knowledge regarding their collective and 
individual treaty compliance (i.e., the potential benefits of supplementing overt treaty 
monitoring with covert sources and methods).   
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3. Changing Games  
An important question for theorists, and ultimately for all inhabitants of the 
planet, is whether the world in fact find itself in a prisoner dilemma situation, or another 
game theory variant initially referred to as the “stag hunt,” which is more recently known 
as a “cooperation game.”102  In a cooperation game, players realize that they can only 
achieve the maximum outcome by coordinating their actions with other players.  In the 
realm of climate change mitigation, game theory suggests a far greater chance of treaty 
success if the game played is one of cooperation rather than of conflict.103  Knowledge 
about the behavior of other game participants represents a radical change in “prisoner 
dilemma” game conditions.  So long as all participants believe that the sacrifices they 
make individually will be amply rewarded by the good represented by efforts of other 
participants, they have no reason to “defect” from the agreement.  As evidence of 
adherence mounts, the agreement becomes self-enforcing.  This ideal situation is 
described by natural resource economist Scott Barrett who notes:  
Suppose that the players in Stage 1 can correctly forecast that the players in Stage 
2 will correctly forecast how the players in Stage 3 will behave.  The equilibrium will be 
especially compelling in the sense that the players’ beliefs will be confirmed by the 
choices actually made in later stages of the game.104    
By increasing the level of commonly available participant behavior information, 
monitoring efforts like those proposed by the GHGIS or the ICCME hypothesized in this 
thesis can likewise increase the likelihood that the game played will be of coordination 
rather than of conflict.105   
4. Player Calculations  
Regardless of a state’s constitutional order, an understanding its citizens’ 
expectations aids in understanding the bounds of that state’s actions.  In his book, 
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Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making, Scott 
Barrett, previously quoted, describes the ways that current game theory sheds light on the 
prospects of any international environmental agreement.  In proposing his analysis, 
however, Barnett adds an important caveat.  Although game theory requires the observer 
to assume the players involved, in the case of treaties, nations are unitary actors: 
[This] is an assumption that we know is untrue.  States are represented at 
international negotiations by their governments, but governments are not 
imbued with a fixed set of preferences.  A government’s position on any 
given issue is rather determined by an internal negotiation, even if final 
decisions are made by the executive.  International negotiations normally 
involve a variety of agencies or ministries, and the interest of these parties 
are in turn influenced by lobbyists representing the views of various 
associations, including grassroots environmental organizations and 
business groups… The negotiation supergame is thus a huge and complex 
system, incorporating a rich and far-from-uniform set of domestic political 
institutions.106   
As described in the previous discussion on game theory, a state of equilibrium is 
achieved when all players assume that they cannot improve their individual payoff by 
changing their own behavior given the behavior of the other player(s).  To the extent that 
players can be confident that the other player(s) will not “defect” from the agreement, an 
optimal level of participant contribution may be maintained.  Suggestions that the 
agreement might be either ineffective or inequitable will alter the accounting that each 
player (state) makes regarding the utility it derives from adhering to the agreement. A 
recalculation may compel one or more players to change their behavior (i.e., to “defect”).  
The greater public confidence in the agreement, the greater its perceived utility, and the 
more interest the state’s central authority has in appearing to adhere to the agreement.  (A 
government so inclined might feign adherence but will not do so if the cost of pretending 
to adhere to the agreement exceeds the cost of genuine compliance.  The international 
monitoring regime and the IC’s monitoring efforts may act, in effect, to increase a 
country’s cost of attempting to hide its defection.)  For the purpose of an ICELA, this is 
where public perception and the unitary “will” of the state converge.  In so far as the 
ICCME increases the public’s faith in the ICELA’s equity and reliability, the greater the 
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utility of ICELA adherence for the state, and the more cost it will endure to secure the 
benefit derived by the perception—justified or not—that it is respecting the ICELA’s 
provisions.   
Analysts have identified a similar dynamic at work under treaty regimes that 
regulate weapons of mass destruction.  In a paper commissioned by the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Commission, Jim Walsh wrote: 
The treaty is stronger when member states believe that the treaty is 
working and that nations can be counted on to abide by the rules. It is 
weaker when governments believe that the treaty is not working or failing. 
A perception of failure encourages states to consider alternatives such as 
hedging and gives pro-bomb advocates an opening to make their case.107   
Likewise, to the extent that the ICCME increases the difficulty (i.e., cost) of 
concealing a violation of the ICELA’s provisions, the greater the likelihood that states 
will, in fact, respect their commitments.  In fact, analysts of the Kyoto Protocol have 
attributed much of the treaty’s failings to a lack of any ability to verify compliance.  
Environmental treaty scholar Scott Barrett addresses the issue head on, noting:  
Where verification is difficult, monitoring will be especially important. Very 
often, the payoff to one country of complying with a treaty will depend on whether the 
other parties are also complying with it. Even the suspicion that others are not complying 
with a treaty may cause cooperation to unravel. Put differently, if cheating can’t be 
detected then it can’t be punished; if it can’t be punished then it can’t be deterred; and if 
it can’t be deterred then cooperation can’t be sustained by the treaty’s bootstraps.108   
Given the difficulty of verifying ICELA compliance with exclusively overt 
monitoring, it follows that without intelligence agency resources, the chances of success 
for a future ICELA may be greatly diminished.  
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C. COMPARATIVE TREATIES: NPT AND KYOTO 
1. How the NPT and Kyoto Split the World  
Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, it can be said to have met with mixed 
results.  While subsequent to 1970, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea developed 
nuclear weapons, many countries who might otherwise have gained access to the bomb 
have not.109  The NPT, which required signatories that possessed nuclear weapons to aid 
in the development of peaceful nuclear technology among countries that did not, was 
inspired by a concern that the likelihood of using nuclear weapons grew as the number of 
countries possessing them increased.  So, in return for the non-nuclear weapons states 
(NNWS) forgoing the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons states (NWS) 
offered to share their civilian use nuclear technology.  (As previously noted, an noted 
again below, the Kyoto Protocol likewise includes a technology transfer, in this case for 
less polluting means of producing energy, for less technologically developed countries.)  
Though there have been many attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, by NNWS to 
obtain nuclear weapons technology and nuclear weapons, many observers point to the 
fact that relatively few nations possess nuclear weapons as a testament to the treaty’s 
overall success.110 
Kyoto represents a similar lopsided bargain.  In achieving their high standard of 
living, developed countries have saturated the atmosphere with CO2.  In order to forestall 
climate change, they would pledge to reduce their carbon emissions, but in exchange 
would ask developing countries to give up the hope of achieving many of the 
technological benefits made possible by cheap energy.  Developing countries naturally 
objected to what they considered an unfair proposition.  Most developed countries 
conceded that a more equitable approach to limiting global CO2 emissions would need to 
be adopted.  In addition to agreeing not to require developing countries make hard 
quantitative CO2 emissions reduction commitments in Kyoto, part of the developed 
countries’ “concession” included a transfer of clean energy technology to the developing 
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signatories.  Importantly, there was no objective way of precisely weighing the costs and 
benefits that accrued to the different players in this negotiation.  Climate “equity” would 
remain in the eye of the beholder. 
2. Institutional Treaty Advocates and Opponents 
Achieving a perception of equity is fundamental to any treaty negotiation.  States 
are likely to recognize the benefits to their survival in meta-outcomes like 
nonproliferation and climate stability.  However, political actors within these states must 
reconcile their state’s fortunes with their own political survival.  Inherently unstable 
international agreements—because equity is not quantifiable—suggest an inability to 
reach an equilibrium state.  Both the NPT and Kyoto have been plagued by imperfect 
signatory adherence.   
While it is possible for international critics to deride the NPT as too frequently 
ineffective, some observers find the treaty’s success remarkable.  At the time the NPT 
was established, realist logic suggested future world of nuclear armed countries.  As 
countries acquired the bomb, their neighbors, many felt sure, would feel compelled to 
seek their own nuclear weapons as well.  The reason for the NPT’s success, it has been 
suggested, is that an international agreement itself represents a strong impediment to 
movement away from an established status quo.  Referring to proponents of nuclear 
weapons development programs, Jim Walsh notes:  
The advocates know that once the bomb is built, it is very difficult—
though not impossible—to reverse course. Conversely, opponents push for 
a terminal commitment such as joining the NPT (i.e., a decision to 
abandon nuclear weapons once and for all).  They know that once such a 
commitment is made, it is very difficult—though not impossible—to 
revive a bomb program.111   
Although it is frequently assumed that the NPT encourages countries to forgo 
nuclear weapons by assuring them that their potential nuclear adversaries will not obtain 
nuclear weapons, some analysts suggest that this is not the reason that countries continue 
to adhere to the treaty.  An alternative hypothesis is that, in ratifying the treaty, countries 
alter the dynamics of their own internal politics, undermining the cohesion of those 
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domestic forces who would otherwise continue to pursue nuclear weapons. Typically, for 
example, the military initially joins with the opponents of signing the treaty.  Once the 
treaty is signed, however, the military no longer has an institutional role in the discussion.  
Those treaty opponents who might otherwise wait for a more sympathetic regime or a 
later opportunity to once again advocate for leaving the NPT, have at that point lost the 
military as an ally, and so the very act of signing the treaty in fact increases the likelihood 
that the country will continue supporting it.112  Whether or not either of the two above 
explanations accounts for the NPT’s longevity among the majority of the nations of the 
world, clearly the support or opposition of impacted domestic institutions play an 
essential role in determining the success of any international agreement.  Similarly, by 
encouraging countries to develop alternative sources of energy, and thus creating and 
empowering strong advocacy groups for those alternatives, an ICELA with a more 
aggressive administrative mechanism than Kyoto could undermine the political 
hegemony of the fossil fuel industry.  The fossil fuel industry is likely to take a keen 
interest in negotiations regarding the country’s participation in any future ICELA.113   
As will be discussed in the chapter that follows, U.S. opponents of an ICELA will 
likely focus attention on the question of equity and suggest that concessions made to 
other countries would be unfair to Americans. The designers of the ICCME should, at 
any rate, anticipate a contentious political environment.  Nevertheless, properly 
constituted, the ICCME could serve to forestall the efforts of internal domestic treaty 
opponents.  The ICCME will be able to do so only if its assigned mission unambiguously 
prioritizes success of the ICELA, and if the ICCME is held accountable for that mission 
in a highly visible forum, such as the floor of Congress.  If, however, the ICCME mission 
is embedded within an invisible bureaucracy, it is likely that the integrity of its mission 
will succumb to the influences of other powerful executive branch institutions.  
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3. Treaty Provisions  
Both the NPT and Kyoto Protocol have frequently been criticized for their vague 
language.  Lack of clarity in the NPT elicited protests from non-nuclear weapons 
countries who accused the nuclear weapons countries of arbitrarily imposing restrictions 
beyond those to which the NNWS had originally agreed.  In some instances, the NPT 
language was modified during treaty re-negotiations.114    
It is likely that negotiators of a future ICELA will benefit from the lessons of 
Kyoto and that the treaty provisions will be written with greater precision.  During 
negotiations of any future ICELA, the U.S. ICCME should similarly advocate for clear 
definitions and expectations, as ambiguous language is likely to complicate the task of 
any monitoring regime, whether that monitoring be overt or covert.  In the case of the 
NPT, vague language could be blamed for in encouraging behaviors that clearly violated 
the intent but not the letter of the treaty.  In the case of the ICELA, imprecision is likely 
to lead to arguments that can only prove corrosive to the sense of shared purpose and 
trust needed to sustain the treaty.  In such an atmosphere of mistrust, the work of the 
ICCME is more likely to be perceived as partisan.  
4. Sovereignty Concerns: The Case of Saddam Hussein and Weapons 
Inspections  
While any treaty elicits concerns regarding national sovereignty, it is treaty 
monitoring to which countries are most reluctant to submit.  Countries’ aversion to 
monitoring was remarkably evident in the aftermath of the events at the Fukushima 
power plant.  Since that event, in three separate major international nuclear summits and 
despite the concerns raised by the Fukushima disaster, countries refused to grant the 
IAEA greater power to inspect civilian use nuclear power facilities.115 
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The importance of the sovereignty issue cannot be overstated.  In the case of Iraq, 
for example, Saddam Hussein either refused or hindered monitoring efforts long after his 
regime had abandoned its efforts to build a nuclear weapon.  Among many in the 
international community Saddam’s behavior led to an assumption that Saddam’s regime 
continued to conceal illegal weapons—or at least it’s illegal weapons production efforts.  
It is likely Saddam’s obstructionism was if fact aimed at impressing his domestic 
audience with the regime’s resolve in refusing to allow their country’s sovereignty to be 
“violated.”  By refusing or hindering monitoring efforts, Iraq elicited more intense 
monitoring efforts by the international community, resulting in a “vicious circle” of 
mistrust.116 
The question of sovereignty poses an obstacle for negotiators who might attempt 
to provide a future ICELA GHGIS with the monitoring authority needed to verify treaty 
compliance.  In some ways the task is even more daunting than the one that confronted 
NPT negotiators because the types and scope of activities that generate CO2 include 
virtually every activity conducted within a country’s borders.117  For those inclined to see 
international monitoring within their country’s borders as a violation of their territorial 
sovereignty, the GHGIS could indeed provoke opposition. 
Some countries have already indicated reluctance to submit to any intrusive CO2 
limitation monitoring regime.  As reported in the Economist, during the Copenhagen 
Conference of the Parties in 2009 (one of the UNFCCC’s annual negotiations), the U.S. 
representatives suggested that countries be more transparent in regard to their CO2 
emissions.  In response, Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh asked, “Are you 
worried China and India will make up our figures?”  The same Economist article went on 
to note that, in 2006 according to the Chinese government, up to a fifth of China’s power 
plants were illegal.118   
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Compounding the challenge of monitoring absent in situ sensors and on-site 
inspections is the simple inability of many countries to accurately determine their own 
CO2 emissions.  China’s difficulties in this regard will be discussed in due course.  
Assuming that resistance to on-site inspections persists and such inspections are not 
incorporated into the final treaty provisions, the existence of a competent U.S. ICCME 
may play an important role in maintaining confidence in the ICELA among all 
signatories.  Indeed, the sources and methods available to the IC will contribute to the 
assessment of whether a country’s CO2 limitation efforts are in fact genuine (i.e., 
reflected in that country’s internal communications).  
In the context of treaty monitoring, it is instructive also to consider the dispute 
that arose during negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was 
adopted by the United Nations in 1996.  This dispute echoed the same “have” versus 
“have not” division between nuclear weapons state (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons 
state (NNWS) discussed earlier.  In this case, the U.S. insisted that on-site inspections 
(OSI) be triggered when “national technical means” (NTM), essentially satellites and 
aircraft, of any of the signatory states expose evidence of a treaty violation. Because not 
all signatories had access to this technology, however, many objected.  Some viewed this 
provision as a means for more technologically endowed nations to bully and harass the 
others.119  The particular case of China’s objections, along with the possible motivations 
for them, will be explored in the next section.  Suffice it here to note that these objections 
suggested the reluctance that developing countries might have to the possibility that 
evidence collected by the U.S. independently might be used to determine the treaty 
compliance of other nations.  It will be difficult, however, for other countries to refuse 
U.S. IC support for the ICELA as long as the ICCME is structured so as to inspire 
international confidence in the transparency of its process, and in the impartiality of its 
results.  Ultimately, it  
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will be the subjectively perceived legitimacy of the ICELA monitoring efforts, rather 
than their objective precision, that will foster trust and willingness within nations to make 
the sacrifices required to reduce CO2 emissions.   
During the negotiations of the CTBT, the U.S. position prevailed and NTM were 
accepted as one trigger for OSIs.120  To date, however, no CTBT OSI has been called for.  
Should OSIs be included among the provisions of any future ICELA, however, it seems 
doubtful that countries would submit to inspections based solely on the assertions of a 
single other treaty signatory.  Chinese leaders, for example, would risk being seen to have 
compromised their country’s sovereignty should they allow OSI within China based on 
U.S. technological superiority—as will be demonstrated more amply in the subsequent 
discussion of China. 
5. Enforcement 
Enforcement of the NTP has generally depended to the use of bilateral diplomacy 
by the most influential treaty signatories, chiefly the U.S.  Individual treaty signatories 
have brought pressure to bear on treaty violators.  The enforcement dynamic is contingent 
on differences between how individual treaty signatories perceive their security 
relations.121  In most cases, some quid pro quo accompanies the resolution of the issue, as 
will later be seen in a more detailed discussion of U.S. efforts to persuade China to 
respect the NPT provisions.  In certain cases, where the perceived threat is particularly 
acute, NPT signatories have, through their representatives on the IAEA Board of 
Governors, the ability to refer a treaty violator to the UN Security Council.122  
Ultimately, referral to the Security Council exposes a recalcitrant nation to possible 
sanctions or the use of force. 
As noted previously, it is likely that any future ICELA will include both clearer 
language than that found in the Kyoto Protocol and an accompanying monitoring regime, 
which Kyoto lacked.  Whether or not the signatories of a future ICELA will be able to 
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devise any type of enforcement mechanism is unknown.  The NPT benefits from the 
ability of treaty signatories to bring military action against a treaty violator in an extreme 
case, something that will never occur in the case of a future ICELA.  Nonetheless, to the 
extent that the ICELA achieves wide international participation and legitimacy, it will be 
able to exert a degree of moral suasion far beyond that of the NPT.  The NPT is only as 
strong as the will of its most determined member.  In this respect, a future ICELA 
diverges widely from the NPT.  It is the global legitimacy of the ICELA that will 
constitute its most powerful “deterrent” to treaty violation, not the threat of military 
action by at most a handful of treaty signatories.  Therefore, it is essential that in 
designing the ICCME great care be employed to ensure that ICCME operations enhance 
rather than undermine trust in the ICELA. 
6. But Is It Fair?  
Before trust in the treaty regime can be fostered, there must first be a perception 
that the agreement itself is fair.  Establishing and maintaining this perception will be the 
treaty regime’s most daunting task.  Though the analogy between nuclear weapons and 
CO2 emissions has practical limitations, a comparison of the NPT and Kyoto does 
highlight a persistent and inescapable division between the “have” countries and the 
“have not” countries.  Because there can be no definitive means of measuring the relative 
sacrifice made by either side, treaty detractors on both sides can always challenge the 
legitimacy of the agreement.  The negotiations of both the NPT and Kyoto elicited 
dissention within countries because of what opponents could easily characterized as their 
underlying inequity.  Overcoming these objections was achieved only through a 
tremendous diplomatic effort.  Scott Barrett described Kyoto as, “the most difficult 
environmental treaty negotiation ever attempted.”123  For a prospective ICCME, the 
primary challenge will be to identify treaty violations without fueling a perception of 
inequity that will continue to simmer just below the surface of any future ICELA. 
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IV. THE EQUITY IMPERATIVE: THE ICCME UNDER THE 
PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT  
The previous section drew attention to the fact that no violator of any future 
ICELA will ever confront a credible threat of military intervention.  This lack of a 
military enforcement option is perhaps what most distinguishes the ICELA from the 
NPT.  Even in the case of the NPT, no military intervention would be conceivable against 
other than a non-nuclear weapon state.  While sanctions or penalties might be invoked 
against an ICELA violator, this option runs into a practical roadblock; any impetus to 
punish a violator presupposes that the violator produces a significant quantity of CO2 
emissions.  Any country that produces a significant quantity of CO2 emissions, however, 
is unlikely to be easily influenced—if at all—by the threat of sanctions.  Moreover, 
sanctions against any such country are likely to hurt the economies of the very countries 
that would be called upon to enforce the sanctions.  Ensuring ICELA compliance, 
therefore, must be accomplished by encouraging the willing compliance of treaty 
signatories and their citizens.  
As discussed in the literature review, in identifying the forces involved in the 
design of government bureaucracies, scholars allocate little attention to the influence of 
public opinion.  Nevertheless, public perceptions and expectations constitute the waters 
within which the bureaucracy, federal elected officials, and interest groups navigate.  In 
an electoral democracy, public opinion is context.  To the degree that public attention is 
disengaged from an issue, political leaders can pursue many policies without undue 
concern for public opinion.  So long as its behavior is unobtrusive, the bureaucracy can 
likewise operate with considerable autonomy, since where public attention is lacking, 
political leaders are loath to invest their limited capital in overcoming bureaucratic 
willfulness.  In areas where the light of public attentiveness shines dimly, interest groups 
can determine, to a large degree, where politicians focus their attention and likewise 
impel or constrain bureaucratic activity.124  However, increased public attention alters 
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any existing equilibrium, and, if sustained, can result in the emergence of new political 
actors, and potentially initiate a new national trajectory. 
This thesis rests on the premise that climate change poses a first order national 
security concern and that all efforts should be directed at achieving a global agreement on 
reducing anthropogenic CO2 emissions. From this it follows that enlisting domestic and 
international public support for such efforts is essential. Therefore, the ICCME function 
must be accomplished without undermining the success of the international agreement 
that it will be designated to monitor.  Moreover, given that success of the agreement is 
essential to U.S. national security, the mission of the ICCME should be understood to be 
support for the international agreement—not to the exclusion of—but nonetheless above 
other considerations.  Unless this premise is internalized by those enlisted to perform the 
ICCME function, there is a real danger that, in carrying out its work, the ICCME will 
undermine U.S. and or international confidence in the equity and viability of the ICELA, 
and it serve to weaken the very agreement upon which national and global security will 
depend. 
Thus the task of the ICCME will include avoiding actions that will undermine 
public trust, while pursuing policies that will increase public confidence.  For this reason, 
it is important to consider the forces influencing, or which might influence, public 
perceptions as they relate to the ICCME mission.  Specifically, two essential mutually 
reinforcing issues deserve consideration: 1) the legitimacy of the link between 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions and climate change, and 2) the credibility of international 
government sponsored efforts to reduce these emissions.  Given that reducing the burning 
of fossil fuels implies economic sacrifice—at the very least during an initial period of 
transition to alternative energy sources—and that inequitably distributed and/or 
inadequate sacrifice will have limited impact on the problem, reducing anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions presupposes that the public trust both that the problem and its “solution” 
are credible.  If the public believes that the problem or its link to human activity is not 
real, then it will not sacrifice to solve it.  If the sacrifice is un-requited by other important 
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CO2 contributors, then the sacrifice will be, to a significant extent, for naught and the 
public will refuse to make the effort.125   
A. SECURITIZING CLIMATE CHANGE  
Well-funded and ingenious interest groups frequently influence public 
perceptions.  In the case of climate change and efforts to limit anthropogenic CO2 
emissions, observers have identified the successful stratagems employed by industry to 
alleviate public concern regarding the phenomenon.  These forces have fabricated the 
myth of a scientific community divided on the question of whether climate change is in 
fact occurring and, if so, whether human activity is the source of this change.  
Remarkably, they have succeeded in deceiving the public despite the fact that the level of 
scientific agreement on climate change is exceptional compared to most other fields of 
scientific inquiry.126  This effort and its success have a significant and well-documented 
precedent: the doubt seeded by cigarette companies before public acceptance of the link 
between cigarettes and cancer coalesced.127  Most notably, ExxonMobil has been 
implicated in the climate science disinformation campaign, and analysts consider the 
company’s recent relaxation of those efforts to be prompted by company concerns that it 
may one day find itself, like the cigarette companies, forced to pay compensation for its 
willful disregard for the public well-being.128   
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The reality of the climate change peril has long been recognized by the federal 
agencies whose areas of expertise encompass elements of the natural sciences, including 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the 
Department of Defense, and the National Aeronautics and Science Administration (NASA)129  In 
order to overcome resistance to climate change mitigation efforts, the Obama 
Administration, along with many other current and former officials and military officers, 
declared climate change to be an issue of “national security.”130  Hope has been 
expressed that the national security establishment’s engagement with the issue of climate 
change will help to highlight the legitimacy of the scientific consensus regarding both the 
anthropogenic origin and perils posed by the current climate phenomenon.131  
Securitization of environmental and other issues not associated with human 
adversaries has received attention by scholars.  Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde affirm that 
the idea of a “national security” threat is a social construct whose significance must be 
considered within its particular set of circumstances.  They argue against the notion of 
any objective set of criteria by which a “national security threat” can be evaluated.132 
Instead, they suggest that such a declaration is designed to move an issue out of the 
sphere of normal politics, to a protected area where the state can pursue policies that 
would normally be subjected to general scrutiny and opposition.133  Such a declaration, 
which Buzan et al., call a “speech act,” involves a complex alchemy, and, though the 
state does exercise a tremendous strategic advantage in invoking “national security” in 
that many of its actions can be hidden behind a cloak of secrecy, such declarations may 
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nevertheless elicit opposition.134  As Buzan et al., explain, “The security act is negotiated 
between securitizer and audience-that is, internally within the unit-but thereby the 
securitizing agent can obtain permission to override rules that would otherwise bind 
it.”135  
Thus far, the Obama Administration’s attempt to “securitize” climate change has 
met with tenacious congressional opposition.136 The inherent complexity of climate 
change has meant that any national narrative regarding the phenomenon can be distorted 
by opponents.137  Viewed within this context, it is difficult not to see the closing of the 
CIA’s Climate Change Center as a capitulation by the current administration.  Whether or 
not the closing will further embolden opponents of action to mitigate climate change, it 
underscores the efficacy of their tactics.  Upon the closing of the Climate Change Center, 
CIA representatives noted that the activities of the center would be integrated into other 
agency operations.  In fact, closing the center may have simply been a means of reducing 
the administration’s “exposure” to an issue that resonated among a large number of its 
opponents.138  
1. Securitization Opponents  
One important difference then between nonproliferation and climate change, in so 
far as securitization is concerned, is that proliferation of nuclear weapons was 
successfully securitized, and the state could exercise dominion over entities who would 
like to be able to sell, for example, the components for making a nuclear bomb to all 
comers.  Thus far, however, although the President has deemed climate change a matter 
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of national security, this has had no significant practical effect. In addition, it has not 
permitted the federal government to assume extraordinary powers to regulate CO2 
emissions as a national security threat, or for the federal government to yet enter into an 
international agreement whereby the federal government could limit the use of fossil 
fuels.  Aside from the practical differences in the effect of regulating the components of 
nuclear weapons as opposed to CO2 emissions, humans react with more intensity to the 
dangers of deliberate harm posed by other humans than they do to those posed by other 
“natural” events.139  Ultimately, we may be less predisposed to recognize an 
environmental threat as opposed to, say, one posed by an aggressive rival.140 
Indeed, Buzan et al., note:  
One of the difficulties facing those attempting to securitize environmental 
issues is that the threats are both new (or newly discovered) and 
controversial regarding their existential urgency. Consequently, they do 
not (yet) have institutions, and they find themselves operating in a political 
context dominated by security institutions designed for other types of 
threat. 141  
Just as the climate has posed a novel concern for the CIA, it has proven easy for 
“climate deniers” to deride the CIA’s interest in the phenomenon.142  What Buzan et al., 
did not anticipate was that in attempting to securitize an issue, the state can instead 
provide a target for opponents of the policies the state hopes to promote through the 
securitization process.  It appears that this is what has occurred thus far in the case of 
climate change and the CIA’s now defunct Climate Change Center.   
In fact, the same forces currently most associated with opposition to climate 
change mitigation initiatives are likewise those which have expressed distrust of the 
federal government.  “Grass roots” organizations, like the Tea Party, have received a 
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significant part of their funding from interests associated with fossil fuel industries.143  
These interests have succeeded in conflating climate change mitigation initiatives with 
the danger of excessive government power.  Even outside the U.S., researchers have 
noted that many of the most ardent climate deniers see their opposition to climate change 
mitigation efforts as a public service.  In their study of Australian climate skeptics, Kersty 
Hobson and Simon Niemeyer described:  
…a profound distrust of a range of authority figures and a somewhat 
hubristic conviction in their viewpoint, making individuals loaded onto 
this discourse actively opposed to talk of, and action on, climate 
change.144   
B. THE CHALLENGE OF CONSOLIDATING MITIGATION EFFORTS  
Again the complexity of climate change, including the broad range of conceivable 
policy actions to mitigate the phenomenon, put advocates of climate change mitigation at 
a disadvantage to climate deniers.  Researchers have postulated that marshaling unified 
public response to a threat depends on being able to provide three elements:  
1. a credible communicator,  
2. a specific warning about a specific event, and  
3. a concrete course of action for the public to pursue.145   
Tellingly, Ezra Markowitz and Azim Shariff, two researchers who have studied 
the reasons that climate change “fails to activate people’s moral alarm system,” have 
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found that it is in part because of the issue’s “abstract, distal and uncertain outcomes.”146 
Given that credibility depends more on the perceiver than the messenger, advocates of 
climate change mitigation find themselves handicapped in attempting to overcome the 
appeal of opponents who can offer more specific, albeit fallacious, warnings and more 
concrete courses of action to their likeminded supporters.  Advocates of climate change 
mitigation efforts can call upon science to support their predictions; however, these 
predictions are of a slowly unraveling litany of future events likely to occur at 
unknowable intervals.  In the words of Markowitz and Shariff, “Climate change 
possesses few features that generate rapid, emotional visceral reactions: it is an abstract, 
temporally and spatially distant phenomenon consisting of many different, disparate and 
seemingly incongruous events.”147 Climate deniers can, on the other hand, warn fellow 
skeptics that each coming election could bring draconian environmental laws and higher 
fuel prices.  While advocates of climate change mitigation offer an array of suggestions 
about altering personnel behaviors and the need for increased international cooperation, a 
lack of a specific common course of action with any prospect of altering the climate 
outcome characterizes much of the their rhetoric.  
In addition, climate change deniers can, as occasions present themselves, appeal 
to their supports to simply vote against mitigation initiatives or against politicians who 
might support such initiatives.  Most climate change mitigation strategists recognize that 
reducing global CO2 emissions in the quantities required to avoid the worst consequences 
of climate change can only be achieved by increasing the global cost of carbon based 
fuels relative to alternative sources of energy.148  The evidence is that science alone will 
not persuade members of the public, who will need to be convinced by sources that they 
consider credible.  These sources will likely be many, and members of the public are 
most likely to follow the example provided by climate change advocates close to them.149   
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Though local efforts to reduce carbon dependency are essential, alone they may 
simply displace the use of fossil fuels to locations where the resultant increase in the 
availability of carbon based fuels will lower carbon fuel costs.  Avoiding “leakage” 
entails a global concerted effort.  Still, if the global community is to heed the “warning” 
of climate cataclysm, then the global community must be provided a common agenda, 
like an ICELA, for reducing carbon consumption. This concerted action will hinge on 
trust—trust that might easily be undermined by injudicious use of the IC.  Markowitz and 
Shariff note,, “psychological research shows the powerful, positive effect of increasing 
perceived similarity, shared identity and superordinate goals on helping behaivour.”150 
Mitigating climate change will need to be framed as a superordinate goal that can only be 
attained through global cooperation.  Only by supporting an international ICELA 
monitoring regime in the most transparent fashion possible will the ICCME increase the 
perception that global efforts to reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions is a shared 
endeavor. 
C. THE DRIVERS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON CLIMATE CHANGE  
Ultimately, there may be little that scientists or scholars can do to alter the 
prevailing public opinion regarding climate change.  Frequent polling suggests that public 
opinion, in the aggregate, varies little over time.  Confusion, manufactured or otherwise, 
about the reality and origins of climate change remains relatively constant, although it is 
subject to moderate influence by the accuracy of media reporting.  Overall, however, this 
reporting has little effect, and what effect it does have is short lived.  What seems most to 
determine public opinion is party affiliation, and, more specifically, the positions adopted 
by what researchers refer to as “elites.”151  
Isolating the factors that influence the public’s opinion about climate change 
poses a challenge, in part due to a lack of consistent polling methodology over time.  
When asked to attribute the source of their opinions on climate change, those polled 
infrequently mention scientific reporting (eight to 10 percent), while nearly half said they 
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had arrived at their conclusions through personal observations about the weather.152  
However, underlying the attitudes of the respondents was a strong correlation with party 
affiliation, with roughly three quarters of democratic respondents answering that they 
agreed that there was “solid evidence” climate change was occurring, as opposed to only 
half of republican respondents.153  Polling about climate change has intensified in concert 
with the intensity of focus on the issue, but consistent long-term polling is generally 
lacking.  To overcome the lack of regularly measured data points, Brulle, Carmichael, 
and Jenkins devised a time series analysis whereby they isolated the effect of different 
variables on public opinion during the period from 2002 to 2008.  These variables 
included: “1) extreme weather events, 2) public access to accurate scientific information, 
3) media coverage, 4) elite cues,154 and 5) movement/countermovement  
 
advocacy.”155  Among “elite cues,” the study authors highlighted “Democratic 
Congressional action statements and Republican roll-call votes.”156 The study found that 
elites and group advocacy were what most influenced public opinion.157   
In light of these and other study results underlining the influence that elites have 
on public opinion, the so called “Climategate scandal” presents a strong cautionary 
example for advocates of action to mitigate climate change. “Climategate” involved a 
series of hacked email exchanges between climate researchers at the University of East 
Anglia over a 13-year period.158  Though the email exchange demonstrated nothing of 
significance about the way climate science was conducted, opponents of action to 
mitigate climate change nevertheless continued to use these hacked emails to great 
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effect.159  The ongoing ramifications of that incident underline the impact that even the 
suspicion of impropriety can have on public perceptions.  “Climategate” was exploited by 
climate change deniers to suggest that reputable climate scientists were in fact 
untrustworthy.  In so far as an ICCME is concerned, though its sources and methods must 
remain concealed, the need for transparency and credibility in its operational 
methodology and target selection criteria cannot be overstated. 
D. FAIRNESS, THE NEXT FRONT IN THE CLIMATE WAR  
Though a supposed scientific “dispute” as to the anthropogenic origins of climate 
change has dominated the global narrative for the last two decades, this controversy will 
not persist into the future.  Just as the causal link between cigarette smoking and cancer 
eventually emerged from the cigarette industry’s disinformation campaign as universally 
accepted fact, so too will the unhappy marriage between CO2 and climate change one 
day be consummated in the public’s mind.  In the wake of the devastation wrought by 
Hurricane Sandy, the declarations of mainstream politicians like New York Mayor 
Bloomberg affirming the association between the burning of fossil fuels and climate 
change offered an inkling of how quickly public perceptions might veer, or be steered, 
from their old course.160  Forces opposed to meaningful action to reduce global CO2 
emissions will find other justifications for procrastination.  Though there are arguments 
regarding the true economic costs of the measures needed to achieve meaningful 
reduction in global CO2 emissions, it is clear that substantial costs would have to be 
incurred.  Although the current global economic situation is particularly unfavorable for 
measures that would necessarily increase fuel prices, even in the more prosperous late 
1990s, economic arguments were already being leveled against U.S. adherence to the 
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Kyoto Protocol.161 Questions regarding the cost of mitigating climate change will not 
abate. 
Without U.S. support and participation, the achievements of the Kyoto Protocol 
were bound to be limited.  While certain observers contend that these accomplishments 
should not be discounted, it is clear that they are insignificant compared to the gravity of 
the problem. Still, in order to anticipate the tactics opponents of a future ICELA will 
adopt, Kyoto provides a strong indicator. 
Insufficient attention has been given to the reasons the U.S. failed to ratify Kyoto.  
Instead of arguing against the need for the treaty, critics, especially those in Congress, 
justified their stance against ratification by highlighting Kyoto’s underlying “unfairness.”  
By exempting developing countries from making proportional reductions in their 
emissions—regardless of the merits of the actual provisions or the strength of the 
arguments for differentiating between signatories—Kyoto provided U.S. opponents with 
an argument that resonated with U.S. elites.   
In the summer of 1997, during the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto 
agreement, the U.S. Senate voted 95-0 in favor of a resolution against U.S. ratification of 
Kyoto unless the greenhouse gas emissions reductions required of the industrialized 
countries were similarly imposed on developing countries (including China and India).162  
The Washington Post quoted Senator Larry Craig, head of the Republican Policy 
Committee, as saying that the treaty was “designed to give some nations a free ride, it is 
designed to raise energy prices in the United States and it is designed to perpetuate a new 
U.N. bureaucracy to manage global resource allocation.”163 
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Both within the U.S. and abroad, the problem of differentiating between 
developed and developing countries in any climate change agreement will persist.  The 
agreement reached in Kyoto did in fact recognize such a differentiation, and this appears 
to have contributed to the failure of the U.S. to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Developing 
countries will continue to argue that equity demands that the countries that have most 
contributed to the increase in atmospheric CO2 levels should likewise do more to reduce 
those levels than countries which have only recently begun to contribute to the problem.  
Though citizens in many developed countries have been sympathetic to this argument, as 
greater sacrifices are required it is not unreasonable to expect that there will be an 
increase in the polarization between the two sides.  Behavioral economists have identified 
the phenomenon of “self-serving bias,” or a strong tendency for individuals to conflate 
outcomes that, as shown through objective experimentation, disproportionately benefit 
themselves with equity.  This phenomenon has been identified as at least contributing to 
the paradoxical failure of labor contract negotiations that have resulted in outcomes 
considerably worse for one or both parties than what might have been achieved had not 
their self-serving bias distorted each party’s judgment about what was reasonable to 
expect from the other.164 
While some economists were initially loath to incorporate a “psychological” 
component to their models of behavior, the evidence for phenomenon like the self-
serving bias was too overwhelming to ignore.165  If the self-serving bias manifests in 
human behavior absent exogenous encouragement, it can be assumed that the type of 
concerted opposition already displayed by the “denier” movement will mobilize to 
provoke and reinforce public suspicion regarding the fairness of any future climate 
change agreement.  
The power of the self-serving bias will complicate the task of future climate treaty 
diplomats who must remain mindful of the perceptions of their domestic audience when 
negotiating with their international counterparts.  All treaty negotiators will have to 
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contend with their public’s willingness to sacrifice a more materially favorable outcome 
for one that the public perceives to be more equitable.166  While at first counterintuitive, 
researchers employing mathematical modeling have demonstrated why in fact this 
predilection for self-sacrifice makes evolutionary sense.  Within groups, the departure of 
“defectors” from the normative behavior could be punished in order to induce compliance 
among the remainder of the group members.  While the meting out of this punishment by 
one of the group’s “cooperators” might result in injury or death to the punisher, the threat 
of punishment ensured that defections were rare, and the benefits of group cohesion more 
than compensated for the very infrequent loss—temporary or otherwise—of the 
punisher’s contribution.  Group selection, favoring more cohesive groups, would lead to 
groups containing more punishers eventually predominating over those with fewer.167   
The equity imperative that reigns over much of human behavior is beneficial 
under normal conditions.  However, it can be a poor guide as nations move from 
situations where there are few variables for which to account, to highly complex 
circumstances that are less amenable to routine evaluations of what is “fair.”  In the case 
of climate change and the measures required to reduce the risks of further increasing the 
levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases, equitable distribution of needed sacrifices is 
bound to remain subjective for individuals and nations.  Under such circumstances, it is 
essential that mechanisms instituted in order to monitor any future agreement reinforce 
the global perception that agreed upon processes are being scrupulously respected.  To do 
otherwise will provide agreement opponents with opportunities to seed discord within 
nations and to drive wedges between treaty signatories. 
E. THE INVOCATION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES  
Clearly, the human predilection for fairness should not be seen as a negative 
attribute.  This tendency is integral to human existence as cooperative beings and to any 
hope of successfully confronting the challenge of anthropogenic climate change. 
However, much the world succeeds in mitigating climate change, the achievement will 
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depend on an ability to moderate the instincts that color judgment and to arrive at 
compromises recommended by reason. 
While opponents of action to mitigate climate change may seek advantage by 
exciting nations’ sensitivity to questions of “equity,” proponents of action can call upon 
these same inclinations to support their climate advocacy.  Though the risks of climate 
change bear down on the current age, the real danger they pose is to generations that will 
follow.  In mankind’s history, no such responsibility has yet rested on all humans 
individually and collectively, so there is no formal map to follow.  None of those living 
now will ever know the vast majority who will live with the consequences of the world’s 
current decisions, but few would question that something is owed them.  There are indeed 
commonsense rights and duties implicit in many human behaviors.168  The efforts of the 
many who work today to place limits on the damage done to the atmosphere attest to the 
existence of these duties—just as they confirm the right to demand them on behalf of 
future generations.  
Although some might argue that mitigating climate change can only be achieved 
through global trust and a commitment to reducing greenhouse gases, Kyoto proved the 
limits of an approach based solely on words of honor.  Human collective dependence on 
the burning of fossil fuels can only be overcome through substantial sacrifice, and those 
who are asked to sacrifice will want to know that their contribution will be reciprocated 
equitably and that, ultimately, their sacrifices will be meaningful.  Kyoto, with its flaws, 
is the model for global greenhouse gas reduction to which the human race seems destined 
for now.  Most observers recognize that any successor to Kyoto must include an effective 
monitoring regime.  As diplomat and nonproliferation expert J. Christian Kessler put it, 
“Verifying a state’s compliance with its treaty commitments has a certain inherent logic 
and structure common to all situations, regardless of the technical aspects.”169  The 
human demand for equity can help or hinder in climate change mitigation.  As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, maintaining a perception of treaty equity will be key to 
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V. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF CHINA  
A. CHINA: U.S. ALLY OR FELLOW PRISONER?  
The assumption as to whether China should be a target of U.S. IC ICELA 
monitoring efforts deserves evaluation.  In the previous discussion of the applicability of 
the NPT experience to ICELA, a distinction was drawn between essentially military 
treaties, like those encompassing weapons nonproliferation, and environmental treaties, 
in which agreement enforcement options do not include military force.  At least in the 
short-term, countries must make economic sacrifices in order to reduce their CO2 
emissions.  Economic sacrifice can also imply military disadvantage, in that a country’s 
rivals can use an income disparity to increase its relative military readiness.  Covert 
ICELA monitoring might help the U.S. to ensure that rival countries are not deriving a 
military advantage by continuing to pollute while claiming to be “abate” their CO2 
emissions.  Perceptions about the behavior of other countries, particularly potential 
military rivals, have important implications in determining how countries calculate the 
utility that they derived from different levels of sacrifice.  Unilateral covert monitoring of 
the treaty by any signatory may fuel a perception of inequity among other treaty 
participants and increases their perceived sacrifice to utility ratio.  If the ICCME 
increases the Chinese perception that they are locked in a “prisoner’s dilemma” 
engagement with the U.S., rather than in amicable climate collaboration, the Chinese may 
be less willing to sacrifice to achieve climate change mitigation.   
This chapter focuses on whether the findings of the ICCME might be used to 
increase global cooperation, rather than discourage Chinese ICELA participation.  The 
size of China’s population and the amount of CO2 emissions produced by its population 
alone earn the country special attention within this thesis. The results of the research 
demonstrate that just as in considering weapons nonproliferation goals, China’s influence 
over global climate change mitigation efforts is even more outsized than the country’s 
dimensions alone would predict.  In the past, the Chinese have portrayed the issue of 
nonproliferation in a way that undermines U.S. nonproliferation objectives.  Much in the 
same way, they have framed the western countries’ approach to climate change 
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mitigation as unfair to developing countries.  China will likely play a key role in shaping 
treaty perceptions by many other potential participants and, thus, in determining the 
possibility for achieving any significant climate change mitigation.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Global CO2 Emissions per Region from Fossil Fuel Use and Cement 
Production170 
B. WHAT TO EXPECT FROM CHINA—AMBIGUITY 
China has surpassed the U.S. as the greatest emitter of CO2.  Along with this 
distinction, China’s growth, internal contradictions, and its potential for adversarial 
relations with the U.S. earn the country special attention in regard to U.S. treaty-
monitoring efforts.  While covert U.S. monitoring would need to encompass the globe, 
China provides the ultimate yardstick against which to measure monitoring challenges 
and success.  Still, notwithstanding the utility of studying China as a special case, China’s 
CO2 emissions should by no means monopolize the attention of an operating ICCME.  
Too narrowly focusing on China’s carbon emissions may distract monitoring efforts from 
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other countries that may be substantially less compliant to treaty provisions.  In other 
words, it is important not to focus so intently on China, that we lose sight of India.  
Traditional security concerns should not trump climate concerns. 
Besides being the two greatest emitters of CO2, China and the U.S. have likewise 
been the most confrontational in their concerns regarding the equitable distribution of 
CO2 emissions limitations. This disharmony echoes a similar diplomatic NPT 
confrontation that arose during the decade-long period following the NPT’s 1970 
entrance into force.  The long and ongoing arms limitation engagement between the U.S. 
and China is significant to the current climate change discussion because the success of 
both the NPT and any future ICELA largely depends on the two countries being able to 
overcome their differences and act cooperatively.  As discussed in the thesis section on 
game theory, reducing CO2 emissions entails some and potentially considerable increase 
in energy costs and subsequent negative implications for any country’s relative military 
standing.  It is likely that constituencies within the U.S. and China—countries that 
perceive one another as potential geopolitical rivals—will oppose any agreement that 
might, in DeCanio and Fremstad’s words, “upset the balance of power between them.”171 
China’s growing presence on the world stage has exposed the Chinese regime to 
greater scrutiny and increasingly nuanced international evaluations of Chinese behavior.  
Nevertheless, in large part because of the country’s authoritarian form of government, 
there persists a tendency in the West to attribute greater subterfuge in Chinese diplomatic 
behavior than the facts might otherwise suggest.  In a paper that has been cited by 
scholars thousands of times, Robert Putnam succinctly describes the provisional reality 
underlying the national executive’s ostensible diplomatic autonomy, noting:  
Central executives have a special role in mediating domestic and 
international pressures precisely because they are directly exposed to both 
spheres, not because they are united on all issues nor because they are 
insulated from domestic politics.172   
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Though it may be tempting to view Chinese treaty participation—whether NPT in 
the past or ICELA in the future—as being driven by a unitary will, it will prove more 
productive to consider the international and domestic constraints within which the 
Chinese leadership must operate.173  Overestimating the range of options available to 
China’s leadership may result in a misreading their intentions and lost opportunities for 
achieving maximal CO2 emission reductions from any future ICELA.  
China’s ascendance as a world political and economic leader is fundamental to the 
Chinese’s self-image.  This preoccupation has contributed to China’s engagement with 
the issue of climate change.174  The Chinese wish to be seen as participating in global 
efforts to reduce CO2 emissions.  Concurrently, however, the Chinese leaders have 
clearly stated their unwillingness to sacrifice their country’s economic wellbeing to solve 
a problem created by Western nations.  During the Kyoto negotiations, Chinese 
representatives invoked this argument against the West in an apparent effort to establish 
themselves as the champions of the world’s less developed economies.   
Although other nations may accuse the Chinese of reneging on one or another 
provision of their treaty obligations, the Chinese strive to ensure that their behavior 
remains above international reproach.  The evidence provided by China’s participation in 
various international arms limitation agreements suggests that, should the Chinese 
participate in a future ICELA—even one with much more stringent requirements than 
those China agreed to under Kyoto—the Chinese leadership would make every effort to 
ensure that the international community could not easily accuse China of intentionally 
contravening the agreement’s provisions.175  
C. CHINA’S APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
As they were in the case of weapons limitations, the Chinese have been slow to 
embrace the climate change issue.  Nevertheless, the Chinese are well aware of their 
vulnerability to the effects of increasing anthropogenic CO2, and China consistently 
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strives to demonstrate leadership in issues of international salience.  As the climate comes 
to dominate the global conversation, the Chinese will want to be among the leaders of 
that discussion.  Because China’s contribution to both anthropogenic CO2 emissions and 
to any global solution to the climate change dilemma are so important, it is worth 
examining current Chinese efforts at climate change mitigation. 
While pursuing a unilateral approach to their own CO2 emissions reduction, the 
Chinese have remained active participants in most international climate change 
negotiations.  Despite China’s disagreements with the U.S. at Kyoto and other venues, 
some would consider China to be among those countries having to date made the most 
substantial contribution to global CO2 emissions reductions. In 2006, the Chinese 
established a “National Leading Group on Climate Change,” which included 
representatives from 10 of their ministries.  The group helped to draft a set of domestic 
mitigation measures.  Among their initiatives was the drafting of regulations that would 
promote the development of clean sources of energy such as the “Energy Law of the 
People’s Republic of China.”176  
The Chinese have been heavily involved in the trading of so called “carbon 
credits.”  Kyoto’s “Clean Development Mechanism,” (CDM) allowed for more 
developed countries to finance clean energy projects in less developed countries in 
exchange for certified emission reduction (CER) units or “carbon credits” (i.e., the right 
to emit CO2 from industries operating elsewhere).177  Typically, these credits are sought 
by industries in developed countries where energy production is both more 
technologically advanced and cleaner, and the incremental costs of reducing CO2 
emissions substantially greater.  Initially, China was reluctant to commit to international 
CO2 reduction targets, citing its prioritization of economic development for Chinese 
citizens. Nonetheless, since 2007 China has begun to vigorously pursue cleaner forms of 
energy.  Within its own borders China has devised a domestic form of “cap and trade” 
(i.e., the allocation of emissions permits), which adheres closely to the Kyoto model.    
                                                 
176 Lutken, “A Grand Chinese Climate Scheme,” 5.  
177 Mark Lynas, “How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal? I was in the Room,” The 




While the fact that China has instituted regulations to reduce the country’s CO2 
emissions is encouraging, the form the Chinese actions took is revealing.  The new 
measures ensured that the Chinese would largely remain both the source and beneficiary 
of the CERs they themselves were generating within their borders through their domestic 
CDM projects.   
Just prior to the 15th International Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(IFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen in December of 2009, the 
Chinese adopted domestic initiatives to limit the growth of their CO2 emissions and 
proclaimed a unilateral carbon reduction commitment.178  These internal Chinese actions 
were timed, it appeared, to suggest that China was serious about climate change 
mitigation, at a time when the Chinese representatives to the Copenhagen climate 
negotiations were preparing to stall meaningful international CO2 emissions reductions 
commitments.  Just prior to Copenhagen, the Chinese promised that, by 2020, they would 
reduce their “carbon intensity” (i.e., the amount of carbon emitted per unit of energy 
produced) by 40–45 percent in relation to its 2005 carbon intensity levels.179   
Yet in spite of Chinese CO2 limitation efforts at home, many in the West blamed 
China for the weakness of the final agreement at Copenhagen.  Documentation of the 
negotiations largely bears out this assessment.180  Chinese obstructionism during the 
Copenhagen talks could be seen as a pre-emptive effort to avoid having their climate 
policies dictated to them by the international community.181  Already recognized as the 
foremost global CO2 contributor, China confronts the prospect of its carbon emissions, 
along with world attention on these emissions, increasing with time.  Currently, the 
Chinese leadership faces a conundrum.  These leaders cannot disappoint their citizens’ 
economic aspirations, but as their country modernizes it becomes more difficult to justify 
why China should continue to be held to the CO2 emissions standards of far poorer 
“developing” countries.  Deflecting international criticism is bound to become 
increasingly difficult for the Chinese.  
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If a degree of schizophrenia appears to characterize China’s behavior in both arms 
limitation and climate change, it may be because the intensity of China’s concern for 
world opinion—along with suspicion of Western intentions—compels its leaders to shun 
commitments that it may later regret.  By watering down treaty provisions, China’s 
leaders ensure they will be able to meet their international obligations and will not later 
find themselves having to defend their behavior.  This does not mean, however, that the 
Chinese are indifferent to the perils of climate change.182   
D. THE HISTORY OF CHINESE NTP PARTICIPATION  
Since the Chinese government does not issue policy papers from which an outside 
observer might draw conclusions, anticipating Chinese behavior in regard to any 
international agreement involves analyzing past Chinese behavior under analogous 
circumstances.  A comparison between China’s NPT compliance and the country’s 
hypothetical behavior under an ICELA should only be undertaken after once again 
acknowledging the clear differences between a military and an environmental treaty.  
Most importantly, given its economic implications, an ICELA is bound to elicit far more 
attention from each country’s citizenry than does the NPT.   
China’s engagement with nonproliferation has received U.S. IC attention for close 
to three decades. The IC’s findings have featured prominently in U.S. attempts to ensure 
China respects its nonproliferation commitments.  These IC findings appear in 
unclassified IC reports, in statements issued by U.S. politicians—most notably by U.S. 
congressmen—and in leaks to the press.  The contents of these reports have frequently 
been cited as justification for imposing, or conversely, not imposing sanctions on China 
for its alleged breaches.  This history, necessarily tentative as much of it may be, offers 
itself as a framework for considering the challenge of managing suspected or identified 
Chinese ICELA violations.   
Initially at least, the Chinese could only be considered non-proliferators of 
convenience.  For the Chinese, nonproliferation long represented a bargaining chip to 
achieve other diplomatic ends.  China’s current CO2 emissions reductions efforts suggest 
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that the country’s behavior under a future ICELA would be informed by a greater 
appreciation of its vulnerability to the effects of climate change than it ever was to the 
perils of nuclear weapons proliferation.  Until the early 1980s, while China was still 
under Mao, the Chinese expressed reservations regarding the legitimacy of the NPT.  
According to Wendy Frieman:  
From China’s perspective, it seemed that the United Sates had developed 
its own nuclear non-proliferation regime and then assumed that others 
would adhere to it.  This attitude appeared condescending and insulting to 
a country that wanted to be seen as an equal on the world stage.183  
According to the Chinese leadership, the NPT represented a double standard 
whereby those countries with nuclear weapons denied those weapons to the less 
powerful.  China advanced this argument in order to establish its bona fides as a 
champion and leader of its fellow developing countries.  However, since there was wide 
support among most non-nuclear countries for the NPT, many of whom sought assurance 
that their neighbors would likewise forego arming themselves with nuclear weapons, 
China’s position failed to win them international sympathy.  In her book, China, Arms 
Control, and Nonproliferation, Wendy Frieman notes that in the early 1980s China’s anti 
NPT posture hampered the pursuit of its “open door policy.”184 China found itself subject 
to international censure as an “irresponsible proliferator of nuclear weapons 
technology.”185  International criticism proved “an irritant to the Chinese government, 
and an obstacle to full acceptance of China into the international community.”186    
At the outset, Chinese participation in the NPT was informal.  Though in pledging 
to respect NPT provisions the Chinese sought to improve their country’s international 
standing, they were also pursuing a more tangible objective.  U.S. law prohibited the sale 
of nuclear technology to any country that assisted a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire 
nuclear weapons.  Western entreaties that China support international nonproliferation 
regimes provided China leverage with which to access the West’s highly developed 
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civilian use nuclear technology.  For its part, the U.S. energy interests were likewise 
eager to gain entry to China’s promising civilian nuclear energy market.  Since that time, 
the U.S. has frequently accepted both formal and informal Chinese assurances regarding 
China’s voluntary adherence to NPT provisions and has provided the Chinese with access 
to U.S. nuclear technology.  All the while the U.S. IC has continued to identify instances 
of suspected Chinese NPT violations, leading to ongoing controversy within the U.S. 
regarding the legality and wisdom of providing nuclear technology to the Chinese.  The 
Chinese have, for their part, responded to U.S. complaints and accusations with denials in 
some cases, and promises to rectify their behavior in others.  Eventually in 1992, very 
likely in response to the international opprobrium they confronted after the 1989 events 
in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese formally acceded to the NPT.187 
Frieman offers a taxonomy of China’s international nonproliferation agreements 
that reveals much about how the U.S. and China perceive their mutual interactions.188  
Noting the frequency with which the U.S. has alleged NPT violations, Frieman writes 
that in fact Chinese have displayed a different attitude towards each of three different 
types of commitments, and that:  
…it is critical to distinguish among Chinese activities which are violations 
of international law, Chinese activities that violate a bilateral pledge or 
promise by a Chinese official to a U.S. official, and Chinese activities 
which do not support U.S. interests.189   
Parties to the NPT gradually increased both the specificity and scope of the treaty 
language; most notably after 1974 when India exploded a nuclear device.  China’s 
involvement with the NPT was likewise progressive.  Those countries that were more 
ambitious about the scope of nonproliferation mechanisms entered into a separate 
agreement, initially called the Zangger Committee but eventually renamed the “Nuclear 
Suppliers Group” (NSG).  Though China’s engagement with these agreements 
increased—along with the initiatives whereby signatories to the NPT expanded the types 
of “safeguards” or tracking and inspection mechanisms to be supported by the IAEA—
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China’s growing involvement and level of adherence to these agreements invariably fell 
short of U.S. expectations and demands.  Frieman identifies a pattern in this engagement 
in which Chinese behavior—particularly their technology exchanges with regimes, 
including Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Libya—reflected an adherence to the letter of the NPT, 
rather than to what the U.S. considered the substance of the treaty and associated Sino-
American agreements.190   
For its part, the U.S. focused on China’s real or alleged treaty shortcomings only 
sporadically.  U.S. attention to China’s nonproliferation behavior followed domestic or 
international cues, and lacked any underlying consistency.  Regarding this intermittent 
U.S. attention to Chinese proliferation, Frieman highlights several “specific 
instances.”191  Two of these are particularly pertinent to the current discussion.  The first 
occurred “during congressional hearings in 1985 on the proposed United States-China 
bilateral nuclear agreement;” and second, “when the U.S. intelligence community 
disclosed the Chinese sale of ring magnets (for use in an enrichment centrifuge) to a 
Pakistani nuclear facility in 1996.”192  Frieman goes on to describe how, from China’s 
perspective, the U.S. appeared to condemn or punish China by selectively invoking the 
NPT, other ancillary nonproliferation agreements, or U.S. law whenever U.S. leaders 
suspected China of facilitating weapons proliferation.  Frequently, in fact, U.S. criticism 
was based on criteria that the Chinese may not have clearly understood, nor been to apply 
in the conduct of their nuclear technology exchanges with their other trading partners  
1. Senator Cranston and the Disclosure of Secret Chinese Intelligence 
Perhaps the best example of the dynamics involved in the U.S./China 
nonproliferation negotiations can be found in the 1985 Congressional hearings cited 
above.  These hearings, involving an assessment of intelligence collected by the U.S. IC, 
formed part of an ongoing debate within a divided U.S. government (the Republican 
Reagan Administration faced a Democratic Congress) regarding the wisdom of selling 
nuclear technology to the Chinese.  According to U.S. intelligence, whether or not 
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intentionally, the Chinese appeared to be assisting the Pakistanis, among other countries, 
in acquiring nuclear technology in contravention of the NPT.193  In fact, the Pakistani 
connection was particularly concerning to many in the U.S. given a prevailing suspicion 
that the Pakistanis were well on their way to building a nuclear weapon.  Some members 
of Congress contended that the administration was simply bending to pressure from the 
U.S. energy industry and irresponsibly allowing continued U.S. technology transfers to 
the Chinese. 
Because much of the evidence is classified, Frieman must deduce how 
intelligence was managed.194  Regardless, the dynamics of handling intelligence during 
this period highlight some of the issues that the U.S. might once again confront in 
employing an ICCME to monitor a future ICELA.   
At the time of the 1985 Congressional hearings, though the IC had apparently 
already identified a Chinese violation of the provisions of the NPT, this information was 
never shared openly.  This observation raises the question of how an ICCME might 
respond or be required to respond once it had identified a real or suspected violation of an 
ICELA.  Once an ICCME had identified a suspected treaty violation, it would be 
required, at the very least, to share this information with the Executive—much the way 
the IC informed President Reagan regarding its nuclear technology transfer suspicions 
regarding the Chinese in the early 1980s. U.S. presidents have routinely temporized on 
nonproliferation, ignoring relevant intelligence and concealing it from the legislature or 
the public.  In the 1985 example, the Reagan administration received intelligence 
suggesting that the Chinese were transferring nuclear technology to the Pakistanis.  
Concurrently, energy interests in the U.S. were eager to enter a very promising Chinese 
nuclear energy industry, and the Chinese hoped to benefit from U.S. nuclear energy 
expertise.   
For its part, the U.S. administration appeared to prioritize easing commercial 
restrictions that would have precluded the sale of U.S. nuclear technology to the Chinese.  
In its defense, the Reagan administration had ample cause to question whether or not the 
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Chinese had in fact violated the letter of NPT, and could without undue effort justify to 
itself, if not to all the members of Congress, its willingness to overlook the Chinese 
exchange with Pakistan.  Nevertheless, the administration’s willingness to countenance 
questionable Chinese behavior on matters of significant U.S. or international security 
cannot be assumed to be a rare phenomenon,195 or one restricted to questions of nuclear 
proliferation.   
Under analogous circumstances, the current or a future U.S. administration might 
confront a similarly ambiguous situation, wherein information it received from the 
ICCME could be interpreted as suggestive of a foreign contravention of the ICELA.  
Were the administration involved in other bilateral negotiations or attempting to enlist the 
support of the suspected ICELA violator to achieve some other U.S. objective, the 
administration might also refrain from taking further action on the suspected violation.  
What is more, while the NPT language may well have been ambiguous, achieving a 
reasonable degree of certainty regarding a single NPT violation is nevertheless far easier 
than establishing an ICELA treaty’s violator’s culpability.  Though a single intercepted 
telephone communication might uncover the intention to violate either the NPT or an 
ICELA, establishing the fact of a NPT violation can occur at a single location at a single 
point in time, while violations of an ICELA can only be confirmed by analysis of a vast 
amount of data collected over a period measured in months or years.  For a U.S. 
administration so inclined, there could be few alerts easier to ignore than intelligence 
regarding an ICELA violation which might take two or three years to prove.196    
2. The End of Secrets  
Even were the administration to retain authority regarding the release of 
intelligence related to foreign ICELA violations, this discretion would have limited 
practical use.  Due to the number of IC and administration personnel with access to 
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ICCME intelligence, the opportunities for intentional or inadvertent intelligence leaks 
would be great. Any such leaks would serve to shake public confidence in the treaty’s 
value and equity.  
In the case of the 1985 Congressional hearings, an unknown source within the 
administration or Defense department apparently had stronger reservations regarding the 
Chinese sales of nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapons countries like Pakistan and 
Iran than did the President.  Armed with classified information, Democratic Senator Alan 
Cranston challenged the administration on its intention to allow for the sale of nuclear 
technology to the Chinese.197  The source of Cranston’s information has not been 
confirmed; however, for the purpose of considering how intelligence regarding a possible 
ICELA violation might be processed in the U.S., the identity of Cranston’s source of 
information is less telling than the Senator’s willingness to influence administration 
policy by sharing the information publicly.   
Just as importantly, at the time of the Congressional hearings, Cranston accused 
administration officials of attempting to mislead Congress regarding the extent of 
Chinese nuclear technology assistance to Iran.  As will be discussed subsequently in this 
thesis’ section on legislative oversight of the IC, Congress must often expend 
considerable effort to remain informed regarding IC activities.  Regardless of the degree 
of certainty it might attach to a suspected ICELA violation, should the administration 
retain discretion in publicizing or employing this intelligence, individuals within the 
ICCME could covertly override the administration’s decision by forwarding the 
intelligence to, for example, a member of Congress. 
If future ICCME-identified instances of suspected or actual ICELA violation are 
not to be used as diplomatic currency by current or future administrations, Congress will 
need to remove such discretion from the executive branch.  There is evidence that in 
doing so, Congress will in fact strengthen the administration’s hand in other areas of 
bilateral diplomacy.  A foreign regime can coerce the U.S. administration only on issues 
over which that administration wields discretion.198   
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3. The Problem of Attribution  
In 1996, the Clinton administration found itself in a situation similar to that that 
confronted Regan in 1985.  In this case information collected by U.S. intelligence and 
leaked to the media revealed the sale by a Chinese corporation of 5,000 ring magnets, 
whose only use could for the building of nuclear weapons, to Pakistan, in clear 
contravention of the NPT.199  This discovery, if pursued by the administration, would 
have scuttled a $10 billion loan to China.200  The Clinton administration decided, 
however, not to release the IC’s findings officially.201  One element of this apparent NTP 
violation has characterized many instances of alleged Chinese violations; the question of 
whether the Chinese government should or can be held responsible for violations 
purportedly committed by “entities” within China (i.e. not under the direct control of the 
Chinese government).  In the case of the ring magnet sale to Pakistan, the “entity” in 
question was the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), which was engaged in 
business dealings with Westinghouse Electric Corporation.  Ultimately, the Clinton 
administration opted to sanction neither the Chinese government nor the CNNC.202   
It might fairly be assumed that the government of any country who has entered 
into an international agreement has the ability to ensure that its citizens and private 
industries comply with the provisions of that agreement.  Regardless, this is not the 
standard to which the U.S. has held the Chinese, and frequently the U.S. has imposed 
sanctions on “entities” within China for weapons proliferation violations rather than on 
China itself.  Instead of insisting that the Chinese government develop the means of 
effectively policing its industry, the U.S. government has found it either more prudent or 
more productive to target Chinese industries for criticism and sanctions.  In her April 
2012 Congressional Research Service review of China’s nonproliferation history, Shirley 
Kan wrote: 
Policy debates concerning PRC technology transfers have often centered 
on the questions of whether to impose unilateral sanctions under U.S. 
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laws, to enact new legislation to tighten mandates for sanctions or reports, 
or to integrate the multiple laws. Also, there have been the issues of 
whether to target the PRC government or PRC “entities” … and whether 
the PRC government lacks the will or the capability to enforce its stated 
nonproliferation policy. Decisions on sanctions impact U.S. credibility and 
leverage on the non-proliferation issue. While certain PRC transfers might 
not violate any international treaties, sanctions may be required under U.S. 
laws that Congress passed to set U.S. nonproliferation policy and shore up 
nonproliferation treaties and standards.203 
A review of congressionally required reporting on IC nonproliferation findings 
reveals a tension that existed within George W. Bush’s administration over whether to 
blame the Chinese government for certain nonproliferation agreement violations, or to 
instead restrict these indictments, and corresponding sanctions, to implicated Chinese 
“entities.”204  At times IC or administration representatives indicated in their statements 
that the Chinese government was knowledgeable about these violations, while other 
executive branch statements suggested the Chinese government had no prior knowledge 
of them.205  Similar ambiguity, whether regarding the facts or intelligence reporting of 
the facts about Chinese or any other nation’s treaty compliance, will complicate the 
administration of any future ICELA. 
E. PROVINCIAL INDEPENDENCE  
The issue of Chinese governmental accountability for the actions of Chinese 
corporate entities is only one dimension of the attribution problem. The Chinese central 
government has historically struggled to maintain its authority over provincial 
administrations.  Whether or not the Chinese government can effectively enforce the 
provisions of any future international CO2 limitations agreement should be of concern to 
anyone interested in the treaty’s prospects.  The question will certainly remain foremost 
in the minds of Chinese treaty negotiators.206 
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While the Chinese have promulgated laws to reduce CO2 emissions within 
China’s borders, there is little indication that the Chinese government has the means of 
ensuring compliance with these restrictions.  A 2012 study published by University of 
Leeds researchers found that statistics collected by the Chinese national government fell 
1.4 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2eq) short of the figures they derived by 
aggregating CO2 emissions statistics from 30 Chinese provinces and municipalities.207  
This 1.4 gigaton disparity represents approximately five percent of total estimated world 
CO2 emissions.208  Because the Chinese government does not publish official estimates 
of national CO2 emissions, the researchers were forced to derive their own figures by 
basing their calculations on the Chinese energy consumption data that the government 
does publish. It is impossible for anyone to know the true level of Chinese CO2 
emissions.   
It is in fact that impossibility that underlines the real problem faced by the 
Chinese government and any future international attempts, whether overt or otherwise, to 
monitor Chinese CO2 emissions.  Currently, the Chinese central government leaders 
would like to demonstrate that their efforts to reduce CO2 emissions are meeting with 
success.  These national leaders are in effect working at cross purposes with local 
officials who are eager to show how local economies are growing under their leadership.  
The performance of these local officials is evaluated according to increases in 
manufacturing, which, in turn, is calculated by using local energy consumption 
figures.209  Given the Chinese government’s inability to assess its country’s emissions, 
independently monitoring China’s emissions will present a significant challenge, 
regardless of whether this independent monitoring is supplemented with clandestine 
intelligence collection. 
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F. CHINESE ECONOMY IS GROWING FASTER THAN REGULATION  
Chinese economic growth has been so rapid that even genuine Chinese 
governmental efforts to measure or regulate it may long remain impossible.  It has been 
suggested that the U.S. IC may have succeeded in identifying Chinese NPT treaty 
violations that the Chinese government, overwhelmed with the pace of the country’s 
growth, had not yet developed the regulatory infrastructure to discover on its own.210  
Similarly, in regard to CO2 emissions, the bookkeeping problem is exacerbated by the 
rapid rate of Chinese growth.  The demand created by this growth is being met by the 
emergence of small local manufacturers who are not equipped to record accurate records 
on their own energy consumption.211 This inability to track their own energy use, and by 
extension their own CO2 emissions, could very well contribute to a Chinese reluctance to 
make treaty commitments they may not be able to fulfill.  Just as in the case of 
nonproliferation, the U.S. and other countries might struggle to determine whether any 
future Chinese reluctance to support severe treaty provisions, or to adhere to their treaty 
commitments, is the result of the Chinese government’s intransigence or incapacity.212    
As in the U.S., it is likely that Chinese attitudes towards the threat of climate 
change will evolve and respond according to individual and institutional Chinese 
circumstances.  Positions or treaty obligations adopted by the Chinese central government 
will almost certainly be subject to de facto bureaucratic or provincial overrides.  It seems 
unlikely the Chinese will support a highly invasive GHGIS monitoring regime.213  
Conceivably, by augmenting the GHGIS’s ability to identify any Chinese treaty 
violations, the U.S. IC may ultimately reinforce the Chinese central government’s treaty 
provision enforcement by helping to focus international attention on particular Chinese 
treaty violators. The more exposed potential violators are to discovery, the less inclined 
local leaders (such as Chinese provincial leaders) will be to allow for violations within 
their jurisdictions.   
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G. ALONE THE IC WILL NOT ALTER THE CHINESE CLIMATE 
BEHAVIOR  
Ambiguity in international agreements, particularly multinational agreements, is 
not uncommon and increases the challenge of ensuring agreement compliance.  Analysts 
of the Kyoto Protocol have contended that Kyoto’s vagueness and its lack of an 
enforcement mechanism have limited the treaty’s achievements.  These weaknesses 
stemmed in large part from the Kyoto negotiators’ preoccupation with achieving an 
agreement at all.  The fact that the U.S. failed to ratify Kyoto underlines how difficult the 
treaty negotiations in fact were.  It was easier to overcome the resistance of many other 
countries to make commitments in Kyoto by avoiding, what seemed at the time, overly 
ambitious treaty provisions. 
As described earlier, the initially vague language within the NPT led, at least 
initially, to some confusion.  Though the Chinese played no role in formulating the treaty, 
they have shown no inclination to openly violate or challenge its provisions.  When 
considering the prospects for an ICELA, it is important to highlight that while China has 
failed to abide by their pledges to the U.S. on many occasions, it has, according to 
Frieman, “by any objective standards, lived up to its international (original italics) 
commitments.”214 In their nonproliferation negotiations, the Chinese have usually 
demonstrated respect for the letter of the agreement, rather than for the underlying treaty 
objectives.  Typically, disagreements have arisen where the treaty language is unclear.  In 
fact, in many cases where Congress or the executive branch have expressed concerns 
over Chinese compliance with the NPT, there has been some indication that ambiguity in 
the terms of the NPT might account for a difference of opinion.215   
In its pursuit of genuine weapons limitations, the U.S. has found itself virtually 
alone in its attempt to hold the Chinese to a standard beyond what is clearly expressed in 
the NPT provisions. As expressed by Frieman, “nonproliferation has effectively been 
reduced to a bilateral issue between the United States and China.”216  When combined 
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with ambiguity in the NPT language, there has often been an inclination for the Chinese 
to suspect bias in the way the U.S. was attempting to apply the treaty provisions. As 
Frieman noted: 
Quick to perceive a double standard, the Chinese pointed out that 
Washington ignored certain nonproliferation “norms” when the situation 
involved a U.S. ally or a country that was helpful in achieving its other 
foreign policy objectives (as Pakistan had been in the early 1980s).217   
Under these circumstances, regardless of whether the Chinese leadership might be 
inclined to concede to the U.S. position, it had also to consider how these concessions 
might appear to the Chinese people.  As Frieman goes on to note, “The appearance that 
China is caving in to U.S. pressure can end or substantially weaken the careers of the 
very Chinese officials who make the commitments in the first place.”218   
Unclear treaty provisions are the first obstacle to determining the existence of a 
treaty violation. The success of any future ICELA will depend in great part on how well 
negotiators are able to eliminate vagueness from the treaty’s provisions.  For its part, the 
ICCME and the GHGIS will benefit from the clearest possible standards against which to 
measure compliance.219 
Ultimately, a perception of ambiguity will persist only where there is no clear 
international consensus regarding the treaty’s meaning.  Where there is widespread 
agreement, it is less likely that treaty signatories will propose their own self-serving 
interpretations of the treaty language.  Whether it be in interpreting the treaty provisions 
or in leveling accusations against identified treaty violators, it is essential the world 
appear to speak with one voice. 
At the time of the 1985 Congressional hearings on the bilateral agreement for 
nuclear technology exchange with China, Congress could exert pressure on the Chinese 
by threatening—along with withholding the technology in question—not to renew 
China’s Most Favored Nation trading status.  Since that time, China has become too 
important a trading partner for the U.S. to threaten the Chinese with bilateral trade 
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sanctions.  Should there arise a need to pressure the Chinese into compliance with 
provisions of an ICELA, it is far more likely that the Chinese will only respond favorably 
from pressure exerted, not by a single nation but rather by the international community as 
a whole.220 Should the Chinese require greater incentive than enlightened self-interest to 
adhere to any future ICELA, that incentive is more likely to come in the form of an 
appeal from an internationally recognized GHGIS than from the U.S. government.  For 
this, if for no other reason, it is essential the GHGIS benefit from support from the U.S. 
IC, and that this support be offered in such a way as to preserve the international 
legitimacy of the GHGIS. 
1. China: In Situ Sensors and On Site Inspections  
As noted previously, the Chinese will likely be reluctant to permit the installation 
of internationally controlled and monitored “in situ” sensors throughout their country.  
Chinese reluctance, however, is not the same as outright refusal.  Just as the Chinese have 
increasingly welcomed more stringent NPT provisions over time, so too has the Chinese 
attitude toward other international weapons limitation agreements evolved and become 
more “liberal.”  In considering the U.S. adoption of covert monitoring of a future ICELA, 
this Chinese history is important to bear in mind.  Indeed, an open U.S. discussion and 
implementation of the ICCME option will certainly attract Chinese attention, and the 
prospect of confronting “covert” monitoring may prompt the Chinese to prefer the 
“overt” alternative.  In the U.S. as elsewhere, there will be little appetite for expending 
resources to verify information that is open and otherwise uncontested.  Less need for 
spying will likely result in fewer spies.  All sides can appreciate those economics.    
In regard to the NPT, Chinese behavior has suggested a balancing of interests, and 
a willingness to trade the achievement of one objective for the attainment of another (e.g., 
less nuclear weapons’ technology sharing with non-nuclear weapons states in return for 
or greater international influence, trade concessions, or access to more sophisticated 
western technology).221 
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During negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Western 
countries were eager to include a provision for the use of satellite technology, primarily 
U.S. in order to trigger on-site inspections.  The Chinese and other developing countries 
did not have access to similar “national technological means” (NTM), as they had come 
to be known.  The Chinese argued that allowing the unilateral use of this technology 
would permit Western countries to abuse their technological advantage and unfairly 
target other countries for inspections. However, instead of rejecting the use of Western 
NTM, the Chinese instead argued that the proposed International Monitoring System 
(IMS) should be endowed with similar technology at the expense of the treaty signatories.  
Such a measure would have provided the Chinese with access to this highly coveted 
satellite and other sophisticated sensor technology.222  In any case, it should not simply 
be assumed that the Chinese cannot be persuaded to support the most transparent possible 
ICELA monitoring regime.  Such Chinese support, however, will likely come at some 
cost for Western countries. 
H. STANDING TOGETHER: PROSPECTS FOR A CHINA-U.S. CLIMATE 
COLLABORATION  
Analysis of relations between the U.S. and China generally assume an inevitable 
strategic rivalry.  This assumption suggests that any cooperation on climate change will 
be colored by an underlying mistrust between the two countries.  Indeed, some American 
strategists have suggested a zero sum competition between the two countries, and that the 
U.S. should ever strive to derail Chinese growth.223  These anachronistic “realpolitik” 
arguments fail to take into account the growing difficulty of distinguishing where U.S. 
interests end and Chinese interests begin.  Indeed, important representatives of the 
Chinese leadership already acknowledge that, given growing international economic 
interdependencies, lack of trust between the U.S. and China can threaten Chinese 
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stability.224  While the U.S. should remain clear eyed regarding the potential for Sino-
American conflict, both countries will have to recognize that the global stability they 
desire cannot be achieved at the expense of one another. 
While some in China might have once felt insulated from the threats of nuclear 
proliferation, many Chinese recognize that no similarly cavalier attitude can be 
maintained in regard to climate change.  The air quality in Beijing has now long been a 
topic of global discussion.  If we in the U.S. have come to appreciate the damage humans 
can inflict on our atmosphere, we can be sure the Chinese people are every bit as aware. 
There is reason to hope that all countries, including the U.S. and China, will 
recognize their own self-interest in faithfully adhering to the ICELA.  Particularly, in the 
case of the U.S. and China, there is no reason to assume that they will attempt to 
contravene the agreement.  The CO2 emitted by either county represents a substantial 
portion of the global total.  The U.S. or China alone can each cause considerable damage 
to the atmosphere, the consequences of which all will suffer.  Ideally, the role of the 
ICCME will not be to police the treaty, but simply to help confirm to all treaty 
participants that their efforts are being reciprocated by their treaty partners. 
China should be seen, like any other country, as a composite rather than a 
monolith.  There will be forces within China who will strive to achieve climate change 
mitigation, just as there will be Chinese forces that will prioritize other objectives.  
Regardless of their interest in climate change mitigation, there are few Chinese who are 
insensitive to the international image of their nation.  There seems little chance the 
Chinese will knowingly allow their country to be confronted by “incontrovertible 
evidence of their non-compliance.”225  By identifying specific instances of treaty 
violations, and ideally by being able to identify those responsible for those treaty 
violations, the international treaty monitoring regime may avoid indicting “China” and 
instead permit those Chinese striving to reduce CO2 emissions to array their forces 
against their internal Chinese opponents. 
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I. LEVELING COMPLAINTS AGAINST CHINA  
China’s nonproliferation history has earned it the distrust of the IC.  The IC’s 
justified suspicion may, however, fuel an adversarial attitude toward China in regard to 
ICELA compliance issues.  Just as it is preferable that China perceive itself in a 
cooperative endeavor with the U.S., it is just as important that the U.S. not consider every 
treaty violation to be a threat to the geopolitical balance of power.  Direct U.S. 
accusations regarding Chinese ICELA violations will only exacerbate tensions between 
the two countries.  Only violation findings endorsed by the international community will 
prompt a desirable Chinese response.  The routing of ICCME findings through the 
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VI. THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATING COVERT AND 
OVERT MONITORING EFFORTS  
At the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, plans for a “Green House Gas 
Information System” (GHGIS) have been developed by three of the U.S. National 
Laboratories and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.  The plans anticipate that international 
CO2 emissions limitation treaty monitoring will be the primary GHGIS objective.226 The 
GHGIS will make possible meaningful treaty validation and verification.227 The CO2 
monitoring regime will be transparent, and treaty signatories will be allowed to review its 
methodology and findings.228 This thesis contemplates the potential benefits of 
complementing the GHGIS’s treaty monitoring mission with U.S. Intelligence 
Community resources.   
A. MISSION VALUE ADDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY  
Conceivably, the IC could provide a CO2 limitation treaty monitoring regime 
with additional technological sensing capabilities, either of higher sensitivity or greater 
capacity.  However, absent an inventory of the technology available to the IC, it is 
impossible to evaluate any potential technological benefits.  In fact, Chapter II, the 
review of the existing and proposed technologies, suggests that there is little additional 
technological capacity that the IC could currently offer in this regard.  There appears a 
higher probability that the IC could—using human intelligence, clandestine collection of 
documentation from foreign industry, the insertion of sensing devices in locations 
precluded from overt access, and electronic eavesdropping—identify governments who 
may not intend to adhere to their treaty commitments.  This potential early identification 
of violators by the IC might be used in one of two ways: 1) directly, through open or 
classified reporting on evidence of intentions to violate international treaty provisions or, 
2) indirectly, by providing the GHGIS with information that would permit it to 
concentrate monitoring efforts on anticipated violations and violators.  
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While findings by the IC might be readily accepted by many in the U.S., it is 
likely that those reports would meet with skepticism or denial by many outside the U.S.  
Therefore, direct IC reporting would have limited potential influence on violators’ 
behavior.  Indirect IC reporting (i.e., to the GHGIS or to the GHGIS through another 
intermediary) on the other hand, could potentially narrow the enormous scope of the 
GHGIS’s monitoring task. More importantly, it could reduce the time required for the 
GHGIS to provide compelling evidence of treaty violations.  The GHGIS contemplates 
both remote (satellite) and in situ CO2 sensors taking vast numbers of measurements that 
will then be processed in order to inform an “inversion model” or a series of virtual 
images of relative concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere that can be compiled to 
determine where humans are producing CO2 and how much they are emitting.  The more 
frequent and the more geographically dense the number of sensor measurements, the 
higher the image resolution provided by the GHGIS.  So long as the image is blurred, 
conclusions about the specific national sources of anthropogenic CO2 remain relatively 
uncertain.  Like astronomers searching the vastness of the heavens, knowing where to 
aim their instruments would accelerate the speed with which CO2 monitors could 
produce an adequately resolved image of treaty non-compliance with which to confront a 
violator.   
1. Treaty Monitoring Options: Benefits and Drawbacks—Inevitable 
Uncertainties 
There are various means by which a CO2 emissions treaty could be framed.   The 
monitoring technology discussion in Chapter II distinguished between “bottom-up” and 
“top-down” measurements.  Bottom-up measurements are what a country declares to be 
emitting based on an “inventory” of its CO2 producing activity.  “Top-down” 
measurements are what the GHGIS would take using the sensing technology at its 
disposal (i.e., “remote” satellites, or “in situ” sensors within the atmosphere).229  As yet 
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undetermined is whether the GHGIS monitoring would measure a nation’s treaty 
compliance by detected CO2 concentrations alone (i.e., top-down measurements) or, via 
the authors’ of the GHGIS plan preferred model, by comparing these detected 
concentrations against each nation’s reported emissions (bottom-up measurements).230 
Each alternative comes with its associated benefits and drawbacks, but each would 
involve some level of uncertainty—the acceptable or understood degree of which the 
treaty signatories would need to agree upon during treaty negotiations.   
The authors of the GHGIS document suggest that only upon exceeding the 
combined self-declared inventory plus GHGIS remote measurement levels of uncertainty 
would a penalty be assessed against a country thus having been found to be in treaty non-
compliance.  In other words, the GHGIS would compare the amount of CO2 that the 
country should be permitted to emit under the terms of the ICELA against the GHGIS’s 
model based calculations of that nation’s actual emissions.  To this second number, the 
GHGIS calculation, the GHGIS would add an internationally agreed upon margin of 
error.  Only when the emissions of the country in question surpassed the resultant actual 
emissions plus margin of error number, would the country be found to be in violation of 
the treaty provisions.     
Part of the GHGIS process would likely include verification that countries 
documented the correct inventory measurement procedures.  However documentation 
could be falsified, inaccurate, or simply incorrect.  Ultimately, the GHGIS validation 
process—top-down measurements used to assess whether the declared inventories 
corresponded to actual CO2 emissions—would represent the international judgment on 
whether countries had appropriately, accurately, and honestly respected their treaty 
commitments.231  
2. The Race against Time  
The primary challenge posed by climate change is time.  Each day of unrestrained 
CO2 production is a day lost in the race to limit the future effects of climate change.  This 
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race has important implications for any CO2 limitation treaty and thus for any treaty 
monitoring regime.  If, as is likely, negotiators of a future international CO2 limitation 
agreement follow the Kyoto Protocol model, then the agreement will anticipate 
incremental CO2 emissions reductions based on incremental changes in signatory 
nations’ CO2 emissions.  A nation’s inefficient automobiles or factories cannot be 
completely replaced by less polluting alternatives in a single, or even several, years.  
Each country’s imposition of restrictions on its own behavior will require the adoption of 
laws, which in turn may be enforced more or less aggressively.  The GHGIS, for its part, 
will likely initially rely on sophisticated, but as yet relatively limited sensing capacity that 
will have to be augmented—and emissions modeling that will need to be calibrated and 
improved upon—over time.  From the time the U.S., either alone or in partnership with 
other nations, commits to building a GHGIS, perhaps a decade will elapse before the 
GHGIS can be expected to provide measuring precision within its recommended target 
range of ±10 percent.232 Initially, even the most ambitious international agreement will 
have to accommodate a considerable level of uncertainty both in national inventories and 
measuring technology sensitivity.   
It is during this initial agreement period, however, that countries will confront the 
challenge of altering their CO2 emitting behaviors.  Even those leaders most committed 
to combating climate change will face opposition to new restrictions and requirements.  
The temptation to temporize, particularly given the inevitable initial leniency of any 
treaty provisions, will be great.  However, should leaders succumb to this temptation and 
fail to aggressively implement the policy required by their treaty commitments, their 
failure to meet emissions targets might not be discovered until much later when the 
political circumstances that permitted treaty participation have passed.  The failure of any 
country to meet its treaty obligations will reduce the willingness of other countries to 
make unreciprocated sacrifices and tend to undermine treaty effectiveness and the 
prospects for future adherence by other signatories.233   
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Treaty negotiations could lead to a wide variety of treaty provisions, each with 
different implications for the timeliness with which the GHGIS could arrive at 
compliance determinations.  In any case, likely delays between current national behaviors 
and GHGIS conclusions regarding those behaviors would be measured in years rather 
than in months234  It is conceivable that the GHGIS might only confirm a government’s, 
or set of leaders’, intentional or inadvertent circumvention of the treaty after that 
government had been succeeded by another, who would then have to be relied upon to 
appropriately amend its predecessor’s behavior.  Years might pass again before the 
GHGIS would be able to adequately assess the new government’s treaty compliance.  
Long delays would undermine the current national leadership’s incentives to respect 
treaties that might impose immediate economic burdens on those they govern.  These 
long delays could therefore undermine the global will to aggressively combat the perils of 
continued unrestrained human CO2 production. 
3. IC Findings Plus GHGIS Legitimacy  
By assessing the intentions of leaders and the authenticity of their efforts to 
ensure national compliance with treaty provisions, the U.S. IC could considerably 
accelerate process of identifying treaty violators.  However, because revealing the 
sources of this information might preclude future intelligence collection efforts, it is 
unlikely that evidence of treaty non-compliance collected by the IC could alone be used 
to compel countries to adhere to their treaty commitments.  World opinion is unlikely to 
be swayed by unsubstantiated claims made by any nation’s intelligence agency.  On the 
other hand, IC claims that can subsequently be confirmed or refuted by an internationally 
recognized monitoring regime, e.g. the GHGIS, would represent internationally 
compelling evidence.  By confronting potential violators with the prospect of exposure 
early while they are more likely to suffer political costs for their treaty breaches, the IC 
and the GHGIS might complement one another and encourage treaty adherence.   
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For its part, the GHGIS will remain sensitive to treaty signatory concerns 
regarding biased or unfair treaty administration.  Over time, the GHGIS will only 
continue to heed ICCME findings if they are borne out through the GHGIS’s own 
analysis.  
4. Multiple Violation Indicators Informing One Integrated Model  
In the estimation of the authors of the GHGIS plan, the benefits of multiple 
opportunities to detect “departures from target emissions” is that one flashing indicator 
among many can serve to focus attention on a possible or likely treaty violator.  For this 
reason, the authors opt for “precision” in identifying relative changes in emissions, rather 
than attempt to build a system that could account for anthropogenic CO2 in absolute 
terms.  Multiple indicators would ultimately narrow the task presented to treaty 
monitors.235 In the words of the GHGIS document: 
An advantage of such a framing of GHGIS would be its incorporation of 
external information to constrain the detection problem…to confirm 
inferences from other means of detection, or to focus further investigation 
to a particular sector, region, or time period. Verification methods of 
bottom-up inventories, e.g., audits of economic data, could be triggered by 
measurements of high emissions in a particular area. Thus, this framing 
provides substantially more flexibility and potential for integration with 
other methods, somewhat reducing thereby the burden on GHGIS of high 
precision.236  
The authors’ preferred “integrated” GHGIS model suggests an important role for 
the U.S. IC in providing an additional indicator with which to focus monitoring efforts.  
As noted by the GHGIS authors, each increase in treaty monitors’ ability to identify 
treaty violations contributes to the establishment of an international “culture of (treaty) 
compliance.”237  
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B. THE COMPLEX TASK OF PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE TO THE 
GHGIS  
The details of any intelligence sharing arrangement between the IC and the 
GHGIS will be determined in large part by the governance structure of the GHGIS.  It is 
to be expected that members of the international community of nations will organize the 
monitoring regime so as to achieve the widest possible international consensus.  Kyoto’s 
lack of any monitoring regime can be seen as an acknowledgement of the problems 
inherent in trying to impose requirements on sovereign nations, who must, in turn, 
maintain domestic adherence to potentially economically disruptive treaty provisions.   
In this light, Canada’s inability to achieve its Kyoto commitments and the 
country’s ultimate withdrawal from Kyoto, are symptomatic of the challenge facing all 
treaty signatories.  The Canadian government could not attempt to maintain domestic 
support for Kyoto among Canadians who increasingly saw the treaty as both unfair and 
ineffective.238  Although there is wide acknowledgement of the need for more formalized 
treaty monitoring than Kyoto, any future international treaty regime will have to be 
structured so as to satisfy international demands for equitable treaty administration.  No 
future GHGIS could withhold information from any of the treaty signatories without 
undermining the treaty support those signatories rely on from their own constituencies.  
Conversely, should any country uncover evidence of another’s treaty signatory’s 
non-compliance, that information would eventually become an issue of contention.  As 
demonstrated in this thesis’ proceeding section on other governments, while a U.S. 
administration might attempt to withhold or discretely manage intelligence regarding 
another country’s ICELA non-compliance, it is unlikely such information would long 
remain secret.  Should the U.S. collect intelligence on treaty compliance, that evidence 
should be disseminated internationally.  In order to assure the international public of the 
strength and viability of the ICELA monitoring regime, any intelligence gathered by the 
intelligence agencies of any of the treaty signatories should be shared first with the 
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GHGIS, which would, in turn, process that intelligence in conformity with its own 
internationally agreed upon protocols. 
1. IC Intel Sharing with the IAEA: Success and Failures 
Under the provisions of the NPT, the IAEA was tasked with monitoring treaty 
signatory compliance.  Article VIII of the IAEA statute provides for the initiation of 
monitoring of a signatory in response to intelligence received from any of the other 
signatories.239  This important provision has been implemented frequently by the U.S. in 
attempts to forestall the efforts of nonnuclear weapons states (NNWSs) to arm 
themselves with nuclear weapons.  The NPT provides an instructive example of treaty 
evolution, and, more particularly, of how the U.S. has applied its intelligence resources in 
support of national security objectives pursued through U.S. treaty participation.   
a. The Treaty Learning Curve  
The Kyoto Protocol’s lack of a monitoring mechanism is now widely 
considered to be an important failing.  This realization mirrored an analogous evolution 
in the treaty signatory thinking about the NPT. The NPT signatories’ eventually 
recognized that existing treaty provisions did not adequately empower the IAEA to 
conduct the types of monitoring that would identify, for example, the diversion of nuclear 
technology from civilian use to military projects.  The U.S. led efforts to extend the 
authority of the IAEA to perform more invasive inspections, most notably, through the 
“safeguard” and later “comprehensive safeguard” NPT provisions.240 Inevitably, and not 
unexpectedly, the U.S. IC participated in supplementing the IAEA inspection regime.  An 
examination of how intelligence collected by the U.S. IC was employed to overcome 
IAEA limitations, along with the political controversies occasioned by that often unhappy 
collaboration, provides important lessons about how the U.S. IC might best support an 
international GHGIS. 
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b. The Case of Iraq  
Among the most remarkable achievements of the U.S. IC is its long record 
of providing intelligence that has made nonproliferation more than just an aspiration.  
Along with uncovering clandestine attempts to contravene international nonproliferation 
agreements, these IC successes have unquestionably discouraged other nations from 
committing similar violations. Likewise, U.S. IC vigilance increases confidence among 
other nations that they can continue to entrust a part of their security to those agreements 
and forego developing nuclear weapons themselves.  It is, in fact, the contributions of the 
U.S. IC to nonproliferation that should most persuade proponents of climate change 
mitigation to welcome U.S. IC support for any future ICELA.  With that observation 
made, important lessons about this type of intelligence collaboration can be drawn from 
the failures the IC/IAEA association has also occasioned.   
Undoubtedly, the most significant of these failures occurred during the 
lead-up to the war in Iraq.  The global attention focused on this period has provided 
researchers with a wealth of relevant documentation and analysis.  The U.S. invasion was 
predicated on the existence of weapons of mass destruction within Iraq.  The 
administration’s poorly supported assertion directly contradicted declarations made by, 
among others, the IAEA leadership.  A contemporary question posed by a reporter for the 
Los Angeles Times expressed the problem prophetically, asking, “On the eve of a possible 
war in Iraq, a question looms increasingly large: If U.S. intelligence is so good, why are United 
Nations experts still unable to confirm whether Saddam Hussein is actively concealing and producing 
illegal weapons?”241  The U.S. administration’s distortion of the  
 
intelligence provided to it by the IC, along with the administration’s attempts to 
undermine the credibility of the IAEA, highlights the need for Congressional oversight of 
ICCME collaboration with any future international GHGIS. 
Among the best sources of information regarding the U.S. IC/IAEA 
relationship is the then head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
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Commission, Hans Blix.  Blix, who also served as the IAEA Director General from 1981 
to 1997, welcomed good intelligence, stating, “I would rather have twice the amount of 
high-quality information about sites to inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors 
to send.”242 
Prior to the war, the IC identified sites where Saddam Hussein was 
suspected to have concealed illegal weapons.  The CIA conveyed these suspicions to Blix 
through a Canadian official at the U.N.243  Eventually, it would become apparent that 
Saddam was not in fact hiding weapons.  In the meantime, U.N. inspectors were 
following up on unproductive “leads” received from the CIA.  For his part, Mohamed 
ElBaradei, who succeeded Blix as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, expressed 
suspicions that the classified evidence he had been presented by “unidentified states” regarding the 
sale of Nigerian uranium to Iraq had in fact been faked.244  It was not difficult to infer the 
provenance of the “intelligence” was the U.S. and that the U.S. administration was attempting to 
fabricate a stronger case against Saddam Hussein.   
c. The Administration’s Shifting Agenda and Long-term Treaty 
Stability  
While the U.S. engagement in Iraq presented a particularly egregious 
instance of intelligence manipulation, a similarly distorted trilateral relationship between 
the U.S. administration, the IC, and the international CO2 emissions monitoring effort 
could likewise develop should the U.S. administration impose itself as gatekeeper over 
the information the ICCME shares with the GHGIS.  In the case of Iraq, the inevitable 
result of this administration attempt to manipulate the evidence was the loss of trust 
between the U.S. and the monitoring entity (i.e., the IAEA).  Regardless, in Iraq, the 
administration could pursue what it determined were U.S. vital interests without the 
endorsement it nevertheless sought from the international monitoring effort.  In the case 
of any future ICELA, however, protecting the U.S. national interest by reducing 
international CO2 emissions, will be dependent on the legitimacy (i.e., the autonomy) of 
the GHGIS. Congress will need to ensure that the ICCME is structured so as to 
                                                 





incentivize the agency’s close cooperation with the GHGIS.  Trust between the two 
entities must be maintained. 
As amply illustrated by Iraq, intelligence sharing is a complicated 
endeavor, made more so when one of the two parties to the exchange can neither 
reciprocate nor withhold intelligence from the other.  In the case of Iraq, the IAEA had no 
leverage with which to compel greater cooperation or trustworthiness from U.S. 
intelligence.  Under normal circumstances, absent the conditions specially imposed on 
Iraq by the Security Council, the IAEA has been statutorily precluded form sharing the 
information it collects in the conduct of its “safeguards” inspections.  In countries other 
than Iraq, breaches of this restriction would have been seen as risking the compromise of 
commercial secrets.245  Typically, then, the IAEA would have no leverage with which to 
influence the IC.  The IAEA could in no way “punish” the IC for disingenuous 
intelligence sharing, and thus the IAEA could have no assurance that the information it 
received from the IC was of any intrinsic value.  The problem of incentivizing the IC’s 
genuine support for an international treaty monitoring entity will be returned to briefly.   
2. National Intelligence and the Loss of International Monitoring 
Legitimacy 
Given Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 
anticipated collaboration between member intelligence agencies and IAEA and United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) (biological, chemical, and long-range missile) 
inspectors. The IAEA certainly did receive intelligence from national intelligence 
agencies regarding Iraq, and, in due course, Iraq claimed that IAEA inspectors were, in 
fact, working for the U.S.246  In fact, it is widely assumed the IC went beyond simply 
providing inspectors with information, as allowed by Resolution 687, and there is 
evidence that intelligence officers participated directly in UNSCOM inspection teams.247  
News stories to this effect appeared and, ultimately, they served to undermine the 
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legitimacy of UNSCOM.  Blix himself believed the reports, and, as he put it, “The 
publicity about the intelligence affairs critically damaged UNSCOM, which was seen by 
many as an instrument in large measure controlled by the U.S., rather than as a tool of the 
Security Council.”248 These revelations undermined the cohesion within the monitoring 
nations.  Blix maintained, “There was no agreement between the five permanent 
members of the Security Council on where to go.  Many considered UNSCOM so 
discredited that it should be discontinued.”249  Regardless, whatever sympathy the 
regime’s appeals might have won it among the international community, Iraqi 
protestations ultimately proved futile.   
a. Bad in Iraq: Worse for an ICELA  
The IC/IAEA relationship in Iraq is fundamentally different than one 
involving a country who had not been roundly ostracized from the international 
community.  It seems likely that any similar type of IC association with a future GHGIS 
would compromise the legitimacy of the international monitoring regime and damage the 
ICELA’s prospects for success.  In any disagreement regarding suspected treaty 
violations, most individual signatories to an ICELA will be able to rely on at least some 
degree of support from countries with which they have a longstanding affinity and shared 
interests. These countries will have few qualms about ignoring claims made by any single 
intelligence agency.  This would be very unlike the circumstances confronting the Iraqi 
regime who had few international supporters in 2003.  
There is another lesson to be drawn from Iraq’s protests regarding the 
intelligence agencies’ participation in UNSCOM’s inspections.  The Iraq invasion was 
propelled by a series of miscalculations.  Without sympathizing with Saddam, it is 
possible to nevertheless wonder what might have transpired if the regime had not been 
able to indulge its self-righteous indignation.  As Blix put it, “The Iraqi regime, which 
had long accused UNSCOM of espionage, felt vindicated.”250  The UNSCOM 
inspections proved nothing about Iraqi weapons that in fact did not exist.  Indeed 
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intelligence agency participation in the inspections only served to worsen the existing 
diplomatic crisis.  Morally justified as intelligence agency participation in the UNSCOM 
inspections might have been, strategically it proved counterproductive. Transposed into 
the ICELA environment, such conflation of intelligence and overt monitoring activities 
would unquestionably violate the treaty provisions, and undermine the legitimacy of the 
treaty itself.    
b. Ongoing Iranian Criticism of the IAEA  
Iraq’s diplomatic assault on the IAEA was not unusual. Attempts to discredit the 
IAEA through criticism of the agency’s reliance on intelligence services are a perennial 
issue.  Currently, the world’s attention has been drawn to alleged Iranian attempts to 
build a nuclear weapon.  In April of 2012, a group of Iranian students released a letter 
accusing the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano of too readily lending credence to 
Western intelligence sources.  In their letter, the students asked, “Don’t you think that 
one of your weak points as the head of the IAEA is overreliance on unverified and 
suspicious intelligence documents of the West(ern countries) which is moving against 
Iran stealthily?”   More interesting, perhaps, is the criticism Amano has received from 
former American IAEA official Robert Kelly, who drew parallels with the period before 
the Iraq invasion, stating: 
Amano is falling into the Cheney trap. What we learned back in 2002 and 
2003, when we were in the runup to the war, was that peer review was 
very important, and that the analysis should not be left to a small group of 
people.251  
Regardless of the legitimacy of these criticisms, they seemed destined to increase 
nationalist sentiment within Iran, and ultimately to undermine efforts to dissuade Iran 
from pursuing its nuclear weapons ambitions. In the case of a future ICELA, whether or 
not some regimes feel compelled to respect their treaty commitments could hinge on 
similar perceptions of GHGIS bias.  
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3. IAEA Inspectors: Damned if They Trust the IC, Damned if They 
Don’t—The Problem of Defection  
The 2003 Los Angeles Times article referenced earlier includes what the author 
describes as a “serious criticism” of Blix’s insistence on distancing the IAEA from 
Western intelligence sources.252 The Times writer noted that in his memoirs Blix, “doesn’t 
seem aware of the price to be paid for keeping at arm’s length from the spooks. His independence left 
him baffled at what the Americans and British knew about Hussein’s programs.”  This criticism is 
unfair on at least four different counts.  First, Blix does, in fact, acknowledge the benefits of 
intelligence resources when, describing the successes of one of his fellow inspectors and longtime 
detractors, he wrote:  
The rich caches of documents which [David] Kay seized that year showed 
that such a search could be highly rewarding—provided you had good 
intelligence on where to look.  The documents did not lead to any weapons 
stores, or for that matter, to any weapons at all, but they were crucial and 
conclusive evidence about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.253   
Second, as noted previously, Blix did indeed follow leads provided to him by 
Western intelligence. Third, and perhaps most importantly, had Blix in fact bent to U.S. 
pressure, he could have irreparably damaged the reputation of an agency that is integral 
to the success of the NPT.  Fourth, and as made plain in the L.A. Times article, Blix had 
every reason to distrust the intelligence he was being fed.  Regardless of the quality of the 
evidence, the Bush administration was intent on building a case for military action 
against Iraq.254  This last point is especially relevant to this thesis, and moreover to the 
question of intelligence sharing generally.  As described by James Walsh in his book, The 
International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, in any intelligence sharing relationship, the 
recipient of the intelligence typically does not have access to the source and method of 
the intelligence collected and must rely on the integrity of their intelligence sharing 
partner.  At any time this partner may “defect” from that partnership and distort or 
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fabricate intelligence for its own purposes.255  Walsh notes the importance of ensuring 
that partners to an intelligence sharing arrangement have incentives to abide by their 
commitments.256  In the case of the ICCME, it is essential that the GHGIS and the world 
more generally be confident that the ICCME will provide relevant and unbiased 
intelligence regarding ICELA signatory compliance.  By exposing the ICCME to 
rigorous and transparent oversight, Congress can incentivize ICCME adherence to the 
mission set out for it and instill confidence in the GHGIS that it can rely on information it 
receives from the ICCME.  
Just as signatories to the various international nonproliferation agreements have 
conceded the benefits of receiving support from member intelligence agencies, it seems 
likely ICELA signatories will acknowledge the advantages of accepting intelligence 
support for their own monitoring regime.  Inevitably, in accepting support from the 
ICCME, the GHGIS will risk provoking accusations that it is working for the U.S.  So 
long as ICCME support is provided through a transparent process, which can be reviewed 
and validated independently, these accusations are not likely to win sympathy for 
identified treaty violators.  So long as the U.S. IC recognizes the need to uphold the 
legitimacy of the GHGIS, it is likely that the GHGIS will strive to ensure the ICCME’s 
continued support for their shared objectives.  
C. REPLACING EXECUTIVE JUDGMENT WITH IC PROCEDURE  
This thesis has focused on some notable examples of how intelligence collection 
has been predicated on the desire to support nonproliferation goals championed by 
Congress.  These examples, however, demonstrate how the discretion exercised by the 
executive branch frequently distorts the intelligence findings, undermines confidence in 
the IC, and—albeit inadvertently—subverts the purpose of the treaty.  Congress has in 
the past imposed constraints on intelligence activities.  There are measures Congress 
could take to discourage executive branch and IC actions that run contrary to the treaty 
objectives. 
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1. Incentivizing Trustworthiness: Congressional Reporting 
Requirements  
In considering how the U.S. IC could best support a future ICELA, an essential 
question is how the intelligence the U.S. collects should be managed.  So far the research 
collected for this thesis demonstrates the risks of allowing the administration discretion in 
releasing information.  In the case of the NPT, there seems to be little evidence to suggest 
that such discretion serves the treaty goals.  In fact, through its imposition of IC 
nonproliferation reporting requirements, Congress has indicated its judgment that such 
executive branch discretion has not served the country well.  
a. The Release of Intelligence Findings of Treaty Violation, Section 
721 Reports  
Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act provides a 
particularly relevant precedent for the type of oversight regime Congress may consider 
for the ICCME.  This legislation created a requirement for semi-annual unclassified IC 
reporting on “the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction 
and Advanced Conventional Munitions.”257 Subsequently, in the FY 2004 Intelligence 
Authorization Act, the frequency of this reporting was increased so it is now an annual 
requirement.  The 2012 Congressional Research Service’s China and Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues publication makes dozens of 
references to these reports in describing suspected and confirmed nuclear and missile 
technology transfers from China or from “entities” within China that violate the NPT, 
other weapons limitations treaties, or bilateral agreements between the U.S. and China.258  
Frequently, the information within these “Section 721 Reports” only confirms previous 
newspaper reports based on unnamed “intelligence sources.”  In others, however, this 
reporting contradicts previous administration statements. 
Although it would be helpful to be able to assert that the release of these 
reports ensures that the Administration does not withhold negative IC findings, no such 
categorical declaration is possible.  Frequently, the language within these reports is vague 
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and, as the reports are unclassified, they do not reveal sensitive information regarding 
methods and sources.  Nevertheless, the contents of these congressionally required 
reports must be taken seriously within the administration and the IC.  Any intentional 
distortion or obfuscations contained within these reports could easily be discovered 
through other disclosures or revelations. Members of the IC and the administration must 
exercise caution when considering withholding evidence from Congress for fear that 
misleading reports might later expose members of the federal bureaucracy to legal or 
political sanctions.  Foreign leaders must likewise be attentive to the release of these 
reports, as they can complicate ongoing international negotiations and potentially expose 
proliferators to sanctions or loss of political influence at home.  
The complexity of the diplomatic issues raised by these required reports 
can be astounding. In 2002 North Korea was once again escalating nuclear weapons 
tensions and had expelled IAEA inspectors.  The Bush administration pressured China to 
employ its influence over North Korea to achieve a peaceful resolution to the dispute.  In 
2003, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was eventually able to convince the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to participate in “Trilateral Talks” with 
the U.S. in China.  Subsequently, Secretary of State Colin Powell praised the Chinese for 
their assistance.  Clearly, the administration sought to foster a perception that the meeting 
had been successful.  However, the following year, in releasing the unclassified Section 
721 report, the DCI noted that North Korea had in fact during the meeting  threatened to 
“’transfer’ or ‘demonstrate’ its nuclear weapons.”259 There are a variety of ways of 
interpreting what amounted to a diametrically opposed characterization of the results of 
those talks.  The administration may simply have wished to persuade its U.S. audience 
that its efforts had met with success.  Alternatively, it may have desired to reward the 
Chinese for their assistance.   
Regardless, due to what Robert Putnam described as the “logic of two-
level games,” the release of the Section 721 Report may have absolved the administration 
of having to itself publicly criticize its Chinese negotiating partners, while maintaining, 
nevertheless, U.S. and international pressure on the PCR to exert greater pressure on the 
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North Koreans.260  Likewise, by requiring the ICCME to report its findings routinely, 
whether directly through unclassified reports to Congress, or alternatively by using the 
GHGIS as a conduit for that information, Congress would alleviate the administration 
from having to itself issue a negative report on an ally or negotiating partner.  This type 
of mandatory reporting could greatly reduce an Administration’s inclination to conceal or 
otherwise distort the ICCME findings.  Most importantly, from the perspective of the 
ICELA, encouraging full and truthful ICCME reporting will increase the agency’s 
domestic and international credibility.     
In 2001, Congress received a Section 721 Report that rectified a previous, 
more encouraging assessment of China’s adherence to its pledge to the U.S. regarding 
questionable nuclear technology interactions with Iran.  While it is impossible to 
determine whether the content of either report was influenced by the administration or by 
contemporary events, the fact of the change suggests that the IC’s reporting was 
ultimately truthful and possibly independent.  In any case, in 2002 the Washington Post 
reported that an Iranian opposition group had divulged information regarding Chinese 
material assistance to a secret Iranian nuclear weapons facility at Natanz.  In issuing any 
of these required unclassified Section 721 Reports, the DCI will remain mindful that 
information withheld from Congress might well become public through other 
channels.261  
Congress has not, however, been uniformly successful in encouraging IC 
candor through the imposition of the Section 721 reporting requirement.  As noted 
previously, the administration has allowed ambiguity to reign by characterizing suspected 
or confirmed proliferation violations as either having been committed by “the Chinese” 
or by Chinese “entities.”  The DCI has likewise exercised this same discretion when 
issuing some Section 721 Reports.  In 2001, the Pentagon reported that the Syrians had 
received missile development assistance by “Chinese firms.”  Not until 2010, however, 
did a Section 721 Report reveal that this assistance was in fact supplied by the Chinese 
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government.262  Intentional or not, reporting ambiguity by a future ICCME will likely 
result in undesirable diplomatic outcomes.  In empowering an ICCME, Congress will 
want to reduce, to the extent possible, the agency’s incentives or opportunities to exercise 
reporting “discretion” that may easily be perceived at home and abroad as deception. 
2. Routing of ICCME Reports  
Congress’ preference for routine IC nonproliferation reporting coincides with the 
research findings presented thus far within this thesis.  Those findings highlight the 
desirability of transparent ICCME engagement with the GHGIS.  Congress has not yet 
defined or imposed any requirements regarding the intelligence the IC shares with the 
IAEA.  In order to build a strong collaborative relationship between the ICCME and the 
GHGIS, Congress should consider statutorily defining how intelligence collected by the 
ICCME will be shared with the GHGIS.  Only in so far as the ICCME is held to a clear 
set of operational standards will the U.S. and international public develop confidence in 
the ICCME’s findings.   
ICELA signatories will have committed to the provisions of the treaty, and it 
seems highly probable that among these will be support for, and adherence to, GHGIS 
determinations.  Thus, while Congress should exercise close ICCME operations oversight 
to ensure that the ICCME makes the most appropriate use of it resources, it is most 
important that ICCME findings be shared with the GHGIS.  While this model of 
intelligence sharing is predicated on the same logic that drove IC intelligence support for 
the IAEA monitoring efforts, the two should not be seen as identical.  Just as the Bush 
administration found itself at odds with and ultimately sought to discredit the IAEA’s 
(negative) Iraq findings, a future U.S. administration might pursue an agenda contrary to 
the work of the GHGIS.  It is essential that the ICCME operations—to the extent 
possible—be insulated from pressures emanating from within the IC or any other part of 
the executive branch.  In order to foster international confidence in the impartiality of 
ICCME findings, these findings should be arrived at through a process that is transparent 
and void, to the extent possible, of human discretion.  
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Examples from IAEA monitoring operations highlight the pitfalls of allowing 
outside entities, up to and including the IAEA’s own governing body, to exercise 
discretion in the administration of treaty provisions.  Once the IAEA had been 
empowered by the NPT signatories to monitor treaty compliance, the world’s perception 
was that the IAEA would act impartially.  Nonetheless, the IAEA Secretary General 
worked under tremendous pressure in issuing findings that could raise the ire of entire 
nations.  In different instances involving Iranian and Libyan violations, the IAEA 
Secretary General purposefully opted against employing the treaty language in his 
declarations.263 Instead of using the words “non-compliance” in statements regarding 
those two countries, the Secretary General employed alternative language, leaving it to 
the IAEA’s Board of Governors to formalize the finding.264  Pierre Goldschmidt, who 
previously served as the IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of 
Safeguards, described the unfortunate result of this ambiguity, writing, “This may have 
contributed to the politicization of the issue and, from 2003 onwards, to the collapse of 
the widely praised “Vienna spirit.”265   
While the Secretary General’s reticence to provoke the anger of implicated 
countries is understandable, succumbing to that temptation undermines not only the 
IAEA’s reputation, it also corrodes the treaty’s ability to constrain potential violators.  A 
mechanistic rather than a discretionary response to treaty violations serves to discourage 
that violations be committed by leaders who, rightly or wrongly, believe that they can 
employ political stratagems to avoid sanctions or condemnations.  A strong treaty regime 
can encourage individual or group avoidance of choices that will result in widely 
anticipated results (e.g., being called to task for nonproliferation or CO2 emissions 
violations).  Once those outcomes become less certain (i.e., contingent on choices being 
made by other political agents), bad actors may begin to rationalize their behavior or 
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weigh the likelihood of being caught against the benefits they hope to derive by flouting 
treaty provisions.   
As Goldschmidt does remind his readers, “The IAEA Secretariat is expected to 
act as a technical and totally apolitical body in order to maintain its reputation of 
objectivity and impartiality.”266  If countries, their representatives, or their industries 
believe they can exert political influence on those entities involved in treaty monitoring, 
they will have less incentive to respect treaty provisions or to expect that other treaty 
signatories will respect their own commitments.  While there are undoubtedly 
circumstances that might benefit from greater ICCME discretion in sharing its findings, 
these occasional exceptions will doubtless confirm the long-term value of basing ICCME 
decision making on the most mechanistic and invariable standard operating procedures 
possible. 
a. The Herzberg Solution  
Students of the NPT have recommended measures to improve the sharing 
of intelligence with the IAEA.  Some of these suggestions may help in devising a means 
of sharing intelligence with the GHGIS.  In a white paper on improving intelligence 
sharing with the IAEA, Michael Hertzberg has examined similar sharing conducted by 
NATO members.267  Countries which are members of NATO direct intelligence to 
NATO which then, after consideration by NATO personnel, distributes this intelligence 
to member countries as deemed appropriate by NATO.  Adopting a similar additional 
layer of bureaucracy between the IC and the international GHGIS could have the 
unfortunate effect of retarding the identification of treaty violators, but this additional 
encumberment might be justified. Creating or employing an intermediary between 
national intelligence agencies and the GHGIS would help reduce the potential for the 
GHGIS to be seen as an extension of the U.S. IC.  As Hertzberg puts it:  
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Funneling intelligence coordination through a multilateral security 
organization with its own distinct preferences and interests would provide 
an internal check on the ability of one national government to use the 
IAEA as a vehicle for promoting its own interests, as the CIA did in 
Iraq.268   
The same might also hold true for the GHGIS. 
Another potential advantage of employing Herzberg’s intermediary international 
agency is that the GHGIS could direct requests for information back through that 
intermediary, rather than making requests directly to the U.S IC.  Given that GHGIS 
suspicions regarding signatory non-compliance might take many months to years to 
confirm, there may frequently be instances when the GHGIS would benefit from the 
ability to compare its own suspicions against intelligence that an intelligence agency 
might have the means to gather but to which it had not yet devoted attention.  In such 
cases, being able to route such requests through an international intelligence 
clearinghouse like NATO, could be of great benefit.  The drawback to such a strategy, as 
Herzberg is careful to note, is that, in the case of the IAEA:  
…non-NATO IAEA members may view any association of the agency 
with NATO as a threat to the IAEA’s impartiality.  In particular, they may 
see any agreement with NATO as a first step towards greater manipulation 
of the agency by Western nuclear powers, and could consider withdrawing 
from the IAEA.269 
Hertzberg illuminates an area of intelligence activity that has received too little 
attention.  Given the secret aspect in the IC mission, there is a tendency to defer to the IC 
regarding the need for secrecy in all matters, whether this is justified by the need to 
protect sources and methods or not.  As will be described later in the “Congressional 
Oversight” section of this thesis, under normal circumstances, the harm of too little IC 
oversight is insidious and only reveals itself when the resulting damage becomes far too 
costly to ignore.  
In considering how the IC might best monitor a future international CO2 
emissions limitation agreement, Congress will have an opportunity to ensure that IC 
                                                 
268 Ibid. 4–5.  
269 Hertzberg, “Shining a Brighter Light on Dark Places,” 13–14. 
 125 
 
resources are employed optimally and that the structural causes of past intelligence 
sharing failures do not imperil an international climate change mitigation effort.  
Hertzberg’s suggestion are worthy of consideration. Whether or not Hertzberg’s 
suggestions form part of a future intelligence sharing process is less important, however, 
than ensuring that whatever process is adopted can be readily modified to overcome the 
unforeseeable challenges that are certain to arise.  A strong Congressional oversight role 
will be essential in encouraging appropriate and timely ICCME adaptation to changing 
circumstances.    
3. Breaking with Precedent: The Need for Ongoing Congressional 
Oversight  
Treaty provisions will ultimately determine the best use of national assets to 
promote treaty success.  Depending on the actual regime adopted by future ICELA 
signatories, Congress should establish mechanisms to ensure that the uses of IC resources 
are aligned with the treaty.  Regardless of the ICELA adopted, Congress should not 
assume that either the political or institutional objectives of either the executive branch, 
generally, or the IC, specifically, will faithfully reflect those of the treaty absent close 
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VII. ACHIEVING TRANSPARENCY THE LEGISLATURE IN THE 
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT “CYCLE” 
Not until 1996 did the British government even acknowledge the existence of 
their foreign intelligence service, the MI6.270  The cloak and dagger ethos that ruled 
intelligence activities has in Britain, like in the U.S., given way to a more practical 
approach to intelligence collection.  Governments in democratic nations, including their 
intelligence services, have become more transparent and accountable.  The legitimacy of 
all democratic institutions depends on the credibility of their leaders, which in turn can 
only be sustained transparent governmental processes.    
Nations will only feel compelled to respect the provisions of a future ICELA so 
long as the treaty retains legitimacy among its signatories.  Like that of all democratic 
institutions, the legitimacy of any ICELA can only be sustained if the international public 
trusts the processes established to administer the agreement.  If the actions of the IC 
undermine the ICELA’s legitimacy, U.S. interests will not have been served.  Should the 
U.S pursue climate change mitigation through an international agreement, it will be up to 
Congress to ensure that independent IC monitoring of the treaty is conducted in 
conformity with international norms.  While the idea of “transparency” may appear to be 
an oxymoron when discussing intelligence agency activities, the two should not be 
considered mutually exclusive.  “Transparency” is not the exposure of secret sources and 
methods.  “Transparency,” in terms of intelligence activity, has to do with accountability 
to the legislature for process integrity.    
The executive branch’s reluctance to pursue some NPT and other bilateral and 
international weapons nonproliferation treaty violations has prompted Congress to 
expand its oversight of the nation’s efforts to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, most notably through the imposition of routine reporting requirements on the 
IC.  More generally, the progressive expansion of Congressional oversight of the IC 
reflects an underlying dynamic that should be considered when designing an IC entity 
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(ICCME) to monitor a future international CO2 emissions limitation agreement (ICELA).  
Because the success of any future ICELA will rely so heavily on the legitimacy of the 
international treaty monitoring regime, and because of the likelihood that the U.S. will 
seek to supplement these monitoring efforts with intelligence collected by the IC, 
Congress would do well to consider the roots of the issues that have led to its own 
increasing efforts to constrain and direct IC activities.  Such a consideration will highlight 
the dangers of excessive intelligence agency discretion, and the benefits of ensuring the 
IC monitoring effort remains transparent.  
A. LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES: 
ORIGINS AND OBSTACLES  
Having recognized a need and acknowledged its competency to address it, 
Congress empowers an agent to pursue goals and objectives identified with meeting that 
need.  Ensuring that the agent carries out its mandate appropriately, however, requires a 
sustained focus at odds with Congress’s ever-increasing oversight demands.271 Though 
this dilemma is one Congress confronts in all realms of its activity, when dealing with 
matters of national intelligence, the need for secrecy compounds Congress’s challenge.272   
U.S. intelligence agencies are ultimately the creatures of our legislative process, 
and, as such, they must be answerable to it.273  Congress invests extraordinary powers in 
the IC, powers that may easily be abused if left un-monitored.  The legitimacy of our 
government rests on adherence to the precepts of our Nation’s founding documents. 
Should our intelligence agencies be seen as acting without the legal and fiscal bounds 
described by those documents, the public has a right to question the lawfulness of our 
government as a whole.  The powers and secrecy afforded our intelligence agencies have 
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been used to undermine civil liberties, provide partisan advantage in the political arena, 
and misuse public funds.  Because they are hidden from public scrutiny, left 
unmonitored, our intelligence agencies may perform sub-optimally and fail in the mission 
for which they were created—protecting our citizens and democratic institutions from 
domestic and foreign threats.274 U.S. intelligence abuses in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
missed intelligence opportunities that might have altered events on 9/11, and the 
perceived or real intelligence failures noted in the lead up to the war in Iraq are just a few 
of the events that focused public attention and motivated Congressional efforts to better 
monitor activities of the IC. 275  
Intelligence oversight challenges are not unique to the United States.  Congress’ 
predicament is shared by legislatures in all democratic countries that endeavor to ensure 
their security in accordance with their democratic principles. As an example, members of 
Parliament in Britain, like their American counterparts in Congress, respond most 
aggressively to issues important to the constituencies that elect them and reserve 
relatively less of their time for matters, such as national security, that are of less acute 
local importance.  As in the U.S., in Britain, the development of clandestine national 
security agencies reflected the exigencies of a particular set of historical circumstances.  
Measures to mitigate the potential for mismanagement or abuse of the special powers 
vested in these agencies were pursued with less energy than were those to ensure these 
agencies could protect the nation against foreign threats.  That the peacetime burning of 
fossil fuels would create a new national security threat was an unimagined contingency at 
the time.  Now Congress and the nation will be faced with the challenge of employing 
bureaucratic institutions established for human conflicts to instead aid in overcoming a 
challenge that we can only confront in collaboration with both our allies and our rivals.   
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B. HOW LACK OF OVERSIGHT RESULTS IN LOSS OF INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY LEGITIMACY  
Efforts to integrate government activities within the European Union and the 
advent of new democracies throughout the world have fostered broad studies of 
parliamentary intelligence oversight.276  Though the intent of these studies is not to 
demonstrate the causal relationship between lax or absent intelligence oversight and 
intelligence abuse and failure, they do indeed highlight a correlation.  Whether in the U.S. 
or abroad, countries’ legislative efforts to institute effective oversight of their intelligence 
agencies routinely follow incidents that have raised public concerns that these agencies 
had failed in their mission or had exceeded their authority. 277  
The naissance of U.S. intelligence has been traced to different historical 
moments.278  Whether it be deemed the 1947 creation of the CIA, of the Office of Naval 
Intelligence in the 1880s, Washington’s Revolutionary War deceptions of the British, or 
some other point in U.S. history, the essential fact is that the establishment of U.S. 
intelligence is the result of events rather than the culmination of a progressively identified 
need or a national epiphany regarding an intrinsic state requirement.  Like any institution, 
once established, intelligence agencies have an interest in preserving their resources and 
prerogatives.  Justified or not, it is expected that intelligence agencies will insist that their 
operations require insulation from outside review.  However, reference to these assertions 
should only be accorded as justified by the IC’s operational needs.  Failure to overcome 
IC resistance to ICCME oversight will ultimately ensure the ICCME’s irrelevance.   
Within a democracy, the public’s perception of events generally constrains their 
leaders’ range of policy options.  Unless events raise questions regarding an intelligence 
agency’s behavior, there is little motivation and less ability for members of Congress to 
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overcome the I.C.’s resistance to oversight or reform.  Congressional oversight can be 
undermined or improved, but it can never be wholly satisfactory because its aggressive 
implementation is dependent on the public revelation of intelligence missteps.  Under 
most circumstances the cycle cannot be circumvented.  Generally, all that can be altered 
is the frequency and timeliness with which problems within the IC are identified and 
rectified.  Because public perceptions will be integral to the success of an ICELA, 
Congress must pre-emptively reduce the likelihood of problems regarding the ICCME 
escalating to a degree that undermines the ICCME’s domestic or international legitimacy. 
1. Different Legislative Models: The Same Intelligence Oversight 
Outcome  
In considering any adjustment to Congressional oversight of the IC, care should 
be taken to adopt changes that recognize and address the underlying oversight dynamic.  
To confirm that missteps are features rather than aberrancies of intelligence institutions, it 
is instructive to consider how intelligence failures manifest equally in legislative systems 
alien to our own.  Increasing British legislative intelligence oversight over the last three 
decades has provided a window into the British intelligence system unavailable in most 
other countries.  This visibility has made it possible to observe that, though the difference 
between the U.S. and British legislative systems are vast, both have followed remarkably 
similar paths in adopting greater intelligence agency oversight responsibility.  An 
assessment of intelligence agency abuses in the two countries reveals nearly identical 
cyclical patterns. 
In the U.S. and Britain, as in other democracies, the intelligence agencies function 
as part of the executive branch.  In the U.S. independent oversight of our intelligence 
agencies is conducted primarily by a select committee on intelligence in each house of 
congress.  In addition to these intelligence specific committees, budgetary oversight is 
conducted by subcommittees of the defense appropriations committees in each house.  
Additionally, the Judiciary Committees and Homeland Security Committees exercise 
their own oversight responsibilities.279  
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Early in the 1970s, allegations of IC involvement in the Watergate break-in led to 
the establishment of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, better known as the “Church Committee.”  The 
committee’s investigation led to the discovery of three decades of intelligence abuses.  
Prior to these revelations, Congress and the nation vested their trust in the patriotism of 
the intelligence agencies.  In great part due to Church Committee’s findings of 
intelligence abuses by the FBI and CIA, Congress came to the realization that the IC 
oversight provided by its intelligence subcommittees of the Armed Services and 
Appropriations Committees needed to be more focused.  Ultimately, this realization led 
to the establishment of an oversight committee specific to intelligence in each 
chamber.280  Only revelations of pervasive abuse within the IC overcame external 
resistance, and Congress’s own reticence to assume a more prominent intelligence 
oversight role.  Among the many lessons of the Church Committee was that without 
effective oversight, intelligence agencies will undermine not only the nation’s democratic 
values but also their own missions.281 
2. The Genesis of Intelligence Agency Oversight in Britain  
While British intelligence services are also directed by the executive, in the form 
of the Prime Minister, oversight of these services is exercised from within a more 
ambiguous structure. The British public was content to remain in the dark regarding the 
country’s intelligence activities until the 1970s, when civil strife began to erode 
Parliamentary collegiality on matters of national security.  The social and economic 
changes brought about by Margaret Thatcher’s neo-liberal policies exacerbated the 
partisan divide. Spy scandals became fodder for partisan electioneering.282   
What propelled actual legislation regarding legislative intelligence oversight was 
a 1984 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that found Britain’s 
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policies regarding domestic wiretapping in contravention of the country’s treaty 
obligations.  During this period, a former MI5 official disclosed that the agency’s 
activities had included surveillance of two former members of the National Council for 
Civil Liberties who would soon become government ministers.  As the two prepared to 
submit their case to the ECHR, the prospect of continued unfavorable ECHR findings and 
additional negative publicly prompted legislative actions within Britain, culminating in 
the 1989 Security Services Act that established a legal framework within which Britain’s 
Security Service (MI5) would subsequently operate.283   
That British Parliamentary oversight mechanisms were in large part instituted in 
response to the requirements of its international treaty obligations suggests a potential 
long-term motor for increased oversight and greater intelligence transparency 
internationally.  This British experience is particularly relevant to the ICCME, since only 
if international ICELA signatories feel confident that U.S. ICCME operations conform to 
international standards will they allow those findings to be integrated into the 
international GHGIS monitoring regime.  By ensuring the ICCME adheres to practices 
consistent with international collaboration, Congress will help foster international trust in 
the ICCME.  
Succeeding Margret Thatcher, John Major’s government finally promised 
legislation to place Britain’s intelligence agencies under Parliamentary oversight.  The 
deal was sealed when another scandal—this one involving the sale of British military 
equipment to Iraq in the 1980s against the then British government’s stated position—
broke in the media. The story involved three British businessmen who were put on trial 
for selling arms to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war when such sales had been forbidden by 
British law.  In fact, the British government had secretly been supporting Iraq and had 
been receiving information from one of the defendants.  Ultimately, in 1994, the public 
outcry over the government’s hypocrisy forced the Prime Minister to support the passing 
of the Intelligence Services Act (ISA), which included the creation of the Intelligence and 
Security Committee (ISC). 
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In consultation with Parliament, the Prime Minister selects the members of the 
ISC.  The ISC is comprised of nine members chosen from the House of Commons and 
House of Lords. Unlike in the U.S., where Congress has theoretical purview over all 
federal agencies and thus the ability to determine the structure and scope of its oversight 
committees’ responsibilities, the ISC derives its authority from the act under which it was 
created.284  Thus, the ISC is a “committee of Parliamentarians” rather than, as in the case 
of Congressional investigatory committees, a “committee of Parliament” with 
independence from the executive. 
In creating the ISC, the British government did not forego an ability to restrict the 
amount of information it releases either to the ISC or to the public. All in all, the history 
of the ISC has been of a continual public discussion regarding the extent and limits of its 
investigatory powers, as much as of the substance of it inquiries.  Generally, the ISC 
provides the executive branch with a pseudo-independent affirmation of the integrity of 
the government’s intelligence collection activities.    
If the ISC has frequently described as “window dressing” for the British 
government, there have been instances in its investigations where it has been able to 
amplify its investigatory power by presenting the government with an ultimatum. In 
1999, at the government’s request, the ISC initiated an inquiry into past Soviet spying 
referred to as the “Mitrokhin Affair.”  Initially, this ISC investigation widely perceived as 
another government attempt to create the illusion of a genuine investigation. If this 
supposition was correct, the stratagem revealed a miscalculation on the part of the 
government.  Prior to agreeing to take on the investigation, the ISC publicly insisted on 
full access to a relevant documentation, including the MI5’s ministerial level 
recommendations.  In this case, the government conceded, once again demonstrating the 
degree to which the prospect of further public focus on an issue determines the power 
that investigators will ultimately wield in overseeing intelligence agencies.285   
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Interestingly, the treatment of the British citizen held in Guantanamo by the U.S. 
prompted demands among the British public that their government release relevant 
information. U.S. officials warned the British that the release of this information 
threatened intelligence relations between the two countries.  Ultimately, the British 
government yielded to its constituents’ outcry and released the information.286  The event 
revealed how unfavorable public attention among an U.S. ally’s public can trump that 
government’s concerns regarding the preservation of even their most important 
international intelligence sharing partnership.   
C. A NEW THREAT: NEW INTELLIGENCE EXIGENCIES   
It is only recently that national security resources have been asked to consider and 
perhaps confront threats that do not arise from competition between nations.  In the case 
of climate change, the adversary is a byproduct of peaceful modern human activity.  This 
is important to keep in mind when designing an intelligence effort for treaty monitoring 
activities.  While a military adversary will invest heavily in counter-intelligence efforts, it 
is extremely unlikely that a rival will divert its own intelligence resources to undermine 
the operations of a U.S. ICCME.  IC resistance to oversight is frequently predicated on 
the fear of enemy infiltration.  However, concerns which are legitimate in the case of 
nuclear weapons should not preclude Congressional insistence on ICCME transparency 
when the fundamental threat is CO2.  As will be argued in this thesis’ consideration 
ICCME “Goals and Structure,” the more circumscribed the ICCME mission, the less 
concern there should be within and without the IC that measures undertaken to increase 
ICCME transparency will compromise other more traditional IC objectives. 
In considering measures to monitor any international agreement, whether 
involving weapons proliferation or CO2 emissions, there must be a recognition that the 
ultimate purpose of monitoring is to legitimize rather than to indict the treaty.  
Particularly, in the case of a future ICELA, the U.S. should less fear that another country 
is failing to respect the treaty, than it should be concerned that that country’s behavior 
will undermine the world’s commitment to work together to solve the problem.  By 
framing the nation’s objective in this way, it follows that the U.S. should focus on 
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supporting the international monitoring regime, rather than directly confronting 
individual international violators with U.S. IC findings.   
1.  “The Fire Alarm”: The Missing Link to IC Oversight  
The forces involved in establishing Congressional oversight of the IC do not 
parallel those of other areas of Congressional responsibility. In domains other than 
national security, a considerable amount of Congressional oversight relies on what has 
been called the “fire alarm” model, whereby Congress is alerted to potential problems by 
attentive interest groups.287  While Congressional oversight of federal agencies may 
appear to respect a straightforward client/agent relationship, as already described in the 
literature review, the truth is more complicated.  It is in fact disproportionately impacted 
societal sub-groups that prompt Congressional intervention. These groups exercise an 
even more disproportionate influence on the substance of congressional 
intervention.288  Secrecy and the issues inherent to intelligence activity, however, diffuse, 
mute, or more generally nullify the influence of those disproportionately impacted by 
secret intelligence activity.   
In other spheres, the federal bureaucracy must yield to the wishes of those who 
can influence members of Congress’s electoral prospects.  Not so in matters of 
intelligence, where elections are usually not won or lost.  The only “natural constituency” 
for the IC is the executive branch itself.  Thus, relative to other bureaucracies, our 
intelligence agencies have far greater influence over their own fate.  Historically, because 
the IC has typically operated beyond public scrutiny, the “fire alarm” model of 
congressional oversight of the bureaucracy has proved irrelevant as it applies to national 
security.  It is typically only upon the discovery of “catastrophic failures or scandals” 
within the nation’s national security institutions that underlying chronic problems have 
been identified.289 
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The intensity of legislative oversight inevitably follows a cyclical pattern driven 
by the public’s attention.  Without the “fire alarm” mechanism provided by interest 
groups, Congress is unable to exercise the same level of scrutiny over the IC that is can 
over other bureaucracies.  Recognizing that it operates from a unique structural 
disadvantage in matters regarding the IC, in designing an ICCME Congress should seek 
to rectify this imbalance.   
Should the ICCME remain cloaked in secrecy within the IC, it will be subject to 
the same irresistible forces that lead to IC excesses or excessive institutional loyalty.  
Because the ICCME mission is unique and because the entity’s influence will be subject 
to such intense international scrutiny, it is imperative that Congress harness this wide 
public interest to ensure that any distortion in the ICCME’s mission is discovered before 
it can lead to public censure.  The fact of the ICCME’s existence, regardless of the 
entity’s constituent parts, will be impossible to hide.  Moreover, as has been 
demonstrated in previous sections, there is reason to hope that knowledge of the 
ICCME’s engagement in ICELA monitoring will improve the prospects of wide 
international treaty participation and compliance.  Only if initial international suspicion 
of the ICCME is allowed to fester will the ICCME’s potential contribution instead 
become an ICELA liability.   
D. ICCME TRANSPARENCY AND ICELA SUCCESS  
Some will argued that there areas of national security in which we must allow 
intelligence agencies and the executive branch wide discretion in spite of the risks of 
insufficient IC oversight leading to public relations complications.  Regardless of their 
merits under other circumstances, such arguments ring hollow in the case of international 
climate change mitigation where even a small ICCME misstep might imperil ICELA 
success.  Given the stakes involved in our efforts to mitigate climate change, in 
empowering an ICCME Congress should adopt—and the executive and IC should 
embrace—mechanisms that promote sustained Congressional expertise and awareness 
regarding all aspects of the ICCME’s activities.  
The public’s short historical perspective means that most institutional failures, 
whether related to government intelligence collection or not, are discussed in relative 
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isolation and underlying trends are neither sought nor identified.  In fact, lack of scrutiny 
in any domain results in unfavorable outcomes.  Frank Partnoy, the author of Wait: The 
Art and Science of Delay, and a law and finance professor at the University of San Diego 
School, and Jesse Eisinger, a Pulitzer Prize winning ProPublica and New York Times 
writer, published an article on the 2008 financial meltdown in the January/February issue 
of the Atlantic.290  They began their article with the following observation: 
The financial crisis had many causes—too much borrowing, foolish 
investments, misguided regulation—but at its core, the panic resulted from 
a lack of transparency.  The reason no one wanted to lend to or trade with 
the banks during the fall of 2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed, was 
that no one could understand the banks’ risks.  It was impossible to tell, 
from looking at a particular bank’s disclosures, whether it might suddenly 
implode.291    
Intelligence agencies and banks both have legitimate needs for secrecy, which 
they will go to great lengths to preserve.  But, just as depositors need not know every 
bank transaction in order to understand whether a bank’s practices are sound, through its 
elected representatives the public can remain confident in the reliability of its intelligence 
agencies without knowing the name of each source or the details of each method.  The 
ICCME can make an important contribution to international confidence in the monitoring 
regime of a future ICELA so long as the ICCME’s routines and procedures are widely 
understood.   
Intelligence deviations from standard operating procedures are an inevitable 
feature of agencies like the CIA and the FBI, as well as of their international 
counterparts.  Effective oversight of the ICCME will depend on legislators’ collective 
ability to remain versed in the issues surrounding the ICCME’s operations.  By adopting 
measures designed to expose ICCME operational protocols to the widest possible 
scrutiny, Congress can help ensure that inevitable problems are identified prospectively, 
rather than once they have reached the headlines.  Figure 2 is a simplified representation 
of the self-correcting intelligence cycle envisioned by this thesis.   
                                                 








Figure 2.  A Conceptual Model For ICCME Intelligence Routing 
GHGIS is the Greenhouse Gas Information System, a Department of Energy 
sponsored proposal for a greenhouse gas emissions monitoring regime develop jointly by 
four U.S. National Laboratories. This thesis assumes that the regime will be either 
internationally run, or internationally recognized as the monitoring authority by the CO2 
emissions limitation agreement signatories. 
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ICCME is the Intelligence Community international CO2 emissions monitoring 
entity (a hypothetical agency contemplated by this thesis).  
ICELA is an international CO2 emissions limitation agreement (a hypothetical 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol). 
Congress could establish this cycle by defining the ICCME’s target selection and 
intelligence collection criteria.  While the IC’s sources and methods would only be 
accessible to Congressional Intelligence Committees in closed session, questions about 
the allocation of IC resources, weighting of intelligence findings, and analytical 
methodologies employed would be subject to open Congressional discussion.  Treaty 
signatories could formally or informally express misgivings or objections regarding the 
ICCME’s actions.  The international public would make its own determinations about 
how much credence to lend the protests of an accused regime.  But by providing the 
international public with this, albeit partial, window in the covert monitoring process, the 
U.S. would clearly demonstrate good faith and commitment to the treaty goals.  The 
frivolous objections of any non-compliant country would not alleviate that agreement 
violator of internal and external pressure to come into treaty compliance.  For its part the 
GHGIS would shun unreliable or clearly biased intelligence, or risk undermining the 
legitimacy of the international monitoring effort.  And, though no other country’s 
complaints regarding the IC’s actions would have legal standing in the U.S., open 
Congressional debate or discussion would encourage ICCME conformity with the 
agency’s congressionally pre-established criteria.  Over time, Congress could modify 
these criteria in order to align the ICCME’s mission with domestic and international 




VIII. ICCME DESIGN OBJECTIVES  
The ICCME will confront two potentially conflicting challenges. The first is to 
identify treaty violations; the second is to accomplish this first objective while 
encouraging the ICELA violator to comply with the agreement.  While it is not up to the 
ICCME to remediate violators, unless covert sources and methods are employed in 
conformity with ICELA signatory expectations and within treaty provisions, findings 
based on covert resources will elicit violator resistance and potentially undermine the 
legitimacy of the treaty itself.  Based on the discussion in preceding chapters, this section 
outlines thirteen goals and objectives the ICCME will need to fulfill if it is to meet the 
wider dual challenge of identifying and correcting signatory non-compliance.  
This section will elaborate on the following design objectives: 
• Prioritize the identification and reporting of treaty non-compliance  
• Identify violators quickly and reliably 
• Use all available means to accomplish the mission 
• Adapt quickly to a non-traditional mission 
• Respond to identified potential violations 
• Select targets to optimize global CO2 emissions reduction 
• Maintain credibility  
• Maintain the confidence and support of the legislature 
• Maintain credibility among domestic and international public and 
institutions  
• Make speedy assessments  
• Quickly establish the ICCME within the IC 
• Collaborate Effectively with the GHGIS  
• Assist in developing a treaty that can be monitored effectively 
• Determine the optimal use of resources  
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A. PRIORITIZING THE IDENTIFICATION AND REPORTING OF 
TREATY NON-COMPLIANCE  
In the idealized model of intelligence agencies or any other bureaucracy, the 
agency’s agenda is set by popularly elected political leaders.  The previous chapters on 
bureaucratic agency design and on legislative oversight of intelligence agencies revealed 
that the will of political leaders is only one of the drivers of bureaucratic behavior.  
Though the agencies that comprise the IC are under the direction of the executive branch, 
the President’s ability to alter these agencies’ priorities is limited by his or her need to 
focus on many issues and his or her inability to devote unlimited energy to overcoming 
bureaucratic inertia.292 
Given that this thesis seeks to determine whether the resource of the IC can be 
employed to support an ICELA, the suggestion that the IC should strive towards 
accurately identifying instances of non-compliance might appear self-evident.  As 
discussed previously, however, there are many instances where competing administration 
or IC priorities ensured that information collected by the IC regarding NPT non-
compliance was not employed in the furtherance of NPT objectives.    
Just as there were sober high level discussions contemplating the means of 
surviving nuclear winter, there are currently writers who propose to weigh the 
cost/benefits of attempting to halt the anthropogenic contribution to climate change.  
Nevertheless, national security cannot be based on best case scenarios, particular when 
even moderately optimistic projections suggests long-term environmental devastation 
should humans continue to saturate the atmosphere with CO2 at current rates.293 
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In his book, Security and Climate Change: International Relations and the Limits 
of Realism Mark Lacy poses the question: “How do we act in a condition of 
uncertainty?”294 This thesis assumes the answer to be that, in the face of uncertainty, 
where there is abundant credible evidence of a threat that might ultimately undermine the 
political and economic viability of our nation, we must adopt the “precautionary 
principle.” Under such circumstances, there can be no legitimate argument, absent a 
superior threat, to adopting other than a conservative view regarding the urgency of 
preserving, to the extent possible, the climate in a state which we know to be compatible 
with our national security.   
There is ample discussion regarding the challenge of reducing international CO2 
emissions.  The scope of the problem, both in environmental and political impact and in 
the time—measured in centuries—over which the repercussions will endure, will in turn 
require a unique level of persistence on behalf of those engage in climate change 
mitigation, as opposed to climate change adaptation. 
The overall goal of those engaged in monitoring an ICELA must remain on the 
achievement of optimal participation (the optimal number of signatories to the 
agreement) and the optimal level of signatory compliance. “Optimal,” rather than 
“maximal,” is employed here in recognition of the vast differences in emissions between 
individual countries, and the fact that many smaller countries may together emit far less 
CO2 than one large heavily industrialized country.295  This consideration is essential, 
since, according to the evidence collected for this thesis, finesse in exercising its mandate 
will be integral to ICCME mission success.   
The assumption of ICCME mission primacy is essential to any effort at 
marshaling the resources of the IC in reducing future climate change.  It is likely that 
certain consequences of climate change, such as conflicts over diminishing natural 
resources, may take immediate precedence over the need for mitigation, with the result 
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that the effort to address these immediate threats may divert the IC from the long-term 
goal of avoiding further climate change.  Within the IC, then, individuals or individual 
departments may argue that, in the interest of ensuring success at combating one aspect 
of climate change, the more temporally remote concerns of continued climate change 
must be subordinated.  Such balancing of interests is typical and inevitable within any 
institution confronting so many discrete and interconnected challenges.  While under 
most circumstances, the integration of a new mission among existing projects would 
disrupt any single institution—frequently, it is already difficult to get agencies within the 
IC to cooperate—the challenge of incorporating the novel ICCME mission appears 
especially daunting.296 The recognized difficulties of achieving IC coordination in the 
achievement of the novel and unprecedented ICCME mission suggest that Congress will 
need to structure the ICCME so as to ensure its mission receives the highest possible IC 
priority. 
Along with the many science based arguments for elevating ICCME mission 
success to a “first order,” national security concern (i.e., trumping, though not obviating, 
other national security priorities) is the long-term, low-acuity nature of the threat in 
relationship to other national security threats.  A terrorist incident or a reported diversion 
of fissile materials will always focus public and IC attention.  These issues have 
significant institutional ramifications for the IC.  Mark Lowenthal describes a 
phenomenon known to intelligence agencies as “swarm ball,” where intelligence 
collectors collectively focus on a single high visibility target “to show that they are 
working on high-value issues, regardless of their contribution, which will be important 
for their continued success in the next round of budget allocations.”297  
Once the ICCME begins operations, it will be difficult to sustain IC attention on 
ICCME needs in the face of other more acute IC concerns. Vesting the ICCME 
responsibility in an entity whose responsibility is exclusively CO2 monitoring will reduce 
mission discretion.   
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B. IDENTIFY VIOLATORS QUICKLY AND RELIABLY 
The effects of CO2 emissions are cumulative, and regardless of the uncertainty 
inherent in a phenomenon as complex as climate change, it must be assumed that less 
emissions are always preferable to more.298 
The dynamics of identifying treaty violators and bringing them into compliance is 
likewise complex; yet, again, it must be assumed that delay or imprecision in the 
identification of treaty violators will lead to either greater emissions or less overall 
compliance, and likely both. 
C. USE ALL AVAILABLE MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION  
Given the perils of climate change, it is imperative that those institutions most 
directly engaged in its mitigation not be encumbered with potentially conflicting 
obligations.  To the extent possible, they must be granted the resources needed to 
accomplish their mission. 
Because the ICCME mission requires a sustained, long-term commitment, an IC 
agency for which the ICCME function is not indeed the exclusive mission may be asked 
too often to prioritize and advocate for other objectives and to invest its credibility and 
prestige in the service of other, potentially conflicting ends. 
D. ADAPT QUICKLY TO A NON-TRADITIONAL MISSION  
Institutional inertia within the IC may discourage the adoption of novel means of 
accomplishing the monitoring task.  While the IC has evolved to identify discrete 
incidents of rival threat or malfeasance, whether or not a country complies with its CO2 
limitation treaty obligations is a question that can only be answered in thousands, if not 
millions of distinct locations.  Awareness of anthropogenic contributors to climate change 
continues to grow, and multitudes may collectively, rather than individually, know 
whether or not their governments’ declarations can be trusted or not. 
Should, as seems likely, an overt international treaty monitoring regime be 
reluctant or unable to collect, investigate, or publicize citizen reporting against treaty 
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signatories, task of building a process to identify or capture non-traditional sources of 
intelligence may very well fall to the U.S. IC.299  
E. RESPOND TO IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS  
Any future international CO2 emissions limitation agreement will have been 
negotiated with certain emissions targets and/or limits.  Likewise, it will have to set levels 
of certainty for the findings of any instituted overt treaty monitoring regime whereby 
penalties to be levied against treaty violators would be triggered.  Similarly, the ICCME 
would have to work within an operational framework to be established either by the 
executive branch and/or Congress.  In other words, the ICCME would not only reach 
findings, it will need to share these findings in a way that will most encourage 
participation and compliance with the international agreement. 
Practical questions regarding the identification of potential violations include how 
to establish and limit the degree of discretion exercised by the ICCME.  Policymakers 
may or may not find it desirable to allow the ICCME to weigh the extent of any violation 
and balance the benefits of identifying all violations against the dangers of eliciting a 
withdrawal from the treaty or a reinterpretation of the treaty’s meaning by a country or 
countries that will be inclined to contest unfavorable monitoring findings. 
F. SELECT TARGETS TO OPTIMIZE GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS 
REDUCTION  
If the ICCME is to support the efforts of a regime established to monitor an 
ICELA (e.g., the GHGIS), it must focus its monitoring efforts in such a way as to help 
ensure those countries that emit the greatest amount of CO2 do not exceed the limits of 
the agreement provisions. Importantly, such focus need not necessarily include the most 
important CO2 emitters.  The ICCME must employ finesse in ensuring that 
comprehensive or aggressive monitoring does not lead to a suboptimal level of CO2 
emissions reductions.  In order to achieve the objective that follows the target selection 
objective (i.e., “maintain credibility”), target selection must be seen by all the treaty 
signatories to be conducted on the basis of maximizing CO2 emissions reductions.  
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Should targeting be seen as politically biased, there is a danger that countries may 
question the fairness of the monitoring regime generally and feel justified in violating its 
provisions.   
Transparent criteria must be employed in committing ICCME resources, and the 
fact that U.S. IC resources are distributed according to previously established national 
security prioritization should not unduly influence which countries or regions receive 
ICCME attention.  In empowering an ICCME, Congress will confront the need to 
establish a mechanism for ICCME target selection that is both restrictive enough to 
promote international credibility but flexible enough that it does not hamper the 
ICCME’s ability to direct attention at suspected “high value targets.”  To achieve the 
proper balance, it may be necessary to permit the internationally recognized GHGIS to 
participate in or influence decisions regarding the ICCME’s target selection.    
G. MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY   
1. Maintain the Support of the Legislature  
Intelligence is collected in order to ensure governmental policies have the greatest 
possibility of success.  Intelligence activities are conducted to support policymakers.  It 
follows, then, policymakers must trust their intelligence advisors.  Intelligence is a 
continual struggle to turn limited information into the basis for sound policy.  Intelligence 
agents must not be so timid in their assessments as to provide only useless Generalities.  
They must, however, not be so cavalier in their prognostications as to undermine the 
confidence Policymakers have in their usefulness. 
2. Maintain Credibility among Domestic and International Public and 
Institutions  
While the loss of public trust may compromise the operational latitude of an 
intelligence agency in a liberal democracy, intelligence agency credibility is a 
prerequisite for agency participation in the monitoring of an international CO2 emissions 
limitation agreement.  Limiting anthropogenic CO2 emissions requires a unity of global 
effort that could easily erode should the legitimacy or fairness of the monitoring regime 
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be called into question. 300Most notably, the ICCME will need to work closely with the 
GHGIS.  The GHGIS will have the same or greater interest in preserving public trust in 
order to optimize the likelihood of treaty success.  If the GHGIS is to focus its monitoring 
attention based in part on ICCME intelligence, it must first trust that the intelligence it is 
receiving is accurate, unbiased, and unlikely to provoke international distrust. 
a. Make Intelligence Collection Target Determinations on 
Predetermined Criteria  
Possibly the greatest among the many daunting challenges that confronted 
the negotiators of the Kyoto Protocol was the issue of how to equitably distribute 
responsibility for reducing CO2 emissions among countries in very different stages of 
economic development.  They arrived at compromise—dividing countries into two 
groups with distinctly different treaty obligations—that ultimately proved unsatisfactory 
to U.S. lawmakers. This was at least in large part the reason the treaty was never ratified 
by the U.S.301 
Countries not only contribute CO2 emissions to the atmosphere in widely 
different quantities, they also have vastly different development, and thus CO2 emissions, 
trajectories into the future.  Any future international CO2 emissions limitation agreement 
is certain to discriminate between individual countries, and so too must any treaty 
monitoring regime, overt or covert, be able to allocate monitoring resources based on the 
need to optimize the global potential for emissions reductions.  Should these allocation 
decisions be made on an ad hoc basis, it is likely these decisions will elicit accusations of 
monitoring regime bias.  Therefore, careful consideration must be made as to how best to 
pre-empt any such accusations while ensuring that monitoring efforts are nonetheless 
pursued efficiently.   
Because China and India contribute such a disproportionate portion of 
anthropogenic CO2, ensuring they abide by their treaty obligations will be a high priority 
for any treaty-monitoring regime.  Given, however, that relations between India and the 
                                                 
300 National Research Council, Informing an Effective Response to Climate Change (Washington, 
D.C.:  National Academy of Science, 2010), 130. 
301 CNN, “Clinton Hails Global Warming Pact,” All Politics, December, 11, 1997, CNN, accessed 
November 5, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/12/11/kyoto/.   
 149 
 
U.S. are generally more harmonious than between the U.S. and China, it is important that 
there be no question that the U.S. IC is preferentially disregarding Indian treaty 
violations. 
Because treaty adherence will rest largely on the fragile basis of mutual 
trust, it is especially important that no important incidents of treaty non-compliance go 
undetected.  In the late 1980s, Iraq successfully concealed its attempts at developing 
nuclear weapons, thanks in great part because to the world’s preoccupation with Iran.  
Hans Blix asked, rhetorically, “Could the Secretariat have done more?”302  He went on to 
answer his own question, writing:  
Yes, it could have performed inspections at Iraq’s declared installations 
more often than it did. (Fewer inspections were done, in order to save 
resources.) It could have systematically scanned media for information 
and found a few suspicious items regarding Iraqi imports.  Could states 
have been more alert?  Yes, they might have had sharper export controls 
and better intelligence. However, during the Iran-Iraq War many states 
were more concerned about fundamentalist Iran and were probably not 
keen to ask questions and possibly rock the Iraqi boat.303 
If the ICCME is allowed too much discretion in focusing its resources, the 
fact of the discretion alone is likely to raise concerns among U.S. geopolitical rivals, 
whether or not such bias in fact exists.   
H. MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT OF THE 
LEGISLATURE  
If the agency loses the support of the legislature that empowered it, then it may be 
eliminated.  It cannot become a creature of the GHGIS.  It must be seen as protecting 
U.S. interests within the U.S.304  
The ICCME will ultimately be answerable to the U.S. legislature, and as such, 
must be seen as protecting U.S. interests.  Members of Congress have demonstrated 
considerable discord regarding the urgency or even the need to reduce global CO2 
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emissions.  Just as the ICCME must be seen to provide unbiased support to the GHGIS, it 
cannot be seen to prioritize foreign interests over those of the U.S.   
I. MAKE SPEEDY ASSESSMENTS  
Any ICELA that imposes significant sacrifices on signatories will receive 
increasing resistance as the costs of those sacrifices become more apparent.  As treaty 
provisions require progressively greater changes in signatory behavior (i.e., a transition to 
energy sources that emit less CO2), there will be greater temptation to violate the treaty.  
The longer any violations persist, the more internal political resistance will mount against 
measures to correct those violations.  Identifying violations quickly is essential to 
encouraging treaty adherence among all treaty signatories. 
J. QUICKLY ESTABLISH THE ICCME WITHIN THE IC  
The sooner an ICCME is established within the IC, the more prepared it will be to 
help frame the U.S. negotiating position on the terms of a verifiable future international 
CO2 limitation agreement.  As discussed above, under the best of circumstances, the 
GHGIS will initially be extremely limited in its ability to precisely assess the treaty 
compliance of any country, much less that of countries that may restrict overt in situ 
monitoring.  In the years during which the GHGIS will be developing its monitoring 
capacity, the ICCME may provide the best hope of reassuring treaty signatories of their 
mutual adherence to the treaty’s provisions.   
K. COLLABORATE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE GHGIS  
Though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is tasked by the NPT 
signatories with this responsibility under the treaty’s provisions, the U.S. IC has been 
engaged in monitoring signatory compliance to the NPT since it entered into force in 
1970.305  The IAEA and the U.S share an interest in discouraging the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.  Nevertheless, there have been disagreements between the two 
regarding the best means by which to accomplish this mutual goal.  Their public 
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differences likely served to undermine their credibility.  In fact, in his book, Disarming 
Iraq, Hans Blix offers evidence that the Bush administration made repeated efforts to 
undermine the credibility of the IAEA, going so far as to suggest that the U.S.’s failure to 
find illegal weapons should have been blamed on the IAEA.306  Given the need for broad 
long-term global cooperation on the issue of climate change, the ICCME and the GHGIS 
will benefit from a collaborative working relationship.  
L. ASSIST IN DEVELOPING A TREATY THAT CAN BE MONITORED 
EFFECTIVELY  
The choice of how to, perhaps even whether to, employ the IC to support GHGIS 
efforts will likely depend on how the treaty is structured.  Still, regardless of whether the 
IC is used to support monitoring, during ICELA negotiations the IC will be called upon 
to help assess the issue of climate change, the negotiations, and the treaty provisions.  For 
instance, according to Hans Blix, in 1991 members of the UN Security council 
anticipated that members would render intelligence assistance to the IAEA’s Iraq 
inspection team, and in order “to prevent the budgetary committee of the General 
Assembly from poking its nose into the new system, its financing was removed from the 
regular UN budget.”307 During future international negotiations to empower a monitoring 
regime like the GHGIS, the ICCME should help assess and recommend similar measures 
to facilitate collaboration between the ICCME and the GHGIS.  Again, however, in the 
case of the ICCME, any anticipated cooperation with an internationally recognized treaty 
monitoring regime should be predicated on international support for that collaboration. 
Only the IC has the knowledge of its own resources needed to determine how 
specific treaty provision will facilitate or hamper IC monitoring efforts.  Nevertheless, the 
IC has its own institutional preferences and predilections formed largely through long 
conflicts with U.S. adversaries.  This thesis adopts, as a premise, the need to prioritize 
global CO2 emissions reductions over other national security concerns.  The support that 
the IC brings to U.S. participation in future ICELA negotiations must be informed first by 
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a recognition of the need for the treaty to succeed and in no way by a preoccupation with 
potential opportunities to gain advantage over global rivals.   
M. DETERMINE THE OPTIMAL USE OF RESOURCES  
As noted previously, the GHGIS and the JASON papers on the challenge of 
monitoring an ICELA describe different potential CO2 sensing constellations including 
existing and future technologies.  It is likely that both remote and in situ sensors would be 
employed.  In any scenario, it can be assumed that the more sensors, the better, but that 
there will be a diminishing aggregate return on increased investment.  It can also be 
assumed that the decisions regarding the use and deployment of sensors will considerably 
influence the utility of the data collected.  The GHGIS paper notes: 
An important characteristic of spaceborne sensors is that of cross-
calibration and traceability to standards. Comparing the cost of spaceborne 
sensors relative to hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of less-costly land-
based sensors, for example, can only be realized in the context of 
operations and maintenance (O&M) costs to sustain calibration and 
stability of many independent sensors to a single stable standard, versus 
the cost of more costly but many fewer independent spaceborne sensors 
that incorporate means of on-board National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST)-traceable calibration.308   
Regardless of the resources allocated to the monitoring task, they will be limited.  
With its knowledge of and access to covert means of intelligence collection, the ICCME 
should be involved in determining the optimal use of limited monitoring funding.  
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IX. STRUCTURAL OPTIONS  
The preceding chapter discussed the goals and objectives of the ICCME derived 
from relevant historical precedent, especially those cases involving covert weapons 
nonproliferation monitoring and circumstances surrounding the negotiation and 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.  That research also revealed that specialized or 
focused IC missions can be organized according to three different models: the IC can be 
allowed to select its own approach, an executive with authority to marshal IC resources 
can be assigned, or a dedicated entity within the IC, a “center,” can be empowered by 
statute.  In fact, many variations on these basic structures have been employed in the 
furtherance of national security objectives.  To these three, this thesis proposes a fourth 
that combines attributes of the second and third options.  A policy analysis is then 
conducted in which each of the four described options is subjected to an evaluation based 












































































Option:              
1             
2             
3              
4             
 
Option 1: Give mission to existing agency (e.g., CIA, DOE) with limited Congressional involvement  
Option 2: Subdivision of existing agency (the “center” model) 
Option 3: Appoint upper level IC coordinator (Chief of Mission, Mission Manager) 
Option 4: Create “Hybrid” CIA Sub-agency or other IC Dept, but with a separate head who would be statutorily answerable 
directly to Congress 
 
 Poor The research suggests that the costs of this option to mission success outweigh the benefits 
 Neutral The research is inconclusive 
  Good The research suggests that the benefits of this option to mission success outweigh the costs  
 * This representation provides a highly truncated summation of four complex policy options considered as a means to 
structure an IC CO2 emission monitoring entity (ICCME).  The determination of how each option rates (poor, neutral or good) in 
achieving each of the 12 individual ICCME mission goals listed is based on the analysis presented in Chapter IX, “Structural 
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Options.”  The analysis is intended to highlight the goals that policymakers should consider in building the ICCME.  While the 
analysis cannot represent a definitive evaluation, it will help policymakers anticipate the obstacles and opportunities they will likely 
encounter in designing the ICCME. Of the 12 goals listed, the goal to “maintain credibility” is the most essential; while building 
credibility will be achieved through the successful attainment of the other goals, unless credibility is maintained over the long term, 
the overall ICCME mission cannot succeed. 
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A. THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE: EXPERIENCE AND 
ANALYSIS REGARDING INTERNAL IC ORGANIZATIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS  
The following discussion of the ICCME’s structural options draws heavily on a 
March 2009 analysis of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) done by 
Congressional Research Service specialist Dana Shea. The U.S. has spent decades 
building and refining a nuclear detection capability.  In 2005, President Bush established 
the DNDO under the Department of Homeland Security in order to coordinate a multi-
layered global “detection architecture.”  There are significant differences between the 
DNDO and ICCME mission requirements, but there are also lessons to be drawn from the 
DNDO challenge.  As noted in a 2009 Congressional Research Service assessment: 
The global nuclear detection architecture has broad, international scope, so 
implementing it is difficult.  Multiple agency initiatives and programs 
must be relied on to achieve the architecture’s goals, and its effectiveness 
is dependent on many factors outside of DNDO’s direct authority and 
control.309   
Enlisting a broad range of IC and other federal agencies in an effort to achieve an 
optimal ICCME collaboration and ultimately support of an internationally recognized 
GHGIS poses many of the same challenges.    
In the aftermath of 9/11, far greater attention was focused on past failures to 
optimize and integrate the gamut of IC resources to achieve national security 
objectives.310  These needs had been recognized even prior to 9/11.  In a report released 
in January of 2001, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, more 
commonly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, declared: 
The intelligence community should place new emphasis on collection and 
analysis of economic and science/technology security concerns, and 
incorporate more open source intelligence into analytical products. 
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Congress should support this new emphasis by increasing significantly the 
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget for collection and 
analysis.311   
These same intelligence considerations will encompass the fundamental ICCME 
challenges.  The cooperation of a range of national security assets, including those of the 
Department of the Treasury and the Department of State, will be required to achieve the 
ICCME mission.312  In determining how the ICCME mission will be structured within the 
IC, Congress should anticipate the ICCME’s need to effectively lead a collaborative IC 
effort.  Congress need look no further than the National Counterterrorism Center’s 
struggle to integrate different elements of the IC to achieve a focused mission—in this 
case protecting the nation from foreign terrorists—for a reminder of the challenge that 
ensuring such an integrated effort represents.313 
1. A Narrow, Credible Mission  
In considering the governance architecture required to accomplish the ICCME 
mission, an important aspect of the undertaking must include narrowing the scope of that 
mission to it essential goal: impartially identifying suspected instances of treaty violation. 
While it may be tempting to combine the ICCME function under a broader climate 
change, environmental, or national security architecture, the ICCME must remain as 
unencumbered by either real or perceived bias or conflict of interests (both domestically 
and abroad), if it is to secure the support of the federal institutions on which it will rely 
for support and the international credibility on which its mission depends.  
For the reasons described in the earlier comparison of nonproliferation and 
ICELA monitoring, the fundamental difference between the DNDO and the ICCME 
objectives involves the issue of international perception.  Whereas international opinions 
may impact the DNDO’s operational environment, public perceptions are not critical to 
the ultimate achievement of the DNDO’s mission. The ICCME will best accomplish its 
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objectives not by detection of violations, clearly important, but by helping to foster an 
international atmosphere of trust.  If the ICCME is unsuccessful in maintaining its 
international credibility, it may win the detection battle but lose the mitigation war.  
ICCME form, then, must closely mirror the ICCME’s trust building function.  The 
DNDO’s multifaceted mission is a reflection of the complexity of the agency’s threat 
environment.  The ICCME need not contend with the same adversarial diversity. By 
narrowing the ICCME’s task to that of covert treaty monitoring, Congress will reduce the 
secrecy considerations involved in protecting IC sources and methods, and thereby 
facilitate the achievement of agency mission transparency.   
B. THE OPTIONS  
In considering the structure of the ICCME functions within the IC, the primary 
consideration will remain ICCME influence over other entities, including but not limited 
to the public, other governments, and other international institutions who will themselves 
determine the levels of CO2 reduction achieved.  There are too many possible variations 
on how its monitoring function could be organized within the IC to attempt a 
comprehensive evaluation of them all.  Instead an evaluation will be conducted of some 
of the general structural options suggested by the scope and technical demands of the 
ICCME functions. These are:  
1. Entrust the Mission to an Existing Agency within the IC 
The most obvious choices in this case are the CIA and the DOE.  While the 
technical expertise of the DOE is likely more in line with the ICCME technical 
requirements, the CIA is endowed with many unique resources, most particularly foreign 
human assets, that virtually ensure the agency’s participation in many of the ICCME 
activities envisioned by the thesis.314  Though reference will be made to the DOE, as an 
alternative to the CIA, the CIA will be most closely considered in recognition of the 
agency’s dominance within the IC.  
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2. Create a New Agency within an Existing Agency to Perform the 
ICCME Function 
The CIA’s Climate Change Center represented the U.S. government’s attempt to 
create an agency that roughly fits this description.  Since its establishment in 2009, little 
information about the center was ever made public.  A cursory press release and then 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Leon Panetta’s terse 2009 accompanying statement 
were available for consideration.315  As low a profile as it maintained, the center 
nevertheless invited attention among opponents of action on climate change, which in 
November of 2012 ultimately led, it appears, to the center’s closing.316 Elsewhere there 
have been discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of the “center” concept, 
particularly as it applies to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)317 and the 
National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) against which to consider the concept of 
the CIA’s Climate Change or some similarly conceived center.318   
3. Empower High Level Official with Authority 
Empower a high level official with authority to coordinate the personnel and 
material resources of different governmental departments and agencies in the service of 
the ICCME mission.  Several examples of is type of high level official exist within and 
without the IC.  One particularly interesting example that has recently been promoted as a 
potential solution to the increasing need to coordinate the efforts of multiple federal 
agencies for missions of narrower scope than those requiring an entire governmental 
department is the ambassadorial “Chief of Mission” function.    
4. Create a Hybrid of the “Center” and the “Mission Manager” Models   
Evidence collected in researching this thesis suggests the hybrid model as the 
most promising of the four discussed below.   
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C. OPTION 1: GIVE MISSION TO EXISTING AGENCY (CIA, DOE)  
At least two federal agencies have devoted attention to the clandestine monitoring 
function, the CIA and the DOE. In 2009, then DCI Leon Panetta indicated that this was a 
natural fit for the CIA’s Climate Change Center, while the DOE commissioned the 
GHGIS design work done by the three National Laboratories and the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory mentioned previously.319  Given the closing of the CIA’s Climate Change 
Center in November of 2012, it is unclear whether the CIA would adopt a role of even 
higher profile and potential controversy like the ICCME function. 
Two fundamental challenges posed by tasking an existing IC agency with the 
ICCME function are ensuring that adequate institutional focus and resources are applied 
to the mission over time and that the various resources needed to accomplish the mission 
are effectively coordinated.  There are reasons to question how well a large federal 
department could sustain focus on the ICCME mission without ultimately neglecting or 
undermining that mission’s success.  A 2008 report by the Office of the Inspector 
General described many governance problems within the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI), most notably those concerning lines of authority, of 
reliance on personal relationships, of turf battles, of information sharing within the IC, 
and with communications generally.320  The ICCME function requires close collaboration 
with other agencies within the IC and, more particularly, with an international monitoring 
regime like that envisioned by the authors of the GHGIS paper.  Such collaboration will 
rely on overcoming existing institutional impediments to information sharing that 
continue to challenge the IC. 
Should the ICCME function be delegated to an existing department, the 
challenges of the ICCME would remain the same, and it would be necessary to apply a 
set of selection criteria analogous to that used here to evaluate different structural options.  
More narrowly, should the choice be between the CIA and the DOE, Congress is likely to 
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discover that the strengths of one are largely the weakness of the other.321  For instance, 
the expertise residing within the DOE is clearly suited to the technical aspects of the 
ICCME mission.  Nevertheless, the CIA’s sources and methods are likely to complement, 
rather than duplicate, the monitoring resources of an internationally recognized 
monitoring regime. Ultimately, both the CIA and the DOE will face challenges passing 
the high “credibility” bar imposed by the need to collaborate with an internationally 
recognized ICELA monitoring regime.  
Since the establishment of the previously discussed Church Committee in 1975, 
the CIA has frequently been embroiled in controversial activities and issues that have 
undermined its credibility in the U.S. and abroad.  Should the CIA assume the ICCME 
mission, it will nevertheless retain its other responsibilities and, if history is any 
indication, there is a strong likelihood the CIA may again come under criticism for 
engaging in actions of questionable legality—or of serving as the agent of a particular 
political agenda.  Regardless of how justified, such criticisms may call into question the 
veracity or objectivity of the CIA’s ICCME findings.  Once established public distrust of 
particular politicians or political institutions are among the most resistant to 
modification.322  Under such circumstances, the GHGIS might be forced to disavow any 
reliance on CIA intelligence, and may nevertheless lose international credibility for any 
past association with the Agency. 
More recently, the CIA has come under criticism by the Federation of American 
Scientists for failing to be more forthcoming regarding information generated by its 
Climate Change Center.323 After the CIA’s Information and Privacy Coordinator, Susan 
Viscuso categorically refused a Freedom of Information Act request for information 
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regarding any information related to the CIA’s Climate Center.324 Steven Aftergood, 
Director of the FAS’s Project on Government Secrecy, wrote bluntly:  
The CIA response indicates a fundamental lack of discernment that calls 
into question the integrity of the Center on Climate Change, if not the 
Agency as a whole.  If the CIA really thinks (or pretends to think) that 
every document produced by the Center constitutes a potential threat to 
national security, who can expect the Center to say anything intelligent or 
useful about climate change? Security robots cannot help us navigate the 
environmental challenges ahead. Better to allocate the scarce resources to 
others who can.325   
Afterwood’s criticism speaks to the possibility that the CIA may indeed be 
institutionally unsuitable for the ICCME mission, which will depend on a substantial 
degree of transparency.   
While less pointed, the CIA’s engagement with the climate change issue has 
elicited elliptical criticism from the Department of Defense.  A year prior to the closing 
of the CIA’s Climate Change Center the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics recommended that the Director of National 
Intelligence, “establish, within an appropriate agency of the Intelligence Community, an 
intelligence group to concentrate on the effects of climate change on political and 
economic developments and their implications for U.S. national security.”326  The 
substance of this language, in fact, differed not at all from that that heralded the opening 
of the CIA’s Climate Change Center whose charter was “the national security impact of 
phenomena such as desertification, rising sea levels, population shifts, and heightened 
competition for natural resources.”327  Clearly, the Department of Defense found the CIA 
somehow remiss in fulfilling this role.  Though not stated explicitly, it seems clear that 
what was lacking in the CIA was an open discussion of its findings.  The DoD paper 
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recommended that the IC group it was proposing “should make extensive use of open 
sources, seek to cooperate with other domestic and international intelligence efforts, and 
report most of its products broadly within government and nongovernment 
communities.”328  
Whether or not the DoD paper was intended to challenge the CIA to demonstrate 
a more transparent approach on the issue of climate change, it is clear that the authors 
recognized a need for broader collaboration.329  In fact, they followed their previous 
recommendation with another that, once created, the new IC climate change group 
“should commission the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Center for Climate Change 
and Security to produce an assessment of regional climate change hotspots that threaten 
human security and governmental legitimacy and exacerbate existing tensions.”330 To an 
outside observer, it could only appear that the DOD was suggesting that someone be 
empowered to tell the CIA’s Climate Change Center to do its job. Most importantly, the 
authors of the Defense Science Task Force report recommend that this group then, “use 
this assessment as a confidence-building measure to promote communication between 
antagonistic peoples or states.  This document should be the basis for interagency 
cooperation at the strategic and regional levels.”331  The authors of the Defense paper 
clearly recognized what the CIA appeared not to—that the issue of climate change could 
only be effectively addressed through open dialogue. 
For its part, since its establishment in 1977, the DOE has struggled with security 
issues that have shaken Congress’ confidence in the DOE’s ability to secure its facilities 
and its secrets.  There have in fact been some high profiles cases involving the possible 
loss of highly sensitive nuclear secrets that may have been shared with foreign 
governments by employees of the department.  Part of the department’s internal struggle 
can be attributed to the diversity of agencies from which it was assembled and a variety 
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of missions, many of which require little if any secrecy, and others, particularly where the 
department is involved in research, dependent on open inquiry and discussion.332 
Indeed the DOE’s sometimes troubled experience balancing security with the 
need for information sharing may actually recommend it for the ICCME function.  So 
long as such prior experience effectively informs department reforms, the DOE could 
possess both the required appreciation for the needs and the limits of both cooperation 
and prudence in the achievement of the ICCME mission.  Nevertheless, Congress as a 
whole may have reservations entrusting the ICCME function to the DOE. Particularly 
where CIA sources and methods may need to be enlisted, it may prove challenging for 
the DOE to assuage Congressional reservations or to overcome the resistance it could 
very well encounter from the CIA.  
Congress’s and the President’s own difficulties in determining how best to 
organize the counterintelligence effort required to protect sensitive DOE information is 
particularly telling.  In 1998, President Clinton required the DOE to establish an 
independent counterintelligence office, the Office of Counterintelligence (OCI).  After 
spying allegations were raised in a highly publicized case against Wen Ho Lee, Congress 
sought council from different quarters, including from the DOE itself and from the 
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), which released a scathing 
report on the DOE’s security failures.  Against the wishes of the executive branch, the 
result was the creation of another, semi-autonomous agency, the National Nuclear 
Security Agency (NNSA). NNSA did not replace but rather shared nuclear 
counterintelligence responsibility with the OCI.333 More Congressional restructuring of 
the DOE’s counterintelligence has ensued, suggesting the complexity of attempting to 
evaluate, much less reform the security measures of a department within the IC.    
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Should Congress entrust the ICCME function to a department within the IC, the 
determination of which department is most suited to this task will need to be conducted 
by individuals with high level security clearances and in depth knowledge of the ICCME 
intelligence collection needs.   
1. Prioritize the Identification and Reporting Of Treaty Non-
Compliance 
Both the CIA and DOE engage in broad mandates which at times would temper 
the zeal or undermine the impartiality required to successfully engage in the narrow 
monitoring function.  For example, with significant commitments on the part of the CIA 
and the DOE, the U.S. has long pursued policies aimed at securing and exploiting the 
world’s petroleum reserves.  As evidenced by the world’s reliance on petroleum, there 
are important current economic benefits derived from petroleum as opposed to forms of 
energy that contribute less or no CO2 to the atmosphere. Even during a transition to low 
carbon economy, petroleum exploitation will continue. The CIA and DOE will be 
expected to ensure that real or potential U.S. rivals do not gain any economic, and thus 
strategic, advantage as the nation shift its focus to developing cleaner sources of energy.   
Should one of the U.S.’s allies receive less CIA ICCME attention than one of its 
rivals, already likely due to the current allocation of U.S. intelligence resources, there is a 
possibility that a treaty violator might go undetected.  The period during the late 1980s, 
during which Iraq successfully hid its nuclear weapons program while the world focused 
attention on Iran, has already been discussed.  In his book, Intelligence: From Secrets to 
Policy, Mark Lowenthal describes another case involving India, when for all intents and 
purposes the IC should have been able to anticipate the country’s 1998 nuclear test 
preparations, but it failed to in part because, “collection assets that might have picked up 
indication of the impending tests were focused on the Korean demilitarization zone.”334 
More generally, the DOE fulfills the various aspects of mission through a wide 
range of activities that, over time, are likely to shift the department’s focus.  Within either 
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of these large organizations, the ICCME function is likely to see its prioritization vary 
according to domestic or global political and economic events. 
Additionally, though the resources of the CIA are particularly extensive, there is 
no guarantee that they would be ideally suited or located for the monitoring mission. 
According to Lowenthal:  
One does not simply tap a clandestine services officer and send him or her 
off to a new assignment.  Cover stories need to be created, along with their 
inevitable paraphernalia: training may be necessary: and a host of other 
preparation must be made.  Inelasticity of resource makes the 
prioritization system difficult at best.335  
Finally, in considering whether to entrust the ICCME mission to an existing IC 
department in general, or the CIA in particular, the CIA’s past history of interest in the 
climate change issue should be considered.  In the past, not surprisingly or 
inappropriately, the CIA has demonstrated an inclination to evaluate the prospect of 
climate change from a strategic, rather than from an existential perspective, and has 
suggested that the U.S. might be the strategic beneficiary from climate change.336  
Increasingly, the notion of any long-term strategic or national benefits to be derived by 
any nation from the effects of climate change have been found to be ill-founded and 
imprudent.337 
2. Identify Violators Quickly and Reliably 
Among civilian bureaucracies, none is more experienced or can focus greater 
human intelligence resources to its mission than the CIA.  While conceivably the NSA 
might identify some violations through signals intelligence, it is more likely that human 
operatives would be able to collect sensor or human intelligence more readily.  Signals 
intelligence, at any rate, would likely be put to best advantage once targets had been 
established through physical collection.  
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Though the technical and scientific focus of the DOE—and its underwriting of the 
design of the GHGIS—would seem to better suit it to the monitoring task, its expertise 
and institutional focus  would tend to replicate, rather than supplement, the tools 
available to a functioning GHGIS. 
3. Use All Available Means to Accomplish the Mission 
The DCI is able to command greater civilian intelligence resources than the head 
of any other single national bureaucracy.  Nevertheless, for the reasons stated previously, 
within any intelligence agency “some issues inevitably get shorter shrift, or may be 
ignored altogether, in favor of those that are seen as more pressing.”338 
4. Adapt Quickly to a Non-Traditional Mission  
The CIA has been the focus of criticism for its insularity and resistance to change.  
However, these criticisms have been forcefully refuted by CIA veteran and intelligence 
scholar, Paul Pillar.339  This is an important dispute that seems at least to leave open some 
question as to whether or not the CIA is indeed as unyielding to evolving security 
demands as its detractors suggest.  The DOE, with its preponderance of technological 
expertise, would likely demonstrate a willingness to embrace innovation, but the required 
innovations will more likely be found in the political and social spheres than in the 
laboratory.  While the global climate represents a highly complex system, the interplay of 
human motivations and institutions that will determine the success of CO2 limitation 
efforts is every bit as resistant to comprehensive quantification.   
5. Respond to Identified Potential Violations  
Most descriptions of the CIA note the agency’s reticence to make unequivocal 
declarations. According to Pillar: 
The Intelligence Community needs to be pushed. It will not do its best 
unless it is pressed by policymakers-sometimes to the point of discomfort.  
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Analysts must be pressed to explain how much they don’t know; the 
collection agencies must be pressed to explain why they don’t have better 
information on key topics.340 
The CIA assesses likelihoods, and routinely qualifies even these “estimations.” 
The ICCME task will require not only an estimation of the likelihood that a treaty 
signatory is violating a treaty, but enough conviction or confidence in that estimation to 
share it with an international monitoring regime.  This may prove an awkward fit for the 
CIA. Likewise, the CIA was established as a means of providing the President and NSA 
with intelligence.  Sharing information with other agencies, domestic or international, is a 
role that runs counter to its original intent and enduring ethos.341 
6. Select Targets to Optimize Global CO2 Emissions Reduction  
A perennial problem for intelligence agencies is the difficulty of reassigning 
collection resources and analysts.342  The U.S. has focused intelligence resources on its 
real and potential strategic adversaries.  Ultimately, there is reason to suspect that the 
U.S.’s current allies will be less inclined to violate an international CO2 limitation 
agreement because their societies are, generally, more open than those of U.S. rivals, and 
treaty violations and violators would be at any rate more subject to discovery.  There is a 
danger, nevertheless, that this political compatibility will undermine U.S. objectivity, and 
that the nation will focus insufficient resources on countries with which it currently 
enjoys amicable relations.  Any bureaucracy as massive as the CIA is likely to display 
considerable inertia and a disinclination to refocus its attention.   
7. Maintain Credibility  
As noted previously, should an existing agency within the IC be selected to lead 
the ICCME effort, the CIA’s resources—particularly its ability to collect the type of 
human intelligence that would complement the technological data collected by the 
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GHGIS—would recommend them for the role.  Nevertheless, the CIA’s long history in 
this area has exposed it to more opportunities to run afoul of domestic and world opinion.  
The challenge of overcoming the CIA’s international credibility deficit is likely to 
be compounded by the CIA’s aversion to exposing any part of its operations to outside 
scrutiny.  The CIA has demonstrated reluctance in collaborating with other U.S. 
institutions, much less with international ones.  
Should an existing agency, such as the CIA, assume the ICCME function, the 
head of the agency will represent the ICCME publicly.  While the agency’s director may 
sincerely advocate for the ICCME, the director’s responsibilities will extend far beyond 
the ICCME mission, and his or her ICCME advocacy will likely remain suspect. 
To maintain credibility, the GHGIS will need to be seen as, at the very least, an 
equal partner in determining monitoring priorities.  If no one outside the agency is privy 
to the criteria upon which the CIA bases its ICCME decisions, it is unlikely that the 
international community would endorse the findings of any monitoring regime that 
worked to closely with the agency.  Domestically, however, the CIA’s clear association 
with conventional national security could be seen as an asset.  Assigning the ICCME task 
to the CIA would likely help to legitimize the issue of climate change among current U.S. 
skeptics and reassure them that the U.S. is not simply placing its faith in the word of 
foreign governments or of an international organization not under direct U.S. control.343 
8. Make Speedy Assessments  
Given the CIA’s unparalleled intelligence resources, the agency would be most 
able to overwhelm a target with intelligence resources, and possibly make more 
assessments quickly.  Only sporadically, however, is it likely that the CIA would have the 
discretion to prioritize climate issues.  The presidential four-year election cycle ultimately 
drives the intelligence cycle and dictates in large part the CIA’s agenda.  The sustained  
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effort required for the ICCME mission coincides poorly with the relatively narrow 
window that Presidents have to achieve the short-term policy objectives on which their 
political success depends.344  
The size of the CIA similarly suggests that the leadership focus needed to 
accelerate the process of identifying targets, marshaling resources, collecting intelligence, 
and applying analytic expertise to finally report findings would prove challenging.   
9. Quickly Establish the ICCME within the IC  
Both the CIA and the DOE have considerable experience in monitoring NPT 
compliance and though the technical requirements of NTP and CO2 emissions 
monitoring are distinct, both agencies could likely draw on institutional memory and 
standard operating procedures to establish the administrative backbone for the monitoring 
function.  The CIA already has a vast international presence, including personnel and 
contractors abroad and domestic administrative support for these foreign assets.345 
10. Collaborate Effectively with the GHGIS  
Information collected by the ICCME, whether this be the CIA or another entity, 
must ultimately be shared with an international monitoring regime.  International 
intelligence sharing poses fundamental challenges for any government or intelligence 
agency.  The problem can be summed up in one word, “defection.” By failing to respect 
the confidential nature of the information, the government or agency receiving the 
intelligence may cause damage to the entity or government collecting the information.346  
The CIA has been reluctant to share information within the federal government, and it 
has gone so far as to encourage other agencies within the IC to resist Congress’ initiatives 
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at increasing its own oversight of the IC.347  Given the CIA’s past history and current 
reluctance to share information with agencies established by Congress, it is fair to 
question whether or not the CIA would be able to work closely with an international 
treaty monitoring regime. 
11. Assist in Developing a Treaty That can be Monitored Effectively  
The potential economic impact of any ICELA will insure CIA involvement in any 
treaty negotiations.  In part, the establishment of the CIA’s Climate Change Center 
anticipated such involvement.  
More difficult to predict are the priorities that will be reflected in the CIA’s 
recommendations to the U.S. negotiating team.  The wide range of CIA objectives may 
make it difficult for the agency to advocate treaty provisions that might complicate one or 
more of its other missions.  Nevertheless, as the repository of the U.S.’s most extensive 
intelligence resources, the agency is best suited to considering the type of treaty 
provisions that would facilitate its own ICCME efforts.   
12. Determine the Optimal Use of Resources  
The IC has developed vast technological resources to accomplish its varied 
missions with a correspondingly enormous expenditure of U.S. treasure.  Criticism has 
long been leveled against the IC for the way that its dependence on technology and on the 
industries that supply the sophisticated technologies it employs determine rather than 
proceed from its mission.348  A study published in 2009 suggested that “as much as sixty 
percent of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) core activities are supported by 
contractor personnel.”349  Given that the ICCME presents a novel mission requiring a mix 
of technologies that have only been preliminarily assessed, there is a danger that, during  
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the evaluation process, the CIA may once again rely too heavily on vendor expertise 
rather than considering the real demands required for successful ICCME support of an 
ICELA.350   
D. OPTION 2: SUBDIVISION OF EXISTING AGENCY  
The unique requirements of the ICCME function may merit the development of a 
specialized agency or semi-autonomous sub-agency within one of the existing IC 
agencies.  Essential to the “center” concept considered here is the entity’s segregation 
from the wider agency, some degree of which is essential to ensure that the center’s 
unique mission is not subsumed by the needs and operations of other, more long-time 
established, agency objectives.351 
To a limited degree, the CIA’s Climate Change Center offered an example of this 
type of arrangement, although to what extent the center could have been considered at all 
“autonomous” is not publicly known.  The degree of secrecy surrounding the center was 
such that its governance structure was unknown—itself a suggestion that the center was 
fully integrated into the wider CIA.  Low as the CIA Climate Center’s profile might have 
been, it nevertheless invited the attention of opponents of action on climate change. It 
seems certain this unwelcome attention is what led to the center’s closing, as no other 
explanation seems plausible.  Recent CIA statements suggest that the center’s work is to 
be integrated into the routine CIA operations.352  Still, there is ever interplay of form and 
function, it is likely that attention to those aspects of the center’s focus which represented 
a departure from the CIA’s previous specialization, such as the ICCME mission, will be 
more difficult to sustain.    
According to the CIA’s 2009 press release regarding the establishment of the 
center, it would “provide support to American policymakers as they negotiate, 
implement, and verify international agreements on environmental issues.”353  The 
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establishment of the CIA’s Climate Change Center was an important practical and 
symbolic step towards a fuller recognition of the perils of climate change by the nation’s 
national security establishment.  Likewise, it provided a venue from which to 
contemplate the ICCME function.  The disappearance of the center is to be lamented.   
The “center” idea was not new, and in fact had been employed for other issues 
since the mid-1990s354 and promoted by the 9/11 Commission as a means of organizing 
analysis.  The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), created in 2004, and the 
National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), created in 2005, were results.  “Centers” 
are not without their own challenges, however.  Like other institutions within the IC, they 
suffer from inflexibility and an institutional unwillingness to share resources and 
intelligence.355  Particularly significant in terms of the ICCME function, the analysis 
produced by these centers is, as Mark Lowenthal notes, “divorced from its political 
context.”356  Analysts in these centers tend to know more about their particular area of 
technical expertise, than they do about the context of the intelligence they are collecting.  
As Lowenthal puts it:  
Analyzing the state of WMD development in a nation is not enough.  One 
should also analyze the international or regional political factors driving 
the program, as these will give important indicators as to its purpose and 
scope.  Being housed in a center does not preclude a functional analyst 
from seeking out his or her regional counterparts.  Analysts do this on a 
regular basis.  But it requires some efforts and can be dropped during the 
press of the day’s work.  The center concept can serve to make 
collaboration beyond the bounds of the center itself more difficult.357  
While the disappearance of the Climate Change Center represents a setback in 
terms of national attention to the climate change issue the declared roles of the center 
were extremely varied and perhaps less compatible than a cursory evaluation might 
suggest. Climate change will likely exacerbate existing and create new zones and 
domains of global conflict for which national security establishment must be prepared.  
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The ICCME function, however, has no obvious correlation with the IC’s traditional 
national security priorities, which have long focused on adversarial relations with other 
state and non-state actors.  Confronting climate change presupposes collegial relations 
with all nations, and the work of the ICCME must be seen as fostering trust, not pre-
empting or countering aggression.   
Despite the lack of primary source information from the CIA on the Climate 
Change Center’s activities and focus, media reports identifying individuals outside the 
agency with whom the CIA had been in consultation suggested that the ICCME function 
has received meaningful CIA attention.  In particular, the National Academy of Sciences 
has brought together a group of climate scientists and former National Security Officials 
from whom the CIA has been able to draw a wide range of climate relevant expert 
advice.  The group is headed by National Academy of Sciences president Ralph 
Cicerone, who has declared:  
If some future president calls up the secretary of state or the director of 
Central Intelligence, and says, ‘Gee, I have this draft treaty on my desk, 
should I sign it? Can we verify it?’ and one of them were to say to the 
president, ‘Gee, we never thought of that,’ that’s not an acceptable 
answer.358   
Given his association with the CIA, Cicerone’s statement suggests that ICCME 
function received attention within the agency’s Climate Change Center, though whether it 
will continue to receive such attention in the immediate future is unclear. 
1. Prioritize the Identification and Reporting of Treaty Non-Compliance  
By combining several missions among which treaty verification is only one part, 
an entity like the CIA’s Climate Change Center would confront the need to balance 
priorities.  As mentioned previously, the various missions of the Climate Change Center 
have little in common.  Because the center’s other missions—evaluating climate change 
science and the potential for the effects of climate change to generate human conflict— 
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differed little from the CIA’s conventional responsibilities, it would likely require a 
strong commitment on the part of the center’s leadership to ensure the ICCME function 
received the considerable sustained attention it requires. 
2. Identify Violators Quickly and Reliably  
Nestled within the CIA, the Climate Change Center may have had more ready 
access to intelligence collection, particularly human intelligence, than would an agency 
outside the CIA.  Much depends on how lines of authority and communication are 
threaded through the center within the wider agency, and on the authority wielded by the 
center’s leadership.  An understanding of and access to the CIA’s international collection 
assets would be essential to a center fulfilling the ICCME role.  To fulfill its mission, a 
designated center might need to develop its own cadre of foreign based analysts.  
Regardless, even under normal circumstances, intelligence agency analysts remain 
largely ignorant of the collection side of the CIA’s operations and, given the unique 
requirements of the ICCME mission, ensuring analysts can solicit and receive the 
intelligence they need will pose a significant challenge.359 
3. Use All Available Means to Accomplish the Mission  
An entity like the CIA’s Climate Change Center may not be able to achieve or 
sustain unequivocal dedication to the ICCME mission for the same reasons it may find it 
difficult to prioritize the mission and optimize the use of its available resources to the 
monitoring “end.”  A 1996 evaluation of the seven then existing IC “centers” described 
them as either being directly under the control of the DCI, or in other instances (such as 
in the case of the NPC) under the director of one of the four CIA directorates.360  The 
report suggested that, in times of penury, there were advantages to being subordinate to a 
directorate, where the center could be cushioned when resources were scarce.361  Those 
centers directly under the DCI, found them in those instances to be more exposed to 
funding cutbacks. Nevertheless, any center is at the mercy of the agency which oversees 
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its funding.  The center could find itself in competition for resources within the larger 
agency and ultimately not be able to call upon the resources it needs to perform its 
mission.362 Although the evaluated centers were all under and characterized as creatures 
of the CIA, they could be situated within a different department, or even set up 
independently.363  
The 1996 Congressional review of the IC centers noted that the centers had had 
mixed success in forming an effective intelligence sharing “community,” that with time 
and effective leadership, they did tend to perform well.  The evaluators suggested that 
being “creatures of the CIA” had both benefits and drawbacks for the centers in that they 
had generally good access to the abundant resources of the CIA, but they enjoyed less 
success cooperating with agencies outside of the agency.364 
4. Adapt Quickly to a Non-Traditional Mission  
The comments made by DCI Leon Panetta upon the establishment of the CIA’s 
Climate Change Center365 attested to an understanding within the CIA of the unique 
challenges posed by climate change.  Whether, however, a center simply attempts to 
confront the challenge with the same IC tools employed in the IC’s conventional 
approach to human adversaries, or whether it can develop new approaches to the 
challenge and opportunity of preserving public trust while enlisting the support of 
“citizen sensors,” for instance, is an open question.   
5. Respond to Identified Potential Violations  
By investing the Climate Change Center with responsibility for climate change 
related issues, the CIA created an entity that could have, conceivably, broken with the 
agency’s historic reluctance to share information and developed mechanisms to report 
identified or suspected treaty violations, or violators to a GHGIS, or to intermediaries 
within the U.S. government (e.g., the executive branch or Congress).  Relying on what 
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amounts to a metamorphosis in the CIA’s ethos of protecting “sources and methods,” 
without past evidence of any ability to engage in such uncharacteristic behavior seems, 
nevertheless, imprudent.  If the CIA or any ancillary center were to adhere to its hermetic 
operational discretion, then at best the outside recipient of the center’s intelligence would 
have to evaluate the relevance and impartiality of that intelligence without firsthand 
knowledge of the methodology employed and of its provenance.  How, for instance given 
two violators, one a U.S. ally and the other a U.S. rival,  would one know that the CIA 
had correctly prioritized—identified—the most egregious treaty violator?  Such a 
determination would be impossible for any outside observer. 
6. Select Targets to Optimize Global CO2 Emissions Reduction  
The same reasoning that suggested the CIA as a whole might confront difficulties 
basing its country target selection solely on the desire to minimize aggregate global CO2 
emissions holds likewise for its parts. The CIA focuses the preponderance of its attention 
on U.S. rivals and retargeting and more “equitably” distributing its global presence will 
present a practical hurdle, regardless of whether it can overcome past political or 
institutional encumbrances.   
7. Maintain Credibility   
The Congressional criticism prompted by the establishment of the Climate 
Change Center suggested that the agency’s engagement with the issue is likely to remain 
controversial for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, as the legitimacy of climate science 
is increasingly accepted by the public, controversy over the CIA’s role may abate. Or, it 
may shift to questions of whether and how an agency (such as the CIA’s Climate Change 
Center) established to anticipate adversarial threats generated by climate change can in 
good faith be expected to serve as an impartial referee for an ICELA.  Already the 
characterization of climate change as a potential source of unrest within developing 
countries has provoked the ire of some representatives of these countries. In U.N. 
Security Council discussion, protests from less developed countries have to do with the 
developed country’s characterization of them as potential threats, rather than as the most 
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susceptible victims of climate change for which the U.S. is disproportionately 
responsible.  According to the Security Council’s website:  
The representative of Pakistan, speaking on behalf of the ‘Group of 77’ 
developing countries and China, agreed, saying that the Council’s primary 
duty was to maintain international peace and security.  Other issues, 
including those related to economic and social development, were 
assigned to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. 
The ever-increasing encroachment of the Security Council on the roles and 
responsibilities of the other main organs of the United Nations represented 
a ‘distortion’ of the principles and purposes of the Charter, infringed on 
the authority of the other bodies and compromised the rights of the 
Organization’s wider membership.366  
The argument could be levied that the purpose of the CIA Climate Center’s 
ICCME function is to reassure the U.S. and not other countries about signatory adherence 
to the treaty.  This parochial perspective, however, would ignore the need to derive 
maximal benefit from the U.S. ICCME expertise and investment, which will be in 
achieving the highest possible level of treaty participation and compliance. Unless the 
U.S. ICCME effort is seen as unbiased, then it will not be accepted by the international 
community, and its findings will prove valueless to an internationally recognized 
monitoring regime (i.e., the GHGIS).   
8. Make Speedy Assessments  
Again the CIA can draw on unparalleled resources to accomplish this mission, 
and an entity like the Climate Change Center, properly focused and empowered, could 
collect and analyze ICCME intelligence with optimal speed.  Nevertheless the ability to 
accomplish this mission will remain contingent on fundamental alterations in the CIA’s 
approach to its mission, a shift, in the case of climate change abatement, from an 
adversarial to a cooperative approach.   
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9. Quickly Establish the ICCME within the IC  
There is currently no publicly available information in regard to how far the 
CIA’s now disbanded Climate Change Center had advanced in preparing for the ICCME 
function.  As noted previously, however, it is known that the center had in fact engaged 
in discussions with the National Laboratory authors of the GHGIS paper and received 
input from the National Academy of Sciences.  
One frequently discussed aspect of the ICCME function is its possible cost. The 
JASON and GHGIS reports both focus considerable attention on cost containment. The 
JASON’s suggest that innovation and mass production of sensors, for instance, will 
quickly drive costs down.367  Attention is paid to the cost/benefit of using satellites rather 
than in situ sensors.  The Obama administration revived the Measurement of Earth Data 
of Environmental Analysis (MEDEA) program that permitted the sharing of information 
collected by IC assets, including satellite imagery, with scientists studying the effects of 
climate change.  The program had been suspended by the Bush administration.  In 
reviving the program, scientists like Ralf Cicerone took pains to dismiss the idea that the 
use of these resources would negatively impact other national security objectives or 
involve more than minor additional costs. 368  
Likewise, upon the establishment of the Climate Change Center, the CIA was 
careful to emphasize the center’s activities have minimal additional costs either to the 
agency or the American tax payer.  While cost can certainly not be disregarded, it seems 
likely that any future circumstances that would prompt the U.S. to initiate the negotiation 
of an ICELA—and to contemplate the economic costs associated with aggressively 
limiting U.S. carbon emissions—would perforce be accompanied by the political will to 
absorb the relatively minor, though not inconsequential, costs associated with ICCME.   
 
 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Climate Change Center was already operational might have 
                                                 
367 JASON, Methods for Remote Determination, 39, 46, 58, 61, 62, 82.  
368 William Broad, “CIA Is Sharing Data with Climate Scientists,” New York Times, December 4, 
2010, accessed July 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/science/earth/05satellite.html?_r=1&hp. 
  180 
helped to alleviate some level of cost concern regarding the need to support the treaty 
with new governmental investments.   
The 1996 Congressional assessment of IC centers repeatedly noted the need to 
anticipate some lapse of time before a “center” would begin to perform as intended.369  
The authors wrote of repeatedly hearing an estimated time of roughly five years provided 
by the officials with whom they consulted.370  It is to be hoped that the efforts undertaken 
at the CIA’s Climate Change Center will contribute to future U.S. action to mitigate 
climate change and that the closing of the CIA’s Climate Change Center not undermine 
the coordination achieved.  The knowledge and experience gained by those assigned to 
the Climate Change Center should be considered by congress when devising any future 
ICCME.   
So long as the ICCME mission entails only a part of the objectives undertaken by 
the Climate Change Center (i.e., clandestine monitoring in support of an international 
treaty monitoring regime), the ICCME’s needed stand-up time might be considerably 
abbreviated. 
10. Collaborate Effectively with the GHGIS  
As noted above, the researchers tasked with developing the GHGIS were 
approached by representatives of the CIA’s now defunct Climate Change Center.  
Climate change coordination or synchronization with the GHGIS did not appear to be a 
center priority.  Whether, upon further analysis, the CIA or other IC representatives 
recognizes IC integration with the GHGIS as an essential requirement for treaty success 
and whether the IC can accomplish this coordination is unknown.  As suggested 
previously, the CIA’s past resistance to outside direction appears incompatible with a 
close collaborative relationship with either a domestic or international GHGIS.  In fact, a 
1996 congressional review of the IC center concept cited previously noted that the 
centers tended to be controlled and aligned most closely with the CIA, and that other 
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agencies were reluctant to work with the centers for fear that their resources would be 
stolen from them by the more powerful agency.371  The study did suggest, however, that a 
center need not be necessarily situated within the CIA, and in the case of the ICCME in 
particular, alternative options might be considered.372  By removing the center from 
under the control of the CIA, the center might enjoy more productive and collaborative 
exchanges with other IC agencies.  It is likely, however, that these more fluid relations 
would come at unacceptable cost, namely at the expense of more ready access to the 
CIA’s substantial clandestine resources. 
11. Assist in Developing a Treaty That Can Be Monitored Effectively  
Having already been established, the CIA’s Climate Change Center would have 
likely been suited to evaluating both the challenge of ICELA monitoring and the 
collection and analysis resources available to the CIA.  Provided an entity like the 
Climate Change Center prioritized maximal treaty participation and compliance of the 
world’s most important CO2 emitters, it would seem uniquely qualified for this role.  
Should, however, any such center approach treaty negotiations with a more conventional 
CIA agenda (i.e., ensuring that the U.S. does not risk strategic military or economic 
disadvantage as the result of any treaty), it could well undermine the achievement of a 
treaty most likely to meaningfully reduce global CO2 emissions.   
12. Determine the Optimal Use of Resources  
Because the governance structure and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the 
CIA’s Climate Change Center were unknown, it is not possible to determine what amount 
of discretion the center could have employed in pursuing the ICCME mission.  
Ultimately, should Congress choose to entrust the ICCME mission to an entity like the  
 
 
Climate Change Center, the choice of governance structure will determine whether or not 
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the center can effectively employ IC resources, including its own, to accomplish the 
ICCME mission.   
E. OPTION 3 UPPER LEVEL IC COORDINATOR (CHIEF OF MISSION, 
MISSION MANAGER)  
The most visible example of a high level position established to achieve a focused 
policy objective is the policy czar. The president may select an individual to coordinate 
an integrated federal response to an issue requiring close collaboration between federal 
bureaucracies, whether or not they are departments of the IC.  This model of maintaining 
presidential unity of command, with multi-agency unity of effort, has often been found 
wanting.  Without statutory authority, policy czars must frequently resort to cajoling the 
heads of departments, or calling upon the president to break bureaucratic log jams.373  
Because this thesis anticipates the need for a close collaborative effort between the 
ICCME and an internationally recognized GHGIS, the statutory limitations of the czar 
position would likely so encumber the international intelligence sharing process, which 
further consideration of the “czar” option will be foregone.  
Alternatively, Congress may provide a high level official with statutory authority.  
One such example of high level bureaucratic integration responsibility that has particular 
relevance to the ICCME “detection” function is the Director of the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office (DNDO).  The director has the authority to employ detailees drawn 
from other federal agencies. Ideally, these detailees provide the DNDO with knowledge 
and communications conduits to their agency of origin, facilitating further coordination. 
Thus far, limited DNDO experience suggests that having less authority than the officials 
in the agencies with which the DNDO is coordinating may hamper the DNDO Director’s 
ability to achieve his or her mission.  Given the current lack of cohesiveness among 
departments within the IC, other officials with whom the director is charged to coordinate 
may, instead, continue to prioritize their own agencies’ agendas.374   
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Another option that has been implemented to address certain specific intelligence 
objectives is the creation of an upper level mission coordinator within the IC. Previously, 
this position was called the “mission manager.”  DNI James Clapper merged this 
position’s responsibilities with those of the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) position 
in 2010, and he renamed the new position the National Intelligence Manager (NIM)375  
The responsibilities of each of these IC positions were or are constituted somewhat 
differently. For the purposes of this thesis, the term “mission manager” is retained and 
assumed to mean an IC position exercising a high degree of statutorily recognized 
executive authority over multiple federal agencies. The “mission manager” can be vested 
with considerable authority to direct resources and appeal directly to the DCI or to the 
president when confronted with resistance from other agencies within or without the IC. 
Unfortunately, for the purposes of analysis, these high level positions are of recent 
vintage and given the sensitivity of their responsibilities, not transparent to outside 
observers.  Fortunately, however, a more longstanding and more readily analyzed 
example of this type of high level statutory authority, including authority over IC 
resources, can be found in the Foreign Service.  In 2010, the National Defense University 
published a highly favorable analysis of the U.S. Ambassadorial Chief of Mission (COM) 
authority.376  The authors strongly recommend that this model be considered to address 
other federal challenges concerning interagency integration.  The authors describe the 
challenge of integration, writing: 
At heart of the problem is the inability to reconcile a desire for a clear 
chain of command from the President down through the heads of the 
departments and agencies with the need to empower new mechanisms 
(individuals or organizational constructs) with sufficient authority to 
integrate efforts across the departments and agencies in pursuit of 
specified national missions.377   
More so even than the policy czar, the  IC mission manager or the  National 
Intelligence Manager, the Chief of Mission (COM) exercises authority which extends to 
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virtually all aspects of the geographical area under his or her jurisdiction.  The National 
Defense University paper closely considers various aspects of the COM authority, and it 
suggests modifications that could be made in the context of other national security focus 
areas.378 Their admonition regarding the need to adequately empower the high level 
official is unequivocal: 
Perhaps the best known model of Presidentially delegated authority for 
integration of diverse department and agency activities, however, is the 
Chief of Mission authority generally associated with resident bilateral 
Ambassadors.  Its origin, effectiveness, and limitations merit close 
scrutiny because the model suggests that the national security system’s 
problem with insufficient integration authority will not be solved until 
Congress provides the President with a legally sanctioned and sufficiently 
empowered mechanism to integrate the activities of the departments and 
agencies for priority national missions.379 
Despite the considerable authority granted the COM, however, he or she may still 
confront difficulties in collaborating with members of the intelligence community, which 
may withhold information from the COM because of “their concern for protecting their 
sources and methods.”380  While the mission manager would likely exercise IC authority 
on behalf of the National Security Council, exercising effective authority over multiple 
agencies within the IC would likely prove challenging.    
Ultimately, the challenge of employing the mission manager approach to the 
ICCME function is that the position is designed to be responsive to the President who is 
himself locked in to the election cycle and may not find it expedient to prioritize the 
monitoring mission. Should the mission manager model be employed to accomplish the 
ICCME function, it is essential that Congress establish tight statutory control over the 
resources available to the ICCME.  For instance, by withholding $15,000,000 in funding 
from Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Congress 
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successfully encouraged the DNDO to enter into a memorandum of understanding with 
the other federal agencies with which it was conducting activities.381  
Circumstances prompting U.S. participation in a future ICELA would suggest that 
the issue will have received a level of national attention and prioritization whereby the 
creation of a high level mission manager with broad ICCME authority would be 
politically feasible.  Nevertheless, should there be inadequate political support, an 
analogous position might be considered at a lower level, with the prospect of the position 
being elevated, should the requisite political support develop.  Nevertheless, should the 
ICCME mission manager option be pursued, it should initially be vested with the highest 
possible authority.     
1. Prioritize the Identification and Reporting of Treaty Non-Compliance  
The mission manager could be held statutorily responsible for prioritizing the 
ICCME mission as congressionally defined legislation.  Congress could further require 
that the mission manager regularly report to Congress and likewise compel this individual 
to appear to give testimony and answer questions regarding his or her activities.  In fact, 
one of the most daunting challenges for the Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (better known as the “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Czar”) is the vast array of areas and issues falling under the position’s 
purview.382 An important reason to constrain the mission manager position to the ICCME 
function would be to ensure the prioritization of the agency’s statutorily defined mission.  
Combining the ICCME mission manager responsibility with others, regardless of their 
pertinence to the issue of climate change, would dilute and possibly undermine the 
ICCME’s focus.   
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2. Identify Violators Quickly and Reliably  
Currently, there exists relatively little institutional knowledge, much less sources 
and methods, to collect ICCME intelligence within the IC.  The DOE has engaged the 
efforts of the three National Laboratories and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory that 
collaborated on the development of the GHGIS paper.  The paper’s authors have also 
engaged in discussions with the CIA regarding the GHGIS concept and requirements.  
Presumably, the mission manager could draw on resources from the DOE or the CIA, or 
both, and eventually develop the capacity to identify treaty violators.  More likely, 
however, the mission manager would face a task far more difficult than that encountered 
by mission managers asked to integrated already existing bureaucracies.  The resources 
of currently existing institutions have been developed by leadership within those 
institutions to accomplish previously established goals in which those leaders had a 
vested interest.  Regardless of the authority given to the mission manager or the 
willingness of the agencies whose resources would be drawn upon to accomplish the 
ICCME function, it is difficult to imagine that these agencies could or would sacrifice the 
accomplishment of their primary missions in order to rapidly achieve ICCME objectives.  
As a best case scenario, the mission manager would face a long struggle against 
institutional passive resistance.  Though the mission manager might find employees 
within the existing bureaucracies who would embrace the ICCME mission 
enthusiastically, the ICCME would likely require the adoption of an interagency 
collaborative ethos that has long eluded IC reform efforts.   
3. Use all Available Means to Accomplish the Mission  
A possible advantage for the mission manager over the “center” is that the 
mission manager would have greater authority to command resources outside a center’s 
jurisdiction. In fact, part of the WMD’s recommendation in the establishment of the 
National Counterproliferation Center, was to vest the NCPC with a managerial role like 
that of the mission manager, so as to permit it to better marshal resources within the 
IC.383 
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It would be essential that Congress in fact put means to overcome bureaucratic 
resistance at the disposal of the mission manager.  When Congress created the “Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Czar,” it enfeebled the position by making its authority to secure 
expertise from the different departments and agencies contingent on the agreement of the 
respective secretary or agency head.384  Unless Congress provided the mission manager 
position with more comprehensive authority over human and material resources, it is 
likely the mission manager would be hindered by inadequate support.  
4. Adapt Quickly to a Non-Traditional Mission  
Congress could require that the mission manager appointee receive Senate 
approval, thereby giving Congress the opportunity to question the nominee regarding his 
or her conceptual approach to the ICCME mission.  Requiring Senate approval would 
demonstrate a level of Congressional engagement, and set the tone for the position. By 
isolating the issue as deserving of dedicated high level attention, Congress would also 
signal the uniqueness of the task.  
Given adequate authority, the mission manager would be able to select staff most 
inclined to abandon former methodologies as required by the demands of the new 
mission.  The ICCME represents a mission of unlimited duration and thought would have 
to be given as to whether the extent of the differences between conventional IC practice, 
sources, and methods were compatible with the ICCME needs.   
5. Respond to Identified Potential Violations  
Perhaps the most important benefit to be achieved by vesting the ICCME 
responsibility with a single high level IC official with direct access to the President is that 
the responsibility for reporting on violations could be entirely streamlined.  Alternatively, 
Congress could establish a process similar to the drafting of National Intelligence 
Estimates, whereby designated high level national security officials consider evidence 
regarding possible violations, and whether and how suspicions might be shared with the 
GHGIS or other domestic or international entities.  Given the previously described IC 
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preference for noncommittal statements, the mission manager authority would likely 
permit an accelerated process of decision making and/or release of findings.  While more 
speedy decisions would likely be the result, so too would be the likelihood of error and of 
personal bias clouding assessments.   
6. Select Targets to Optimize Global CO2 Emissions Reduction  
Again, the high profile of the mission manager and Congressional influence over 
the mission manager selection process would increase the likelihood that the focus of the 
ICCME would be more transparent than if the ICCME mission were obscured by levels 
of IC bureaucracy.  Greater accountability would promote greater responsiveness to 
criticism about target selection, as well as greater care in ensuring that target selection 
was conducted through a fair and defensible process. By making the ICCME mission 
manager publicly accountable, Congress would help ensure that other political and IC 
actors, up to and including the President, refrain from attempting to influence the ICCME 
focus or findings, knowing that such efforts might subsequently become the subject of 
public Congressional hearings. 
7. Maintain Credibility  
By vesting responsibility for the ICCME function in an individual endowed with 
high level executive authority and subject to routine Congressional questioning, Congress 
would ensure the program remains publically accountable.  Public engagement and 
ensuring public accountability have long been recognized as important means of building 
and maintaining public trust.385  The mission manager appointment should be subject to 
congressional approval to further promote transparency regarding the mission manager 
commitment to an unbiased role.  Congress might want to consider granting the mission 
manager certain special powers available to the Chief of Mission, including “country 
clearance,” which empowers the COM to exclude U.S. personnel from their area of 
authority.386  These special powers are rarely used, but they are symbolically important 
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and would highlight the priority that Congress gives to the accomplishment of the 
ICCME mission.  
8. Make Speedy Assessments  
Regardless of the degree of authority the mission manager wields over personnel 
(detailee) selection and management, there remains the likelihood that at least some of 
these personnel may remain more responsive or loyal to their agency of origin or to its 
priorities.  Lack of institutional loyalty to the mission may delay its accomplishment.387 
9. Quickly Establish the ICCME within the IC  
While the mission manager may be selected quickly, the development of a 
structure for integrating IC and other agency efforts in support of the ICCME function 
would likely be a challenge that could only be met after considerable delay.  At the 
writing of the 2009 Congressional Research Service’s evaluation of the DNDO, the 
agency had been operating for four years and was still conducting a gap assessment of 
detection architecture needs. Agencies as well established as the Department of Defense, 
the Department of Energy, and the Department of State, for example, had been engaged 
in detection activities for decades prior to the DNDO’s assumption of the integration 
function.388  The ICCME function is an entirely new undertaking, and while the 
criticality of each “detection” will be far less than for the DNDO, the demands of 
integrating IC protection of sources and methods will be compounded by the requirement 
for sharing the detection of treaty violations with a the international community.  
10. Collaborate Effectively with the GHGIS  
Provided the ICCME mission manager exercises effective control over the IC and 
other U.S. resources nominally at his or her disposal, having a high level IC official 
vested with the authority to share information with the internationally recognized GHGIS 
would greatly facilitate cooperation and permit the development of trust between the 
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ICCME and the GHGIS.  Clearly, however, this desired outcome is contingent upon the 
selection of a mission manager predisposed to cooperating with the GHGIS (i.e., an 
individual who understands that an effective ICELA is essential to preventing 
catastrophic anthropogenic damage to the atmosphere and that, when judiciously 
employed, IC resources can help ensure an effective ICELA). 
11. Assist in Developing a Treaty That Can Be Monitored Effectively  
The creation of a mission manager with narrowly defined ICCME responsibility 
ensures that this individual will provide treaty negotiation recommendations consistent 
with allowing effective monitoring.  To be effectively represented during negotiations, 
the ICCME must speak with a single clear voice.  The mission manager can ensure that 
the ICCME perspective is unambiguously and credibly expressed, only if he or she has 
adequate foreknowledge of the challenges the ICCME will confront in pursuing its goals. 
12. Determine the Optimal Use of Resources  
International initiatives to monitor an ICELA will likely rely chiefly on sensing 
technologies.  The principal value to be added to the IC by this endeavor will be in 
human intelligence, the area in which the CIA is best endowed among civilian IC 
agencies.  Should Congress employ the mission manager model for interagency 
coordination of the ICCME mission, it is essential the mission manager be able to rely on 
close collaboration with the CIA. Regardless of the governance and structure of the 
ICCME, Congress and the President need to ensure CIA engagement with the ICCME 
mission.  While the ICCME mission function was included among those of the CIA’s 
Climate Center, as described by former DCI Leon Panetta, it is not possible to determine 
whether or not the ICCME function ranked highly among the Climate Center’s 
priorities.389  
CIA recognition for the need to prioritize international ICELA collaboration 
above its traditional adversarial objectives will depend in large part on the structuring of 
the ICCME function and on the leadership qualities of those enlisted to achieve its goals.  
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Should the mission manager meet with active or passive CIA resistance—particularly in 
the detailing of its personnel and in the engagement of it sources and methods—
achieving the ICCME objectives will be difficult. The shift from employing institutions 
long dedicated to ensuring the nation’s security from international adversaries to instead 
asking that these national security agencies collaborate with many of those adversaries in 
confronting a looming environmental catastrophe suggests fundamental institutional 
contradictions that should not be dismissed with platitudes or embraced without careful 
forethought. 
F. OPTION 4: HYBRID SUB-AGENCY OF THE CIA OR OTHER IC 
DEPARTMENT, BUT WITH A SEPARATE HEAD WHO WOULD BE 
STATUTORILY ANSWERABLE DIRECTLY TO CONGRESS  
The hypothesized ICCME proposed by this thesis will confront the challenge of 
overcoming a tension between the IC’s need to protect sources and methods and the need 
for its operations to remain sufficiently transparent to maintain international credibility.  
As noted in the preceding analysis, the three previous structural options for the ICCME 
each confront important obstacles to the successful reconciliation of this tension.  Using 
an existing agency or smaller segment of that agency—particularly the CIA or a segment 
of the CIA, like the Climate Change Center—will generate great challenges sharing 
resources and information with an international ICELA monitoring regime, such as the 
proposed GHGIS.  While the mission manager option would overcome the institutional 
resistance to this type of international intelligence sharing, the mission manager would 
nevertheless confront problems overcoming the institutional loyalties of the IC personnel 
he or she would rely on to accomplish the ICCME mission.  
The fourth option considered for structuring the ICCME is essentially that of 
combining the “center” and “mission manger” options.  The analysis is directed at 
determining whether the resulting hybrid structure might overcome the limitations of its 
constituent structures or simply undermine the strengths that each of those constituents 
exhibits when standing alone.   
  192 
1. Prioritize the Identification and Reporting of Treaty Non-Compliance  
The DNDO provides an example of how Congress can carve out a unique area of 
concern and empower a narrowly focused entity with significant administrative and 
multi-agency coordinating authority.  Nestled among very powerful federal departments, 
there is little danger that the agency might engage in “mission creep,” as it is 
inconceivable that these other federal entities will allow further encroachment upon their 
own missions.  At the same time, the DNDO finds itself at the crux of an important and 
highly visible issue.  Because the DNDO relies heavily on “detailees,” much of its 
effectiveness depends on the degree to which these detailees align their own career goals 
with those of the DNDO.  Because the DNDO is engaged in a far more traditional 
mission than would be the ICCME, it is likely that this career alignment would be more 
natural for DNDO detailees than it would be for ICCME detailees.  While Congress 
could increase the number of dedicated ICCME personnel (relative to detailees), the 
novelty of the ICCME function suggests that there would be some resistance among the 
most well established IC personnel in abandoning their current positions for ICCME 
positions that are in many ways completely distinct from their previous employment.390 
As noted in the Congressional Research Service DNDO report cited previously, 
the DNDO director may confront some difficulty in coordinating activities within outside 
agencies that are headed by their own directors, who in fact exercise greater authority 
than that of the DNDO.391  One means of rectifying the type of personnel and authority 
challenges confronted by the DNDO director would be to vest the head of a similarly 
structured ICCME with greater authority, along the lines of that possessed by a mission 
manager.  
Should Congress consider the hybrid structure, it is likely that objections might be 
raised as to whether an ICCME director could abuse his or her authority and undermine 
the authority of the heads of existing federal departments.  In their recommendations 
regarding the need for interagency coordination to be supported by an individual with 
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“Chief of Mission” like authority, Lamb and Marks suggest that the mission manager’s 
authority would be circumscribed by the limits of their mission and by a desire not to 
invoke the intervention of the President, who would retain the authority to adjudicate 
managerial disputes.392   
2. Identify Violators Quickly and Reliably  
Absent a detailed assessment of the type of research and development that 
occurred at the CIA’s Climate Change Center, it is not possible to know how prepared 
personnel at the center might have been for the ICCME function.  Much of the reticence 
to divulge information regarding the center, like its ultimate closing, can be attributed to 
the criticism the CIA received from some conservative Congressmen regarding the 
existence of the center.  The type of information collected and distributed by the center 
was unlikely to be of particular sensitivity from a national security perspective.393  This 
type of information should be subject to Congressional review.  More insight into the 
now closed center’s level of preparedness for the ICCME function, if any, would permit a 
more nuanced discussion of Congress’ options in structuring the IC’s ICCME operations.   
Assuming the CIA’s Climate Change Center had attained some level of ICCME 
preparedness, one option would be to enlist at least a segment of the center’s former 
personnel to staff the hybrid ICCME. Having already considered the technical and 
administrative challenges of the ICCME task, these personnel would have likely 
developed insights into how the challenges to identifying treaty violations might best be 
accomplished.  Likewise, as these personnel are native to the CIA, they would come with 
foreknowledge regarding the means to enlisting IC resources from the CIA and possibly 
from other segments of the IC.   
3. Use all Available Means to Accomplish the Mission 
By creating a separate ICCME entity within an existing agency and vesting high 
level authority in its leader, the hybrid ICCME would ensure that experienced IC 
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personnel, with a degree of institutional affinity—if not loyalty—to the ICCME could 
rely on the authority of their director to secure needed resources for the mission.  Though 
the hybrid agency might meet with some passive resistance from within and some active 
resistance from without, it would also have considerable institutional knowledge of the 
IC and be able to anticipate hurdles before they were encountered.  Under the direction of 
a director with wide authority, the ICCME staff would have both the knowledge and the 
ability to achieve its mission. 
4. Adapt Quickly to a Non-Traditional Mission  
Although individual personnel within the IC may have already contemplated the 
ramifications of climate change for the country and the collaborative international role 
the IC might be required to play in order to confront this new situation, there is thus far 
no evidence these ideas have percolated to the IC leadership.  Congress, however, has the 
option of placing experienced IC personnel under the leadership of an individual with a 
strong grasp of the ICCME challenge.  There seems little option but to rely on the 
professionalism of many existing IC personnel to adapt to and to adopt the ICCME 
mission.  It would not be wise to instead bring personnel with climate expertise into the 
IC in sufficient numbers to staff the ICCME, and expect that they might integrate with 
existing personnel to the degree necessary to collaborate in the accomplishment of the 
ICCME mission.  Under the best of circumstances, the ICCME will place tremendous 
demands on its personnel and leadership, with one of the severest being the need to 
develop new ways of thinking about their mission. 
5. Respond to Identified Potential Violations  
As noted in the corresponding section of the mission manager option, the mission 
manager position will permit the ICCME optimal discretion and latitude in bringing 
identified potential violations to the ICELA and/or the GHGIS either directly or through 
some intermediary as determined by Congress.  
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6. Select Targets to Optimize Global CO2 Emissions Reduction  
While many political forces and the internal predilections of the IC may exert 
pressure on the mission manager, his or her public accountability to Congress would 
serve as a strong counterbalance.  Public accountability, in fact, would help to alleviate 
some of the countervailing pressures to achieving the ICCME mission in an unbiased 
way, since other political and bureaucratic actors will be aware of the constraints within 
which the director of the ICCME operates and be less tempted to divert the ICCME from 
its mission.   
7. Maintain Credibility  
As noted in the corresponding mission manager section above, in empowering a 
hybrid ICCME Congress would best ensure public credibility of the ICCME by granting 
its publicly accountable director wide powers to accomplish the ICCME mission.  A 
publicly accountable director would be obliged to ensure that the focus and findings of 
the ICCME are—to the extent possible—in line with the agency’s Congressionally 
defined objectives.   
As noted previously, in order to effectively collaborate with other agencies within 
the IC, it is essential that those agencies also consider the ICCME’s ability to protect 
“sources and methods.”  Here, the 2009 Congressional Research Service report on DOE 
counterintelligence reform is particularly germane.394  The report notes: 
Many critics blame DOE’s security problems generally on the tension 
within DOE between open scientific inquiry and security, they tend to 
focus on what they characterize as, inter alia, three specific issues: a high 
turn-over of inexperienced top leadership, bloated and dysfunctional 
management, and an agency culture that views the discipline of 
counterintelligence with disdain.395   
The ICCME will confront an analogous “tension” only whereas the DOE must 
promote open scientific inquiry within a secure environment, the ICCME must foster 
international trust while ensuring that sources and methods are not compromised.  The 
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mission manager/center hybrid ICCME structure would possibly confront turnover 
issues, initially, as more traditionally minded IC personnel chose other career paths, but 
its special focus would also attract mission enthusiasts whose expertise and specialization 
would increase over time.  While a certain level of technical expertise would be essential 
to accomplishing the mission, much of the hybrid ICCME’s top leadership could be 
selected from among a wide range of IC personnel, since the novelty of the mission 
would mean that all personnel would initially be mission “novices.”  As a “center” the 
hybrid would likely be less subject to bureaucratic “bloat,” particular if its relatively 
smaller staff was overseen by a publically visible and accountable leader with substantial 
authority to marshal IC resources in service of the ICCME’s narrow mission. 
8. Make Speedy Assessments  
Given that the ICCME is not yet established, the most feasible means of ensuring 
a future ICCME is able and willing to perform its function with the greatest possible 
efficiency and speed may be to transfer existing experienced IC personnel into an 
ICCME with a narrow objective and strong leadership.    
9. Quickly Establish the ICCME within the IC   
Assuming personnel from the CIA’s Climate Change Center were enlisted for the 
hybrid ICCME, this option would combine some expertise regarding the resources 
required and institutional knowledge of the IC with the authority needed to overcome 
bureaucratic impediments with the least possible delay. 
10. Collaborate Effectively with the GHGIS  
The potential benefits of vesting a high ranked federal official with the authority 
to share ICCME information with other agencies, whether domestic or international, was 
discussed in the previous “mission manager” section.  The hybrid option would preserve 
this benefit and extend it to the “center” personnel under the mission manager’s direction. 
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11. Assist in Developing a Treaty That Can Be Monitored Effectively  
As noted in the previous section on the “mission manager,” by entrusting a high 
ranking federal official with responsibly for narrowly defined ICCME objectives, 
Congress would help ensure these objectives receive undiluted advocacy during treaty 
negotiations. Assuming this “mission manager” likewise directed and could call upon the 
resources of an ICCME dedicated semi-autonomous division of an IC department, (i.e. a 
center) it would increase the likelihood that the mission manager’s advocacy was based, 
in fact, on the best available information.   
12. Determine the Optimal Use of Resources  
For the same reasons the hybrid ICCME option would be well suited to assisting 
in the drafting of an effective treaty, its structure would likewise promote the best use of 
the tools at its disposal.  The “center’s” focus would leave it less exposed to competing 
agendas, and its publicly visible and accountable director would have to be able to defend 
his or her policy decisions to well informed interest groups outside the IC. 
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X. FINDINGS  
The signatories to the Kyoto Protocol did not adopt any mechanism to verify 
treaty compliance.  International participants in any future CO2 emissions limitation 
treaty will almost certainly insist that monitoring be included as part of their agreement.  
The U.S. has already gone to great lengths to explore what such a monitoring regime 
might look like.  Though the intelligence collected by the U.S. IC has been instrumental 
in furthering the objectives of international weapons nonproliferation agreements like the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), there is currently no published discussion about how the 
IC might support a future international CO2 emissions limitation agreement or whether 
such support might in fact be needed or beneficial.   
By examining the technological challenge of monitoring international CO2 
emissions, this thesis highlights the many obstacles that an overt treaty monitoring 
regime will confront, and it demonstrates that covert intelligence could indeed assist in 
overcoming them.  Literature discussing the prospects for international cooperation on 
climate change invariably includes game theory prognoses, but this literature does not 
focus on the problem of treaty verification.  These mathematical models do, however, 
suggest that signatory confidence in the compliance of other treaty participants is an 
essential ingredient in achieving maximum treaty potential (i.e., the most sacrifice that 
each treaty participant is willing to endure).  Given the immense global challenge of 
overtly monitoring an international CO2 limitation agreement, the long delays before 
such a monitoring regime would be able to identify and confirm treaty violations, and the 
past success of the U.S. IC in identifying violations of international arms agreements like 
the NPT, it seems clear that by providing intelligence on concealed efforts to violate the 
agreement, the resources of the IC could likewise contribute to a climate change treaty’s 
success.    
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A. EQUITY: THE SINE QUA NON OF GLOBAL CLIMATE 
COOPERATION  
After establishing that covert intelligence could assist in achieving the goals of an 
international CO2 limitation agreement, the question remains as to how to organize the 
U.S. intelligence effort so as to help rather than hinder such an undertaking.  Here U.S. 
experience with the NPT—both in the NPT’s similarities to a future international CO2 
emissions limitation agreement and, in one fundamental difference—provides guidance.  
The difference between the two treaties is that only in the case of the NPT could 
international admonishments be supplemented with military and material threats to 
compel treaty compliance.  In the case of a future CO2 agreement, signatories will be 
held to their commitments primarily by their desire to achieve the treaty ends and to 
preserve their international honor.   
It is likely that national leaders will only be able to uphold their treaty obligations 
so long as their nation’s citizens perceive those commitments as worthwhile and fair.  By 
considering how the domestic politics of climate change will constrain the options 
available to national leaders, this thesis highlights the importance of ensuring the 
perception of “equity” in pursuing treaty objectives.  In employing intelligence to support 
treaty monitoring, the central problem will be one of legitimacy.  If the international 
community considers U.S. intelligence to be accurate and unbiased, then that intelligence 
would retain the power to focus international condemnation on any potential treaty 
violator.  Should that intelligence provoke international distrust, however, then it would 
poison any part of the treaty or treaty monitoring it touches.   
The international trust and cooperation needed to achieve meaningful CO2 
emissions reductions will be contingent on overcoming divisions both within and among 
nations.  If the U.S. IC is perceived as pursuing the parochial interests of the U.S. or its 
allies, rather than ensuring that all international CO2 limitation treaty provisions are 
being respected, recriminations regarding the equitable division of the sacrifices needed 
to reduce global CO2 emissions could easily come to dominate the international 
discourse.  Historically, all sovereign nations have empowered their intelligence agencies 
to protect their own strictly national objectives.  Though it is easy to make the argument 
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that global compliance with the provisions of an international CO2 limitations agreement 
would be a superordinate U.S. objective, such a proposition could easily lead to 
counterintuitive conclusions.  For instance, domestic U.S. violations of the treaty could 
undermine international cooperation and cause the international CO2 limitation regime to 
falter or collapse.  It would follow that the U.S. IC entity charged with treaty compliance 
monitoring would want to expose any such U.S. violation.  Legal provisions preclude IC 
surveillance of American citizens domestically, the question remains, however, as to 
whether IC personnel would be inclined to divulge the covertly identified treaty 
violations of U.S. citizens—should those violations be committed by an American owned 
subsidiary abroad.  This extreme but conceivable possibility serves to highlight the 
complexity of the problem posed by enlisting the IC into such a fragile international 
diplomatic ecosystem. 
As described in the section on public opinion, the public’s preoccupation with 
equity may well prove a more potent behavioral motivator than even considerations of 
self-preservation. In this diplomatic setting, the precision of treaty monitoring efforts, 
especially covertly collected intelligence, will assume less importance than the global 
perception that the monitoring is being conducted fairly.   
B. THE IC MUST COLLABORATE WITH AN INTERNATIONALLY 
RECOGNIZED ADMINISTRATIVE BODY  
A consideration of China’s perspective regarding the NPT and the provisions for 
monitoring various international arms control agreements should forewarn us about the 
limits of unilateral U.S. admonishments in achieving a reduction in international CO2 
emissions. By excluding itself from the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. forewent any moral 
authority on the climate change issue.  Furthermore, by excusing itself from that 
international agreement in a markedly contentious manner, it fueled a perception that the 
U.S. itself assumed no special responsibility for the state of the atmosphere to which it 
had already contributed a disproportionate amount of anthropogenic CO2.  The U.S. 
government fostered a perception that the U.S. was eager to sacrifice economic progress 
in poorer countries, rather than endure any cost at home.  Finally, by using international 
fora to raise the issue of climate change as an international security concern (i.e., in 
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which populations most vulnerable to the effects of climate change would threaten the 
more fortunate), the U.S. offended the sensibilities of certain international 
representatives.  Representatives of some developing countries considered the U.S. 
position callous and claimed that Americans were in effect insinuating that these poorer 
countries were more a threat to be feared than they were partners in solving the climate 
change problem. 
In this international context, the U.S. IC will fail in its mission to ensure national 
security if it becomes the focus of more controversy.  In this uniquely important instance, 
the IC will need to present itself as the champion of unbiased treaty administration.  The 
IC can only do so if it is seen to support rather than to preempt international monitoring 
efforts.  Such a collaborative effort would require a transparent relationship between the 
IC entity entrusted with the covert monitoring task (ICCME) and the overt international 
treaty monitoring regime (GHGIS).  The international community would be unwise to 
reject U.S. covert support, given that U.S. technological and intelligence resources could 
significantly augment the capacity of the international monitoring regime.  Nonetheless, 
to enjoy international legitimacy, that support would have to be offered under conditions 
amenable to both the U.S. and a representative majority of other treaty signatories.   
The challenge to employing the IC to support the international monitoring regime 
will then be to ensure that the intelligence collected reflects the truth and does so in a way 
that does not appear to disadvantage any single treaty signatory or block of treaty 
signatories.  Should the U.S. endeavor to unilaterally condemn alleged treaty violations, 
there is little chance that U.S. accusations will receive global backing or 
acknowledgement.  U.S. intelligence will have to be mediated by an internationally 
recognized institution.  Any such international institution will be unwilling to endorse 
intelligence findings if there is any question regarding the accuracy of the information 
being shared by the IC or of bias in the manner in which the IC selects its targets.   
C. IC MONITORING MUST BE ADAPTIVE  
The non-linear progression of climate change and the vagaries of public 
understanding and interest in the issue do not foster broad windows of political 
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opportunity, nor lend themselves to the building of stable international coalitions. 
Because climate change presents such complexity, covert monitoring of an international 
CO2 emissions limitation agreement must itself be approached differently than 
conventional national security objectives.  Overt or covert, the monitoring regime cannot 
be viewed as external or ancillary to the efforts to reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions.  
For better or for worse, these efforts will become part of the international discourse 
involving climate change.  Hans Blix and the IAEA became recognized international 
names during the lead up to the Iraq War.  In the effort to forestall climate change, 
whatever monitoring regime emerges will doubtless achieve even greater notoriety.  In a 
very real sense, treaty monitoring efforts will become part of the discussion—and more 
likely the debate—regarding the equitable administration of the treaty provisions.  Like 
climate change itself, the global effort to mitigate the phenomenon will present its own 
complex system.  The goal, given the complexity and contentiousness of anthropogenic 
climate change, will be to build a treaty regime that is not only complex, but also 
adaptive in that its own behavior encourages and incentivizes greater treaty participation 
and compliance. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge in designing such an IC treaty monitoring entity is 
the need to remain responsive to legitimate concerns whether be they from within the 
U.S., from the international monitoring regime, or from the international community 
more generally.  In fact, only through attention to domestic and international concerns 
regarding equitable treaty administration will Congress ensure that the IC monitoring 
entity can support and augment the international monitoring effort’s broader adaptive 
capacity.   
D. IC MONITORING MUST BE TRANSPARENT  
As described in Chapter IV, the public’s preoccupation with equity may well 
prove an even more potent behavioral motivator than considerations of self-preservation. 
In this diplomatic setting, the precision of treaty monitoring efforts, especially covertly 
collected intelligence, will assume less importance than the global perception that the 
monitoring is being conducted fairly.   
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Critics have long complained about the IC’s insular and rigid operations.  As 
explored in the section on legislative oversight of intelligence activities, much of this 
rigidity is the possibly unavoidable byproduct of the IC’s widely acknowledged need to 
protect its methods and sources.  The IC can often evade reform by concealing its 
weaknesses behind a cloak of secrecy; however, the “license” often allowed to the IC is 
likewise the source of its frequent failures.  U.S. Presidents of both parties have often 
demonstrated an inclination to trade long-term national nonproliferation goals for short-
term political expediency. The stakes in the case of climate change are too great, and the 
potential climate damage too irreversible for Congress to leave IC treaty monitoring 
operations to the IC’s or even to the President’s discretion.  To remain responsive to 
criticism and adaptive to the changing treaty environment, the IC monitoring entity will 
need to operate with a high degree of independence within the IC and to issue its findings 
without the possibility of censorship.   
Establishing and maintaining this perception will only be accomplished by 
exposing the U.S.’s covert monitoring regime to a high degree of public scrutiny.  This 
apparent paradox need not deter Congress.  IC operations are frequently investigated by 
Congress in a manner that ensures public accountability and that protects sources and 
methods.  By creating a rigorous and publicly visible congressional oversight regime that 
narrowly focuses on the IC’s international CO2 emissions limitation treaty function, 
Congress can shape an IC entity that will bear domestic and international scrutiny and be 
able to offer crucial support to international climate change mitigation efforts.  Should the 
IC’s monitoring regime be sheltered from public accountability, it will invite suspicions 
and remain heedless of the corrosive effects these suspicions will have on international 
treaty cohesion.    
1. The Challenge and the Opportunity  
In the section “Legislative Oversight,” this thesis described the “fire alarm” 
mechanism that ensures that the majority of the federal bureaucracies remain responsive 
to the interest groups most affected by their operations.  Though this “adaptive” 
mechanism does not traditionally operate within the IC, which is forced to reform only 
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when its unwelcome behaviors become so routinized that they burst into the national 
spotlight, nothing prohibits the legislature from exposing a designated segment of the IC 
to the redemptive power of the “fire alarm” through the institution of more pervasive 
oversight and more routine and structured accountability to Congress.  
Unlike other federal bureaucracies, agencies within the IC typically have little in 
the way of natural constituencies outside the executive branch itself.  Generally, the only 
non-governmental entities with which the IC engages are its own vendors and 
subcontractors who must also conduct their business in secrecy.  There exist already, 
however, influential and vocal public groups who focus significant attention on both 
sides of the climate change “controversy.” As noted in the section on “Public Opinion,” 
by successfully hectoring the current administration into closing the CIA Climate Change 
Center, opponents of climate change have demonstrated the power of the “fire alarm” 
mechanism to exert influence on IC initiatives—albeit with unfortunate consequences for 
responsible climate change mitigation efforts.   
The bureaucratic design theory discussed at the beginning of this thesis 
highlighted the ways in which interest groups can advance their objectives by 
concentrating the weight of their collective influence on individual legislators who will 
support their cause in return for political support.  Although interested groups on the 
opposite side of the climate change ledger chose not to counter the CIA Climate Center’s 
opponents, there is no reason why they could not.  Although there is no precedent for 
environmental activists enlisting the support of the IC through pressure on Congress, as 
the climate change issue continues to gain prominence and traditional battle lines begin to 
blur, wise activists will certainly recognize the potential power of an ally like the IC.  
Conceding victory to the opponents of climate change mitigation on such an important 
symbolic and practical point as the Climate Change Center was an unfortunate, but not 
irreversible, oversight. 
Ultimately, Congress can exercise authority in determining how IC resources will 
be employed to ensure appropriate treaty monitoring.  Based on the foregoing research, 
this thesis identifies the most essential goals for any IC entity entrusted with the 
monitoring responsibility, and examines four options for structuring this entity.   
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The monitoring mission will be unique in many respects, and these distinctions 
will have several important institutional ramifications.  IC institutional inertia will make 
it difficult to initiate and sustain IC monitoring which will require new competencies and 
a novel cooperative ethos.  The mission can only be successful if it is conducted with a 
high degree of transparency. The mission will require a close cooperative and highly 
visible relationship with the representatives of an international treaty regime.  These 
requirements are likely to elicit objections from the IC and others within the executive 
branch who will argue that these requirements are incompatible with the IC’s need for 
secrecy.  IC concerns should not be dismissed, but they should be evaluated in light of the 
unlikelihood that this unique monitoring mission will provoke counterintelligence efforts 
on the part of other countries.  Furthermore, while some conventional intelligence sources 
and methods may be employed to achieve the treaty monitoring objectives, these need not 
risk compromise so long as intelligence sharing is conducted through a discrete number 
of high level channels.  Importantly, transparency regarding the monitoring mission will 
encourage those personnel managing the covert monitoring to adjust their activities to 
address or alleviate concerns that might otherwise be used by treaty violators, who might 
seek to “blame the messenger.” 
2. The Best Option  
While this thesis identifies 11 specific goals for a theoretical IC treaty monitoring 
entity, these goals consist primarily of institutional challenges which this entity must 
overcome.  The goals are neither ranked nor weighted since, as revealed in the preceding 
analysis, the attainment of all other objectives depends on transparency.  The imperative 
for transparency in the IC’s treaty monitoring endeavor transcends all other needs.  
Should the IC’s efforts undermine confidence in the treaty, the IC will have obviated its 
own practical contributions and nullified any potential benefit of U.S. treaty monitoring.   
Of the four options discussed for organizing the IC to monitor any future treaty, 
the hybrid option clearly suggests itself as the best and likely only means of achieving the 
required transparency.  Should the IC monitoring mission simply be entrusted to an 
existing agency within the IC, Congress will forego the ability to provide the sustained 
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and meaningful direction needed to overcome the IC’s institutional aversion to outside 
scrutiny. While such an approach will provide the IC flexibility in identifying treaty 
violators, this very flexibility would result in a business as usual approach to a problem 
which requires, in fact, a transparent structured process that can endure and bend to 
criticism from domestic and international treaty supporters and opponents.   
As has already been seen in criticism leveled against the CIA’s now defunct 
Climate Change Center, the center concept alone—simply creating an entity within the 
IC with no special statutorily established requirements beyond those of any other IC 
entity—will not endow the monitoring entity with the transparency needed to ensure its 
responsiveness to legitimate domestic and international concerns.  The prospect for a 
climate change “center” within the IC—absent a high degree of statutorily established 
autonomy and authority within the IC and clear requirements that would expose the 
center to outside scrutiny—is to excite suspicion and resentment among those countries 
that the center might identify as having committed treaty violations. In releasing 
information about possible violations, such a center would likely exacerbate international 
concerns about the equitable administration of the treaty provisions, undermining U.S. 
and international resolve and doing little to remediate violators, who could persuasively 
accuse the U.S. of bias.  U.S. administrations would be inclined to employ intelligence 
regarding treaty violators inconsistently, and, as frequently seen with intelligence 
gathered on nonproliferation, center reports regarding treaty violations would likely be 
released through channels over which presidential administrations could in fact exercise 
imperfect control.  
Far more promising than the preceding two options for how to best structure the 
ICCME is that of Congress statutorily empowering an executive position within the IC 
with Cabinet level authority to marshal IC resources to engage in the monitoring 
function.  Such a position would entail a high degree of public visibility and concomitant 
accountability.  By statutorily establishing goals for this position consistent with 
international collaboration and legitimacy (e.g., coordination of monitoring activities with 
an international treaty monitoring regime), Congress would go far to enhance the 
adaptive ability of all monitoring efforts generally and the adaptive capacity of the treaty 
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itself.  Treaty violators would discover that any objection they might raise about unfair 
treaty administration could effectively be countered through an internationally supported 
process in which the participation of U.S. intelligence would be understood and 
embraced.  The full weight of international condemnation could quickly be brought to 
bear on any treaty violator, with the likely result that such violations would in fact be 
rare. 
Ultimately, however, such a statutorily established executive position, regardless 
of the authority wielded by the particular office holder, would run headlong into the 
resistance of other intelligence “players” with whom he or she would compete for 
resources.  Unless this highly placed executive commanded a core group of dedicated 
intelligence professionals, whose loyalty to the extraordinary climate change mission was 
not divided with other intelligence objectives, the mission would suffer from a lack of 
institutional continuity and determination.  Because collegial and effective collaboration 
with the international GHGIS treaty monitoring regime will be so important, the IC 
monitoring effort must be led by individuals who recognize the need to protect their 
sources and methods, while integrating their work with that of their international partners.   
The IC monitoring effort will be most effective the more narrowly its mission is 
defined.  A broad agenda would complicate not only the monitoring task b7 encroaching 
on the work of other IC agencies, eliciting greater concerns within the national security 
establishment, and multiplying opportunities for public controversy, it would also muddle 
the evaluation criteria applied by Congress’ when considering the monitoring function.  
Given the institutional experience of the CIA’s Climate Change Center, it seems likely 
the CIA could quickly assemble a group of intelligence experts to effectively assist a 
highly placed executive vested with the authority to establish a credible IC entity to 
monitor an international CO2 emissions limitation agreement.  Of the four options 
considered for structuring the ICCME, then, this “hybrid” monitoring agency, combining 
the institutional resources of a center well integrated in the larger IC with the authority of 
high ranking executive leadership, offers the country and the world the best hope for a 
constructive IC contribution to the global objective of climate change mitigation. 
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XI. CONCLUSION  
A. CLIMATE CHANGE AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
While this research was undertaken in order to determine the utility of applying 
IC resources to the climate change mitigation effort, the thesis itself is a homeland 
security product.  IC sources and methods are optimally employed to answer narrow 
questions in order to inform decisions about national security policy issues.  Homeland 
security was instituted to reconstitute the wider significance of disparate pieces of 
information in order to devise integrated responses to threats to the nation.  No single 
other U.S. institution is better suited to addressing the complex global threat of climate 
change. 
B. NO TIME TO WASTE  
Each day that passes without meaningful reductions in anthropogenic CO2 
emissions portends greater challenges for those currently entrusted with the nation’s 
national security and greater challenges still for those who follow.  Mitigating the damage 
should be the first order of business.  
Traditional security concerns will compel the national security establishment to 
consider the problem of climate change from a traditional national security perspective, 
initially.  Many within the national security bureaucracy have focused on the secondary 
effects of climate change (e.g., how floods, desertification, and crop failures will lead to 
global conflict).  Studying these contingencies is essential, but the national security focus 
should not exclude a more comprehensive approach to the issue.  The research for this 
thesis uncovered countless national security works and references that focus on the need 
for increased awareness of climate change.  For national security and international affairs 
experts who recognize the reality of anthropogenic climate change, the prospect for 
increased competition for limited resources is obvious.  Absent from these studies, 
however, is an explicit reminder of the pre-emptive climate option.   
Much of the damage done to the atmosphere is, as the current jargon describes it, 
“locked in.”  The atmosphere is nearly one degree Celsius warmer now than it was a 
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century ago.  That is a significant change with devastating consequences—most still to be 
felt.  Humanity is not yet, however, condemned to the worst that increasing greenhouse 
gas concentrations can do.  Unless humanity undertakes a global effort to substantially 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the American Meteorological Society estimates that 
mean surface temperature will increase from between 3.5 and 7.4 degrees Celsius by the 
end of this century. 396  
Instituted in large part to overcome “failures of imagination,” among U.S. 
national security and other federal bureaucracies, homeland security has found itself 
bringing up the rear on the issue of climate change.  Fortunately in June of 2012, the 
Department of Homeland Security published a plan to “begin to understand the potential 
impacts of climate change across all of our homeland security missions.”397 Nonetheless, 
efforts to mitigate the human causes of climate change should also be considered by the 
homeland security enterprise.  Mitigation strategies require their own focus and, need not 
await further evaluation of the clearly detrimental effects of unabated CO2 emissions.   
C. THE NEED FOR COMMUNICATORS 
Scientists have provided society with knowledge about climate change, but the 
interests of scientific integrity have hindered most experts from effectively articulating 
the urgency of the situation.  In fact, the scientific community has frequently been blamed 
for failing to communicate this prosaic atmospheric process in a way that would 
overcome a collective reluctance to acknowledge the bad news.  Many of the politicians 
that have attempted to take up the cause are, as a result, no longer in office.398   As 
challenging as risk communication is under normal circumstances, the complexity and 
extended time horizon of climate change make it vastly more so.399   
Once there was no single institution vested with the responsibility of explaining to 
the American people how Islamic extremists in distant lands posed a threat to us here at 
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home.  That institution has been established.  Homeland security filled a void by uniting 
and nurturing multi-disciplinary expertise in order to protect and prepare the nation for 
threats that were as real as they were unprecedented.  Homeland security practitioners 
may feel uncomfortable assuming a role that seems, perhaps, far afield from their area of 
expertise.  But it is in fact homeland security practitioners who can best assess the human 
costs of the geophysical processes that confront the nation.  No one else has more 
experience in grappling with the difficulties of communicating risk to the public.  It is 
that communication expertise that is most needed now. 
D. THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL DECOMPARTMENTALIZATION 
The notion that homeland security should play some role in mitigating climate 
change will one day seem as natural as it might seem counterintuitive today.  This 
forecast is not difficult to make because the underlying processes generating modern 
terrorism and future climate disasters are interwoven.  Greater efficiencies allow greater 
numbers of people to exploit more technological and natural resources—often in places 
that were once inaccessible to them.  The vulnerability of societies to transnational self-
organizing criticality is only recognized when the damage has already begun to manifest.  
There is an ongoing need for an institution with the human resources to identify and warn 
us about threats before it is too late.  This institution must be able to encourage the 
decompartmentalization of other governmental, educational, and private institutions; 
draw on their most talented, dynamic, and imaginative individuals; and unite them in 
devising comprehensive responses to threats as they emerge.  There will be an ongoing 
need for specialization, but the specialization of today may be inappropriate for the 
urgencies of tomorrow.  A government institution built to recognize these emerging 
imperatives and endowed with the skills to overcome institutional barriers to timely 
adjustments will serve the nation well.  
Historically the Intelligence Community has operated at a distance from U.S. 
public institutions.  New threats have demonstrated the need for a continuum between 
foreign intelligence and domestic security.  Homeland security has occupied this space.  
The transition is ongoing, and while many may lament this conflation of covert and overt 
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security roles, nothing suggests that the former differentiation should or could be re-
instituted.  The controversy over new security measures has become a feature of U.S. 
national political life, and homeland security will continue to be involved in determining 
how best to achieve both liberty and security.   
E. BUILDING GLOBAL TRUST AND UNITING THE FRONT AGAINST 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
To the question as to whether the U.S. national security establishment has 
anything to offer in solving a problem that can only be remedied through global reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions, the answer is a cautious “yes.”  Early into the research for 
this thesis, it became clear that the question was, in fact, academic and that the U.S. IC 
would necessarily be involved in monitoring any future agreement.  The ramifications of 
climate change are too broad for the IC to ignore them.  The focus of this research then 
turned to the question as to whether the IC’s assistance in meeting the climate change 
challenge could be managed so as to avoid undermining cooperative global effort the 
problem demands. 
In the past, the U.S. Intelligence Community has both sustained and shaken global 
confidence in the viability of the NPT.  More than once, the IC ensured that countries 
could not easily hide their attempts at treaty violation, while on other occasions covert 
U.S. operations threw into question the legitimacy of the IAEA, the treaty’s official 
monitoring agent, and by extension the very treaty itself.  This latter aspect of NPT 
history must not be repeated should the U.S. engage in monitoring a future Kyoto-like 
treaty.  Overcoming climate change is a massive global undertaking that can only be 
accomplished in an atmosphere of trust.  The IC should not be expected loosen its grip on 
secrecy willingly.  Leaving the IC to its own devices in monitoring the compliance of 
other greenhouse gas limitation treaty signatories will inflame international suspicions.  
Properly orchestrated under strict Congressional oversight, however, the IC’s monitoring 
efforts could instead contribute substantially to the international trust on which the 
treaty’s success will depend.   
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States that operate under the consent of the governed earn their legitimacy 
through the protection of their citizens from dangers both obvious and occult.  In his book 
Terror and Consent, Philip Bobbitt notes, “In the twenty-first century, the fundamental 
problem for states of consent must confront the challenges of terror will be to achieve 
public endorsement and official accountability in the face of largely hypothetical threats 
that require anticipatory action based on secret intelligence.”400  Though offered in the 
context of terrorism, the challenge Bobbitt describes could just as well be that posed by 
the covert monitoring of a future international CO2 emissions limitation agreement.  U.S. 
citizens and the global public will want assurance that the treaty is being respected by 
signatories, but they will only be assured if they believe that treaty monitors, whether 
covert or overt, are themselves being held to a high standard of accountability. Within the 
U.S. and without, the expanding role of national security institutions in public life will 
prove corrosive to the state’s legitimacy unless effective mechanisms are instituted to 
reassure the public that their rights and interests are being protected. 
Maintaining public trust while ensuring security already represents a challenge in 
which homeland security is most experienced, if not yet most expert.  At the confluence 
of these two objectives sits contemporary risk communication.  This is where U.S. 
government institutions have been most deficient in dealing with climate change, and 
where homeland security should actively make a contribution, rather than limiting itself 
to the sad task of managing avoidable climatic destruction.  
The media frequently communicates too simplistic, and ultimately overly 
optimistic, view of climate change as some sort of linear phenomenon where “winners” 
and “losers” will be determined according to how the changing climate modifies the local 
weather.  This view is dangerous.  The atmosphere is by far mankind’s most critical node 
in that it is ultimately linked to all human operations.  One characteristic of any highly 
complex networks is that the ramifications of any single failure can be felt throughout the 
network in unpredictable ways.  “Cascades failures” in myriad human networks will be 
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provoked by any analogous abrupt changes in the climate.401  Homeland security 
entrepreneurs are uniquely qualified to understand the vulnerabilities of all networks.  
Homeland security entrepreneurs must remain keenly aware of both obvious and occult 
interconnections. They should consider rectifying the widespread “linear” climate 
misconception to be among the homeland security enterprise’s most solemn 
responsibilities.   
F. NATIONAL SECURITY’S ENGAGEMENT WITH CLIMATE CHANGE 
This thesis also considered whether there were operational contributions that the 
national security establishment could bring to climate change mitigation.  The answer in 
this case is an unqualified “yes.”  The difficulties inherent in overt global CO2 
monitoring cannot be underestimated.  To the extent that the IC can peer behind the 
curtain of other treaty signatories’ intentions, it can provide the international monitoring 
regime with valuable assistance that can help accelerate the slow process of identifying 
treaty violations.  As noted previously, the IC could help encourage greenhouse gas 
whistleblowers by providing a secure means of confidential international reporting.  In 
addition, adapting new technologies to the task of covert CO2 monitoring is yet another 
area worthy of IC attention. 
The research for this thesis visited several important matters that merit the 
attention of both scholars and policymakers.  The Intelligence Community’s governance 
structure during a time of rapid global transformation, the support of U.S. intelligence for 
international peacetime initiatives, and the role of the U.S. security establishment in 
fostering broad international cooperative efforts, are each in need of continued focused 
study.  These operational areas have been well traveled, but the rapid evolution in the 
threats and opportunities confronted by the nation state requires a new integrative 
approach to U.S. national security.   
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G. PURSUING A WIDER ROLE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
If homeland security is to be more than the sum of its parts and something other 
than a reactive conglomerate, it must prove its ability to do something homeland 
security’s constituent institutions cannot achieve independently.  The effort to mitigate 
climate change is unexplored territory, but the research for this thesis suggests possible 
areas for further study.  Both the JASON and GHGIS papers discussed earlier in this 
thesis include CO2 measurement options that could well involve agencies currently under 
the Department of Homeland Security.  Air samples could be collected by inbound 
aircraft originating in the target country.  The Seuss effect (differential concentrations of 
residual carbon 14 from atmospheric nuclear tests of the 1960s) could be exploited to 
analyze imported produce of known provenance to measure fossil fuel combustion in 
distant lands.  It would certainly bespeak the interconnectedness of the globe and break 
many conceptual molds if specially trained Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents at 
U.S. ports of entry ended up discretely furnishing international atmospheric information 
to an international CO2 limitation agreement monitoring regime.   
Several national bureaucracies have published joint studies focusing on the likely 
effects of unbridled climate change.402 Established by Congress in 1990 to provide a 
“comprehensive and integrated United States research program which will assist the 
Nation and the world to understand, assess, predict and respond to human-induced and 
natural processes of global change,” the United State Global Change Research Program 
(U.S.GCRP) unites 13 different U.S. departments and agencies, among them the U.S. 
Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, Energy, Agriculture, and Transportation.403  
Given the implications of climate change for the U.S., the absence of the Department of 
Homeland Security from this group is remarkable and in need of rectification.   
                                                 
402 Backlund, Janetos, and Schimel, The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture; USGRP, The U.S. 
Climate Change Science Program. 
403 United States Global Change Research Program “Global Change Research Program” United States 
Global Change Research Program, accessed January 16, 2013, http://www.globalchange.gov/.  
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H. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: THE OPEN ROAD AHEAD 
Any attempt to design a bureaucratic structure to confront a problem with the 
dynamic complexities of human response to environmental disaster is destined to fall 
short in at least one way, and perhaps many.  Climate change policies, however, should 
not be held to a binary standard of failure or success.  There should be little doubt that, if 
followed, the recommendations offered within this thesis will frequently prompt their 
own revisions.  Frequent adjustments should be considered their strength and not their 
failing.  Climate change and its attendant human suffering imply a constantly evolving 
ecological and political landscape.  A successful treaty monitoring regime will be one 
that encourages treaty compliance by fortifying global confidence in the treaty’s 
equitable and effective administration.  To do so, any monitoring regime must not shun 
scrutiny, but instead demonstrate its own adaptive resilience to treaty opposition.   
In their paper A National Security Narrative, published by the Woodrow Wilson 
Center in 2011, Captain Wayne Porter and Colonel Mark Mykleby suggested that in 
conceptualizing the evolving national security challenge as a closed system, the U.S. 
would ultimately find itself unable to adapt to an environment that will change regardless 
of American resistance.404  The authors recommended instead a strategy that will allow 
the nation to recognize and capitalize on opportunities.405  Such a strategy requires the 
foresight to abandon rigidity and embrace flexibility.  To the extent that the 
recommendations offered in this thesis reflect that counsel, they have hit their mark.   
                                                 
404 Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby, “A National Security Narrative,” 2011, Woodrow Wilson 
Center, accessed December 15, 2011, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/A%20National%20Strategic%20Narrative.pdf. 
405 Ibid. 
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